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Guide to the resource
This resource provides a comprehensive introduction to the subject of co-operatives and employee 
ownership.Itisdesignedforuseinuniversitieswithdueregardforbestpracticeinflexible
delivery, blended learning, and curricula innovation.
•  Chapters 1, 2, 3, and 4 cover the essential elements of a co-operative enterprise; chapters 5  
and 6 do the same for employee ownership.
•  Chapters 7 and 8 provide a more in-depth analysis of employee-owned businesses, addressing 
the arguments for and against employee ownership, and the lifecycle of these enterprises.
•  Chapter 9 examines the international context in which democratic models of enterprise operate.
To obtain maximum value from the learning experience associated with this resource, instructors 
andstudentsareencouragedtousethespecificallydevelopedvirtuallearningenvironment(VLE)
at http://cets.coop/moodle. A range of learning and teaching materials are provided, including:
For instructors:
• Seminar exercises
•  Instructor’s manual containing detailed notes on learning outcomes, key arguments,  
sample essay questions and useful resources
• Sample lecture slides
For students:
• Additional case studies
• Journal articles
• Key reports
• Links to relevant websites
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Preface
‘The Business School ... with its glass atrium and brochure that implies a ticket to the  
plush business lounge ... aims itself at the global managerial class. It does not, by and large,  
sell its wares to voluntary organisations, co-operatives or trade unions, and its relationship with 
the public sector is uneasy.’
HarshwordsfromMartinParker(WarwickBusinessSchool)intheaftermathofthe2008financial
meltdown, but ones which struck a chord with many, especially those who had not attended 
business school and had no ‘golden parachutes’ to soften their economic descent.
As someone who had worked in co-operative and employee ownership development for over two 
decades, I found Parker’s statement had a certain resonance. It had become increasingly obvious  
to me that it was the norm for graduates, even after many years of education, perhaps culminating 
in an MBA, to have only minimal knowledge and understanding in this area of business studies. 
The prevailing neo-liberal free market orthodoxy had strangled any consideration of alternatives, 
such as those offered by the co-operative sector. Hugely discouraging from an educational point  
of view, but then if you don’t teach the subject you can’t expect students to learn! There is also  
the irony, or should that be hypocrisy, that the entire free market orthodoxy is premised on  
the existence of rational economic man making free choices based on perfect information.  
Without information on co-operative business structures, how do you make that rational choice?
We hope that this publication will be a step towards ensuring that more of our citizens are offered 
more choices when it comes to organising enterprises and ordering society. It might not generate 
one hundred per cent take up of co-operative options but given the level of dissatisfaction and 
disaffection with the current system, it might just be the alternative that many seek. Maybe it  
is time to re-invent the co-operative.
Hugh Donnelly 
Managing Director 
Co-operative Education Trust Scotland
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Introduction
On 9 August 2007, French investment bank BNP Paribas announced that it would not allow 
customers to withdraw capital from two of the company’s funds, owing to a ‘complete evaporation 
ofliquidity’inthefinancialmarkets.1Sobeganthefinancialcrisisknownasthecreditcrunch,
which continues to impact upon the global economy in 2012. The effects of BNP Paribas’s 
announcement were felt around the world: central banks moved rapidly to shore up insolvent 
governments,governmentsfranticallypumpedtaxpayers’moneyintoinsolventfinancial
institutions,whilebanksandotherfinancialinstitutionsdesperatelytriedtomeetthestringent
criteria of rating agencies in order to retain the low rate at which they could borrow money  
as a means of staving off insolvency.
The15September2008becameadefiningdateinthedevelopmentoftheglobalfinancialcrisis.
Lehman Brothers, one of the largest investment banks in the world with over $600 billion in  
assets,filedforchapter11bankruptcyintheUScourts.2 Established in 1844 as a dry-goods store, 
the company had prospered for 164 years before succumbing to the ills arising from excessive 
risk-takinginthefinancialsector.Ayearearlier,NorthernRock,aformermutualorganisationthat
converted to investor ownership, requested and was granted emergency funds from the Bank of 
England, a move that precipitated a run on the bank’s deposits by worried customers. Whilst the 
financialcrisisclaimedcompaniesonanalmostweeklybasis,anothersectoroftheeconomywent
about its business in a sustainable manner, unfettered by reckless lending and unethical behaviour. 
Thissectorisdrivennotbyprofit-maximisinginvestor-ownedbusinesses,butratherbymodelsof
enterprise founded on a different set of principles. In 2008, a UK co-operative business celebrated 
its 164thanniversarybypostingrecordrevenueandprofitfigures,allachievedagainstabackdrop
of economic uncertainty. In Spain, an organisation representing over eighty thousand workers 
continued to expand and develop an experiment in industrial democracy which began more than 
fiftyyearsago.IntheUS,collectively-ownedutilitybusinessescontinuedtoprovideenergyservices
for over forty million people in rural areas. And thousands of businesses across the globe decided  
tosharethewealththeygeneratedwiththeiremployeesduringatimewhenfinancialuncertainty
and income disparity reached unprecedented levels.
Organisations within the co-operative sector operate under the radar of mainstream economics 
and education, yet they have survived and even performed better than investor-owned enterprises 
during the most turbulent social and economic periods of the past two hundred years. This book 
sets out to dispel confusion and misinformation about these businesses. By improving knowledge 
and understanding of co-operatives we can begin a process of spreading wealth more equitably 
throughout society.
1.  ‘Timeline: Credit crunch to downturn’ BBC News 7 August 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7521250.stm, accessed  
3 September 2011.
2.  S. Mamudi, ‘Lehman folds with record $613 billion debt’ MarketWatch 15 September 2008. http://www.marketwatch.com/story/
lehman-folds-with-record-613-billion-debt?siteid=rss, accessed 3 September 2011.
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The ethical alternative:
co-operative values and principles
‘Founded on the principles of private 
initiative, entrepreneurship and self-
employment, underpinned by the 
values of democracy, equality and 
solidarity, the co-operative movement 
can help pave the way to a more just 
and inclusive economic order.’
KofiAnnan
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1. The ethical alternative:  
co-operative values and  
principles
Learning objectives
This chapter introduces the co-operative model of enterprise by explaining the internationally 
recognised values and principles that underpin it. These values and principles are integral to the 
identity of co-operatives and provide them with an inherent advantage over other forms of business 
organisation. By the end of this chapter you will be able to:
•  evaluate the relevance of the co-operative values and principles to business and society in the 
twenty-firstcentury;
• analyse the effects of the principles on the operation of co-operative enterprises;
• discuss the concept of a co-operative advantage and ways in which it can be utilised.
The key arguments that will be developed in this chapter are:
The co-operative values and principles are as relevant to business and society in the twenty-
firstcenturyastheywerewhentheywerefirstdevisedover150yearsago.
The values and principles can be used to distinguish co-operative businesses from other 
models of enterprise.
The co-operative advantage provides the potential for co-operatives to sustain a competitive 
edge over traditional forms of enterprise.
Introduction
A co-operative is a business. It resembles any other business in the sense that it trades in  
themarketandusesthefactorsofproduction(land,labour,andcapital)inordertoproduce 
goods or services. What makes the co-operative business model unique? To the casual observer, 
there may seem to be little difference between a co-operative food retailer and an investor-owned 
food retailer. This is because both retailers will have very similar operations, processes, stock, 
supply chains, and pricing. Co-operatives differentiate themselves primarily through their values 
and principles.
Tocelebrateitscentennialyearin1995,theInternationalCo-operativeAlliance(ICA)adopted 
thefollowingdefinitionofaco-operativeinitsStatementontheCo-operativeIdentity:
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A co-operative is an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their 
common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and 
democratically-controlled enterprise.1
Values
TheOxfordEnglishDictionarydefinesvaluesas‘principlesorstandardsofbehaviour; 
one’s judgement of what is important in life’. Co-operatives are based on the following values:
• self-help
• self-responsibility
• democracy
• equality
• equity
• solidarity
In the tradition of the earliest co-operative founders, co-operative members today believe  
in the practice of honesty, openness, social responsibility and caring for others.2
In a general way this is comparable to the situation in the corporate world where many companies 
aspire to abide by a set of values that relate to the company’s priorities. A company will refer to 
its set of values in mission statements, marketing, and policies for corporate social responsibility 
(CSR)whichmaybefoundonthecompanywebsite.
Table 1-Values and priorities of well known investor-owned businesses 
Google Democracy on the web works.  
You can make money without doing evil. 
Focus on the user and all else will follow.
Tesco Treat people how we like to be treated.  
No-one tries harder for customers.  
Look after our people so they can look after our customers.
Barclays Colleagues, Customers, Company and Community
Studying the values and priorities of these three corporate giants, we can see that there are some 
similarities with the values of co-operative enterprises. There is a commitment to community,  
the drive to place users or customers at the core of the business, and the goal to treat colleagues  
or employees in an equitable manner. Co-operatives, therefore, are not distinguished by the fact 
that they operate according to a set of values, but rather by the manner in which they put their 
values into practice.3
171. The ethical alternative: co-operative values and principles
Principles
The co-operative principles are what distinguish co-operative businesses from other forms  
ofenterprise.PrinciplesaredefinedintheOxfordEnglishDictionaryas‘afundamentaltruth 
or proposition that serves as the foundation for a system of belief or behaviour’. The co-operative 
principles act as an essential guide for how a co-operative should operate and organise itself with 
respect to its values.
Case study 1.1 - Origins of the principles4
The co-operative principles that exist today originated with the Rochdale Society of Equitable 
Pioneers founded in 1844. Since then the principles have been revised in 1937, 1966, and most 
recently in 1995 when the ICA also produced the Statement on the Co-operative Identity.
The Rochdale Principles (circa 1860):5
1. The members should provide the capital.
2. There should be a limited rate of return on this capital.
3. Provide high quality produce to members, including full weight and measure.
4. Charge market prices and no credit should be given or asked.
5. Proratadistributionofprofitsamongstmembers.
6. Democraticcontrol(oneperson,onevote).
7. Allocationofacertainpercentageofprofitstoeducation.
8. Sharingoffinancialinformationwithmembers.
It is interesting to note some of the business innovations and standards that the Rochdale  
Pioneers implemented in conjunction with their contribution to co-operative principles.  
Forinstance,noticehowtheyoperatedabusinessstrictlyoncash(agreatexampleofanefficient
working capital model – see chapter 2); their commitment to providing quality produce at fair 
prices(nonprofitmaximising);andtheintroductionofasystemwherebyinformationrelating 
tothefinancialperformanceoftheco-operativewasmadeavailabletothemembers.Transparency
withregardtofinanceisincreasinglyvaluedinmanysectorsandorganisationstoday.6
First principle: voluntary and open membership
Co-operatives are voluntary organisations. They are open to all persons who wish to use the  
co-operative’s services and who are willing to accept the responsibilities of becoming a member. 
Of critical importance, membership is non-discriminatory in respect to age, gender, social 
background, race and ethnicity, political and religious beliefs. In addition, membership of the  
co-operativeshouldnotbeinfluencedorrestrictedbyexternalentitiessuchasthegovernment 
or state laws.
Thisfirstprincipleofvoluntaryandopenmembershipalsomeansthatifamemberwishestoleave
a co-operative, then that decision can be made without fear of prejudice or discrimination.
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Second principle: democratic member control
Co-operatives are democratic organisations controlled by their members. This means that people 
who join should actively participate in setting the co-operative’s policies and making decisions. 
Individuals serving as elected representatives are accountable to the membership. In ‘primary  
co-operatives’ members have equal voting rights; in other words, ‘one member, one vote’. 
‘Secondary co-operatives’, which are federations made up of several co-operatives, are also 
organised in a democratic manner.
This second principle is central to the unique enterprise model of co-operatives. In addition  
to being jointly-owned by members, co-operatives are member-controlled on a democratic basis. 
Governance in a co-operative is based on ‘one member, one vote’, whereas in investor-owned  
firmsitisbasedontheamountofsharesheldinthebusiness.7
Third principle: member economic participation
Members contribute equitably to the capital of their co-operative over which they exert  
democratic control. Part of that capital is usually the common property of the co-operative.  
Capital in a co-operative is an instrument. By that we mean that capital is necessary for the 
successful operation of the business but it is not the driving force behind the enterprise.  
Capitalisameanstoanend–toprovidebenefitstomembers–ratherthananendinitself.
This third principle is important in protecting member control of the co-operative, for it prevents 
those who subscribe capital to the business from subverting the operations of the co-operative  
toservetheirownfinancialinterests.Mostco-operatives,however,doprovidealimitedreturn 
on the capital subscribed by members. For example, the Mondragón worker co-operatives stipulate 
that each member must contribute between €8,000 and €14,000 in capital when they join.  
Eachyear,afixedreturnonthiscapitalispaid(7.5percentinsomeco-operatives)and,inaddition,
eachmemberreceiveshisorhershareoftheprofits.8
Theprincipleofmembereconomicparticipationalsohelpstodeterminehowprofit(knownas
surplus)inaco-operativeistreated.Sincethepurposeofaco-operativeistoprovidebenefitsto 
its members, most co-operative enterprises choose to reinvest most of the surplus they generate 
back into the business, in the form of reserves. Usually, the remainder of the surplus is distributed 
on a pro-rata basis to members – that is, based on the amount of trade a member conducts with 
theco-operative(oritcouldbebasedonlabourcontributioninthecaseofaworkerco-operative).
Itwouldbereasonabletoassumethatdistributingalloftheprofittoitsmemberswouldbethe
bestwayforaco-operativetoachieveitspurpose;however,giventhedifficultiesthatco-operatives
experience when trying to raise capital, it is important to reinvest much of the surplus back into the 
business to facilitate future growth and to ensure sustainability.
Co-operative fact
TheRochdaleSocietyofEquitablePioneerswasnotthefirstco-operativetodistribute
profitsamongstitsmembersonapatronagebasis–thatis,basedontrade.TheLennoxtown
Friendly Victualling Society in Scotland, which was formed in 1812, introduced this practice 
sometimebefore1826whenitwasfirstrecorded.Thesocietynolongerexistsinitsoriginal
form due to subsequent mergers, but there is still a Co-operative Food store in Lennoxtown 
and it will be celebrating its 200th anniversary in 2012.9
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Fourth principle: autonomy and independence
Co-operatives are autonomous, self-help organisations controlled by their members. If they enter 
in to agreements with other organisations, including governments, or raise capital from external 
sources, they do so on terms that ensure democratic control by their members and maintain their 
co-operative autonomy.
This fourth principle is designed to protect the member-based ownership structure of a co-
operative.Fromafinancialperspective,thereisnothing,intheory,thatpreventsco-operatives
from raising capital from external sources. Equity capital, however, is usually not available to  
co-operatives due to the fact that the entity providing the equity would require an ownership  
stake in the business, thereby eroding the member-based ownership structure.
Governments, primarily in developing economies, have championed and supported co-operatives 
as a means of achieving public objectives such as reducing poverty and hunger. In some cases,  
this leads to the government in question seeking to control the affairs of the co-operative.  
This occurred in Poland in the 1970s when the government sought to use housing co-operatives  
asmeansofdrivingeconomicexpansion;thisresultedintheco-operativesworkingforthebenefit
of the government instead of their members. Similar situations arose in Africa with agricultural  
co-operatives and in India with dairy co-operatives.10
Fifth principle: education, training, and information
Co-operatives provide education and training for their members, elected representatives, 
managers, and employees so they can contribute effectively to the development of their  
co-operatives. They inform the general public – particularly young people and community  
leaders–aboutthenatureandbenefitsofco-operation.
Itissometimessuggestedthatthisfifthprincipleisnotsuchadistinguishingfeatureof 
co-operatives since most organisations provide training for their staff and inform the public  
of their operations. Nevertheless, co-operatives can demonstrate a remarkably long track record 
of commitment to education as a social good, prior to the introduction of universal education 
in developed countries. There are various questions that need to be considered regarding the 
importance of education in a co-operative:
•  What is meant by co-operative education? Does it mean providing information and  
raising awareness about co-operatives? Or, alternatively, does it mean providing education  
in a co-operative manner?
•  Should co-operative education relate to the practice of co-operation, the ideology  
of co-operation, or both of these topics?
Most co-operators agree that education of the three main stakeholders in a co-operative  
(themembers,thepublic,andemployees)iscrucialtoensurethesustainabilityandlong- 
term success of the co-operative, as well as it being essential for the practice of democracy  
inaco-operative(andpossiblyinsocietyaswell).11
Sixth principle: co-operation among co-operatives
Co-operatives serve their members most effectively, and strengthen the co-operative movement, 
by working together through local, regional, national, and international structures. This sixth 
principle can be interpreted in different ways. For instance, it may be seen as a call for co-
operatives to form federations or ‘secondary co-operatives’ in which the membership consists 
wholly of other co-operatives. This corporate structure has been used around the world to create 
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some large and highly successful business groups, such as Crédit Agricole, and also major trade and 
representative bodies such as the US Federation of Worker Co-operatives, Mondragón Corporation 
(MC),Amul,Co-operativesUK,andtheICA.
The sixth principle can also be applied to individual co-operative enterprises creating co-operative 
links in the same industry or sector. For example, in the late 1980s GreenCity Wholefoods,  
aworkerco-operativebasedinGlasgow,wasfindingitdifficulttosupplythenorthernregions
andislandsofScotlandinaprofitablemanner.Aroundthesametime,awholefoodsco-operative
in Inverness had ceased trading, which left a gap in the market. GreenCity swiftly came to the 
conclusion that working in partnership with a local distributor would provide a better service  
tocustomersandsohelpedfiveunemployedlocalstoformanewworkerco-operative,Highland
Wholefoods. A bank loan to help them get started was guaranteed not just by GreenCity but by 
other wholefood co-operatives in the UK. GreenCity and Highland Wholefoods continued to 
co-operate in subsequent years: for instance, Highland Wholefoods were able to send new 
members to GreenCity for training.
The principle does not mean that a co-operative enterprise must source all of its services and/or 
raw materials from other co-operatives. In many cases this would be impractical, both logistically 
andfinancially.Exampleshaveshown,however,thatco-operationwithotherco-operativescan
contribute to a rapid scaling up of operations and to the development of entire co-operative 
ecosystems within communities.12
With regards to non-core business activities it is imperative that co-operatives work closely with 
one and other in order to further the aims of the movement. By educating members and the public, 
lobbying policy makers and legislators, and supporting local, national, and international causes,  
co-operatives can achieve so much more together than they can alone. There is tremendous 
potential for positive action in this sixth principle.
Seventh principle: concern for community
Co-operatives work for the sustainable development of their communities through policies 
approved by their members. Early co-operatives were set up with the purpose of creating self-
sustaining communities based on commonly-owned land and the principles of co-operation. 
Modern co-operatives retain this aim of sustainability. Financial co-operatives, such as credit 
unions,helpalleviatepovertybyprovidingfinancialservicestosomeofthemostdeprived
communities and regularly support local initiatives with grants. Similarly, housing co-operatives 
provide decent, affordable housing to local communities across the world. The Co-operative 
Groupisattheforefrontofbeneficialcommunityinitiativesthroughtheirfundforcommunity
development, the Green Schools Revolution, and the Co-operative Enterprise hub.13
It is worth highlighting the importance investor-owned companies are placing on CSR to aid 
understanding of this seventh principle. Large organisations now regularly produce CSR reports 
detailing their community activities in a given year. However, these organisations achieve 
communitybenefitsoutsideoftheirmainbusinessoperationsnotbecauseofthem.Mostco-
operative enterprises place sustainable community development at the core of what they do,  
rather than treating it as a separate activity. A good example of this is the support given by  
The Co-operative Group to remote community co-operatives in the Scottish Highlands & Islands  
by allowing them access to its supply chain.14
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EXERCISE - The co-operative model
In the video found at the link below, Hanover Consumer Cooperative Society, located in 
Vermont and trading since 1936, discusses how the principles distinguish co-operatives from 
other types of businesses. Watch the video and consider the following questions:
1.   Can a business be a co-operative without adhering to all or some of the ICA principles?  
What do you think the narrator meant by the term ‘true co-operative’?
2. Thevideoalludestotheprivilegesandresponsibilitiesofbeinganowner(member) 
of a co-operative. What are these privileges and responsibilities and do they differ from  
beinganownerofaconventional(investor-owned)business?
Video: http://vimeo.com/8572475
Principles in practice
The ICA principles do not apply to all co-operatives in every business situation, but they do serve 
as a crucial guide. For example, housing co-operatives cannot feasibly have an open membership 
policy since they have a limited amount of housing stock; and a worker co-operative can only 
providealimitednumberofjobs.Creditunionsrestrictmembershipbasedonfinancialcriteria.15 
Itisgenerallyagreedthattheprincipleswhichbestdefineanddistinguishco-operativebusinesses
from other forms of enterprise relate to three questions:
• Whobenefitsfromthebusiness?
• Who controls the business?
• What is the role of capital in the business?
Keep these questions in mind as you read the case study of principles in practice below.
Case study 1.2 - The Co-operative Bank
Member-owned, customer-led, and ethically-guided
Createdin1872,TheCo-operativeBankisafinancialservicesproviderthatispartofCo-operative
Banking Group, which in turn is part of The Co-operative Group, Britain’s largest consumer co-
operative. In 2010, the Bank was the recipient of the Financial Times Sustainable Bank of the Year 
award. The judging panel noted the Bank’s achievements in ‘integrating social, environmental and 
corporate governance considerations into their operations’. This award was recognition for the 
sustainable and ethical approach to banking that the business has aspired to since it was founded. 
A leading factor in the attainment of this award is the customer-driven ethical policy the Bank 
developed in 1992. This ethical policy has evolved into the Bank’s competitive advantage over 
Britain’s other high street banks.
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Background
A cursory glance at The Co-operative Bank reveals a set-up that is similar in terms of its business 
modeltoothersinthefinancialservicessector.TheBankofferssavings,loans,mortgages,credit
cards,investmentandothercommonfinancialproductstoindividualsandbusinessesalike. 
It has almost 350 branches, over six million customers, and a record of innovation in the banking 
sectorhavinglaunchedthefirstfullyonlinebankintheUK,‘smile’,in1999.TheBankreported
anoperatingresultof£108.6minthefirsthalfof2011,thirty-sevenpercenthigherthanthe
equivalent period in 2010, with assets of £46.4bn.
TheBank’spurposeis‘tobeapioneeringbusinessdeliveringsustainablefinancialservicesfor
members and customers’. The distinguishing factor between The Co-operative Bank and other 
majorfinancialserviceproviderssuchasBarclaysandHSBCisnotthepursuitofprofitbuttheway
inwhichthatprofitisgenerated,otherwiseknownas‘theco-operativedifference’.Andattheheart
oftheco-operativedifferenceistheBank’sethicalpolicy,thefirstamongstBritain’shighstreet
banks and still unique in 2011.
What is the ethical policy?
In essence, the ethical policy stipulates the types of partners with whom the Bank will or will not do 
business.16 The ethical policy serves as a guarantee by the bank that it will use its customers’ money 
inawaythatalignswithitsstatedvalues.Thishasrealramificationsforthebank;itisnotsimply
avaguestatementoncorporatesocialresponsibility(CSR).Since1992,theBankhaswithheldover
£1bn in funding to businesses that contravene the ethical policy. According to the Bank, ‘it’s a price 
worth paying to run a business that our customers can feel proud of.’
How is the ethical policy implemented?
The Bank operates a rigorous compliance process for ensuring each new business customer 
conformstotheethicalpolicy.Firstly,thepotentialbusinesscustomermustfilloutanethical
questionnaire as part of their application, which is then assessed against the ethical policy. If there 
are concerns or queries, the application is passed onto the Ethical Policy Unit where it is assessed 
against the policy statements and the database of over 1,700 case studies kept by the Bank. The 
effectofacustomer’sbusinessontheBank’sbottomlineplaysnoroleinthefinaldecisionon
whether or not to accept their application.
The future
DavidAnderson,formerChiefExecutive,notes:‘Onethirdofourprofitscomefromcustomers
who have joined just because of the ethical policy.’ The Co-operative Bank continues to deliver 
sustainableandprofitableperformanceguidedbyitsuniquecustomer-ledethicalpolicy.This
shows that a co-operative values-based business model can be used to develop a competitive 
advantage over conventional businesses by leveraging the ethical commitment and values of 
members and customers. In Anderson’s words: ‘We believe that by doing this we can invest for the 
long-termbenefitofcustomersand,atthesametime,useourinfluenceasaninvestortoimprove
our environment and society.’
Source: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YrXWTXuShlQ
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The co-operative advantage
In business, much thought and effort is given by management towards the creation of  
a ‘competitive advantage’, something that distinguishes a company from its competitors.  
A competitive advantage can be created by providing added value to customers, something  
more than your competitors can offer, coupled with the harmonisation of each process or function 
in a company to achieve its objectives.17 Creating a competitive advantage, therefore, is about 
differentiatingyourbusinessfromothersinyourindustry.Thistaskbecomesslightlymoredifficult
forco-operativesiftheychoosetodefinethemselvesinrelationtotheircompetitorsbasedonlyon
product, service, information systems, and so on. The key step for co-operatives is to leverage their 
‘co-operativeadvantage’tocreateauniquesellingpoint(USP)thatwillnotonlyprovideincreased
benefitsformembersbutalsocreateastrongerbottomline.
What is a co-operative advantage?
A co-operative advantage is a co-operative’s equivalent of a competitive advantage. Its foundation 
is the unique ownership and governance structure inherent in all co-operatives – the fact that the 
business is member-owned and member-controlled. The following diagram illustrates how a co-
operative advantage is derived.
Figure 1-The Co-operative Advantage paradigm
Co-operative Advantage
Ownership structure
Member needs Business operations
Member benefits and profitability
Co-operative values
The foundation of a co-operative advantage is the ownership structure of the co-operative. This 
provides the basis upon which the co-operative can both address members’ needs and operate 
a successful business. These two objectives are not mutually exclusive for they are aligned by 
thevalues,principles,andethicsoftheco-operative(remember:co-operativevaluesarehuman
values).Ifdonecorrectly,thisleadstosuccessfulbusinessoutcomes(surplus)andsatisfied
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members, which is the purpose of a co-operative. The co-operative has then created its co-operative 
advantage – that is, a USP that enables the business to compete with, and often outperform, 
traditional companies in its industry. Note the importance of surplus to a co-operative. A co-
operative must balance member needs with the operation of a successful enterprise. Member 
benefitsareenhancedandincreasedwhentheco-operativegeneratesahealthyandsustainable
surplus. The key distinction between co-operatives and conventional investor-owned businesses 
is the role of surplus; co-operatives are surplus focused but not surplus driven, while conventional 
businessesareprofitdrivenandveryoftenlittleelse.Thepurposeofaco-operativeistosatisfyits
members; it does this best by creating a co-operative advantage.
Making the most of a co-operative advantage
Once a co-operative has understood the necessity of creating a co-operative advantage and has 
done so using the process outlined above, it is necessary to optimise the effect the advantage has  
on all of the operations of the co-operative. There are four steps to help a co-operative make the 
most of its advantage.18
Define -  Consult with your members and stakeholders to ascertain how they want their 
co-operativetobedifferentandfeedthisintotheprocessdevelopedinthefirst
section. For example, The Co-operative Bank’s customers wanted the business 
to apply ethical considerations to their investment decisions. This in turn led 
to the creation of an ethical policy in 1992 outlining with whom the Bank will 
and will not do business.
Deliver -  Embed this co-operative difference in every process in the business: 
marketing, production, human resources, strategic planning, customer 
servicesshouldallreflectthisdifference.
Measure - Trackthebenefitstheco-operativedeliverstoitsmembers,customers,
employees, local community, and other stakeholders. This requires more than 
justfinancialreporting;itinvolvesawiderangeofmeasuresencompassing
social, ethical and environmental objectives. Scotmid, Scotland’s largest 
independent consumer co-operative, produces a social responsibility report 
that analyses the company’s performance in terms of its Fairtrade objectives, 
staff training and development, member economic participation, and customer 
satisfaction, among other measures.
Communicate - Tellyourmembers,stakeholders,employees,andthepublicthebenefits 
your co-operative advantage provides. This in turn increases awareness of  
co-operatives amongst the public, generates additional revenue, and increases 
the membership. The process then reverts back to step one.19
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SEMINAR EXERCISE - Introduction to co-operative principles
Materials to support this exercise can be found on the VLE.
1.  Ask for two volunteers, and place one to your right and the other to your left. Tell the 
oneontheleftthatheorsheistheCEOofApexCompanyandneedstohire(pick) 
four other students as employees.
2.  Tell the one on your right that he or she is starting up the Combo Cooperative and  
must ask the students for anyone willing to join the cooperative as an equal member, 
stopping when four other students have joined.
3.  Tell the CEO of Apex Company to think up an activity on his or her own to engage the 
employees. The CEO must then tell the employees to undertake that activity.
4.  Tell the Cooperative group to decide amongst themselves what activity they want 
toengageinandthenexecuteit.Givetheteamsaboutfiveminutestogettheiracts
together and another three or so minutes to demonstrate their activities.
5. Conclude the exercise and conduct the discussion segment.
SEMINAR EXERCISE - The co-operative values and principles
Materials to support this exercise can be found on the VLE.
The purpose of this exercise is to review the values and principles of co-operatives and  
to provide suggestions on how the principles could be updated if necessary.
1.  Divide the participants into groups of roughly even number. The suggested size of each 
group is four to six participants.
2.   Give each group a copy of the ‘Values & principles’ document and ask them to read and 
digesttheinformationforfourtofiveminutes.
3. Forthenexttentofifteenminutes,askeachgrouptocompletethetasksrequired 
of them. Ask them to draw up their analysis using the materials provided.
4. Whenthetaskshavebeencompleted,askeachgrouptosticktheirflipchartpaper
containing their analysis on a wall and allow each group a couple of minutes to survey 
each group’s work.
5.  Conduct a discussion with all the participants on the reasons behind their analysis using 
your own insight and/or some of the discussion topics contained in the facilitator’s note. 
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Summary of learning
This chapter has argued that:
•  Co-operatives and investor-owned businesses may appear to share some values in common,  
but it is the manner in which values are put into practice that makes co-operatives different.
•  Co-operatives distinguish themselves from other forms of enterprises through their principles.
•  The co-operative values and principles serve as a guide rather than strict rules for how these 
enterprises should act.
•  The ‘co-operative advantage’ is crucial to the competitiveness of co-operative enterprises  
in the market.
Essay/discussion questions
•  Are the co-operative principles developed by the Rochdale Pioneers still relevant today 
considering they were developed over a century ago during the Industrial Revolution? How can 
theRochdaleprinciplesguideco-operativesinthecomplexandrapidlyevolvingtwenty-first
century economy in which they operate?
•  Open and voluntary membership is a core principle of co-operative enterprises. With this in 
mind, how should co-operatives act with regards to employees or consumers who wish to work 
or trade with the co-operative but not become members? Is it right for a worker co-operative  
to continue to employ staff if they refuse to become members for instance?
•  Which of the principles are unique to co-operative enterprises and which ones might  
be  considered as general business practices?
•  ‘Creating a competitive advantage in business is crucial to ensure organisational success  
and sustainability.’ Find examples and discuss how the process and elements of creating  
a competitive advantage are different for co-operative enterprises.
Useful resources
The International Co-operative Alliance - http://www.ica.coop/al-ica/.
The Fairtrade Foundation - http://www.fairtrade.org.uk/.
The Co-operative - Good with Money - http://www.goodwithmoney.co.uk/good-with-money/.
Business in the Community - http://www.bitc.org.uk/.
The Plunkett Foundation - http://www.plunkett.co.uk/.
The Equality Trust - http://www.equalitytrust.org.uk .
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More than just profit:
the co-operative business model
‘Cooperatives are a reminder to the 
international community that it is 
possible to pursue both economic 
viability and social responsibility.’
United Nations Secretary-General  
Ban Ki-moon
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2. More than just profit:  
the co-operative business model
Learning objectives
This chapter explains the co-operative business model in terms of its unique ownership, 
governance,andbeneficiarystructure.Itthenshowshowco-operativesusetheirdistinctive
characteristics to operate within the market and compares them with other models of enterprise. 
By the end of this chapter you will be able to:
• discuss the essential elements of the co-operative business model;
• compare and contrast the co-operative business model with other enterprise models;
• identify rights and responsibilities entailed in ownership of a co-operative.
The key arguments that will be developed in this chapter are:
Co-operativesexistforthepurposeofprovidingmaximumbenefitstomembersbysatisfying
adefinedcommonneed.
Members own a co-operative on a collective rather than individual basis. Ownership of a co-
operative is dependent on a member’s willingness to support the business for the collective 
good rather than as the individual owner of private property.
Membersofaco-operativeareentitledtoashareofanysurplus(profit)generated 
in proportion to their patronage of the co-operative.
Capital is an instrument in a co-operative rather than a driver of business operations.
Introduction
Co-operative enterprises are member-based. This means they are:
• member-owned;
• member-controlled;
• distributebenefits(includingsurpluses)tomembers.
A member is someone who uses the services of the co-operative and agrees to accept the 
responsibilitiesofmembership.Thoseresponsibilitiesarechieflytousethegoods/services
provided by the co-operative, provide capital for the business and participate in governance.  
For example, a user of a farm supply co-operative would be a farmer who purchases a tractor  
from the business; the user of a worker co-operative would be someone who works for the business. 
Only users of the co-operative’s services are normally eligible to become members.1
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The purpose of a co-operative
Thepurposeofaco-operativeistoprovidemaximumbenefittoitsmembersbyengagingin
economic activities or, to put it another way, by intervening in the market.2Memberbenefits 
canbedefinedineconomic,social,andpsychologicalterms;thereisusuallyamixofthesefor 
most members. For example, a co-operative may provide food produce at low cost for its members, 
as well as supporting social initiatives in the member’s community. This focus on providing 
maximumbenefitsofvariouskindstomemberscontrastswiththefocusintheinvestor-owned
modelofenterprisewhereshareholderbenefitsaredefinedexclusivelyineconomicterms.3
Undertheheadingsmember-owned,member-controlled,andmember-beneficiary,wewillnow
consider in more detail some of the distinguishing features of co-operatives.
Member-owned
Owning shares... but differently
Most co-operatives issue shares to their users, which must be purchased. But the shares do not 
operate in the same way as shares do in most investor-owned companies. These shares are often 
issued, and remain, at par value, meaning that the shares do not increase in value in proportion 
to the value of the business. The reason for this is to ensure that the co-operative focuses on 
providingtheoriginalbenefittomembersforwhichitwassetup.Therewouldotherwisebearisk
oftheco-operativebeingrunmainlyforthepurposeofincreasingthevalueoftheshares(justlike
an investor-owned business). There would also be a danger of it becoming too expensive for new 
members to join as the value of the shares increased. Remember, membership of a co-operative  
is open, voluntary, and non-discriminatory.
Another crucial distinction between the shares in a co-operative and the shares in an investor-
ownedcompanyrelatestothepaymentofinterestoncapital(knownasadividendinaninvestor-
ownedcompany).Inco-operatives,thispaymentiseitherlimited,usuallytoaroundfivepercent,
or else forbidden altogether. Again, this is a measure to prevent the co-operative being run in the 
interestofcapitalratherthanforthebenefitofmembers.4 Most co-operatives only require a user 
to purchase one share to become a member.5 It is possible to purchase more than one share but, 
crucially, the amount of shares owned has no bearing on the member’s right to participate in the 
governanceofthebusiness(onemember/onevoteasopposedtooneshare/onevote).
Onefinaldistinctionthatcanbemadebetweensharesinaco-operativeandthesharesinan
investor-owned business is the issue of transferability. It is usually impossible to transfer your 
share in a co-operative to another individual or organisation.6 This is because your membership 
reflectsyourabilitytousetheservicesoftheco-operative,unlikesharesinaninvestor-owned
company which can be sold and inherited.7
Rights
As owners of the business, members of a co-operative are entitled to a number of accompanying 
rights. The list below discusses common ownership rights and how they relate to co-operatives.8
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Income rights
Co-operatives assign income rights in relation to the member’s right to a share of the surplus 
generatedbythebusiness(knownas‘patronagerefund’)andtheinterestthatispaidonmember
shares(ifatall).Thisinterestonsharesisusuallyrestrictedtoadefinedpercentage(fivepercent 
is common) and not all the surplus generated is allocated to members: some is kept in the business 
in the form of retained earnings and some may be allocated to social/charitable initiatives.
Voting rights
Theserightsinfluencewhocanparticipateindecisionmakinginthebusiness.Inco-operatives,
these rights are held by the members on a one person, one vote basis.
Transfer rights
 These rights pertain to the transfer shares in a business. Co-operatives tend to limit, if not forbid, 
the transfer of shares as a means of protecting the ownership structure of the company – that is, 
in order to keep the co-operative in members’ hands. Shares are assigned to members as personal 
rights9, similar to the right a citizen of a nation holds, and therefore cannot usually be transferred, 
inherited or bought by another individual or organisation. New members of a co-operative must 
purchase new shares rather than the shares of existing members.
Information rights
 A company’s articles of association will often include clauses relating to the access to information 
byowners.Mostco-operativeswillextendinformationrightstoeverymember(echoingthefifth
ICA principle) and ensure that information is presented in such a way that is useful to members  
(ortoprovideeducationtoenablememberstounderstandtheinformation).
Appreciation rights
 These rights determine whether the value of the company can be captured via the value of the 
shares held by owners. In co-operatives, shares are usually sold at par value and remain at this 
value throughout the duration of a person’s membership. This is a measure to prevent the co-
operative being run in the interests of capital to maximise the value of the shares rather than  
to satisfy members’ needs.
Liquidation rights
 Liquidation rights enable owners to dissolve a business in the event of insolvency. It is also 
possible,however,toliquidateaprofitablebusinessandtodivideupthevalueandassetsofthe
company amongst the owners. Co-operatives tend to limit the ability of members to dissolve the 
business for private gain by assigning the assets the status of common ownership. This means that 
no individual member has any claim to the assets of the business beyond the value of their shares, 
and in the event of dissolution the remaining assets of the co-operative are to be transferred to  
a similar business or to a charitable cause.
Responsibilities
Membership not only confers certain rights but also entails responsibilities, including the duty  
toensuretheco-operativeisadequatelyfinanced.Membersaretheusersofthebusinessand 
so are responsible for its success, echoing the values of self-help and self-responsibility that all  
co-operativesespouse.Memberstypicallyprovidefinancetoaco-operativeinoneofthreeways:
• equity;
• debt;
• patronage(trade).
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Itispossibleformemberstoprovidedebtfinancetotheco-operative,butthemostcommon, 
andimportant,meansoffinancingisthroughequity.Usually,mostoftheequitywillbecontributed
by members at the start-up stage of the co-operative’s lifecycle to ensure that it is adequately 
financedtocommencebusinessoperations.Besidesthisimportantfunction,memberequityhas
three further uses:
• it helps to generate commitment and loyalty amongst members;
• itcanactascollateralwhensecuringdebtfinance;
• memberequitycanbeusedasa‘shockabsorber’intimesoffinancialcrisis.10
Member-controlled
Inaco-operativeenterprise,themembersplayasignificantroleingovernance,bywhichwemean
the way in which the organisation is directed and controlled. The role of the members is to act as 
thefinalauthorityingovernancematters.Themembersofaco-operativecanexercisethisright 
in two ways:
Directly - memberscanvoteonissuesattheannualgeneralmeeting(AGM)andany
other general meetings that may be held. Policy and long-term business 
operations are typical issues that members are required to vote on directly.
Indirectly -  members have the right to elect a board to represent their interests. The board 
can then hire a management team to look after the day-to-day operations of 
the business.11 The key point is that any governance body in a co-operative  
is accountable to the members, not another stakeholder group.
The concept of member control is slightly misleading in that it conjures an image of a business 
without any management hierarchy or one where every member votes on every decision. This is  
notusuallythecase,however.Membercontrolmeansthatthefinalauthoritylieswithmembers,
but generally that is exercised only at the AGM.
Member-beneficiary
Distributionofbenefitsonthebasisofusedescribestheprincipleofproportionality,anotherkey
foundationforco-operatives.Membersshouldsharethebenefits,risks,andcostsofdoingbusiness
in equal proportion to their patronage. It is an equitable system.12
Thethirdelementofourdefinitionofaco-operativerelatestohowthemembersparticipate 
inthebenefits(surplus)generatedbythebusiness,assumingthisiscontainedwithintherules.
The concept of proportionality is central to the distribution of surplus in a co-operative enterprise. 
Membershaveadefinedrighttoashareinanysurplusgeneratedbytheco-operativeona
proportional basis. The amount to which each member is entitled depends on the extent to which 
that member patronised the co-operative during a given year. The amount that a member receives 
is called the ‘patronage refund’.13
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Patronage refund
The patronage refund is calculated annually and is the amount of surplus, if there is one, to which 
an individual member is entitled through his or her use of the co-operative. This entitlement comes 
from the idea that the co-operative has overcharged its members for goods/services during the year 
andmembersareowedarebate(similarlyaworkerco-operativecouldbesaidtohaveunderpaid
its members). The word patronage refers to the use or trade an individual member conducts with 
the co-operative - so those who contributed the most to the success of the business are rewarded 
proportionally. A member’s entitlement to a share of the surplus of the co-operative is one of the 
fundamental rights of ownership.
Process
The process of determining how to return this surplus to members will now be explained.
Step 1 - Decide how much of the surplus is to be allocated for patronage refund.
Co-operativeswillneedcapitalintheformofretainedearningsasabufferagainstcashflowneeds
or possible future losses, as well as for investment purposes such as purchasing new buildings or 
collateral for a loan. The formula for deciding how much of the surplus is retained differs for each 
co-operative and much depends on the capital requirements of the business. Also, the amount of 
surplus that was generated from non-members may be a factor in this decision; members in some 
US co-operatives do not have any entitlement to surplus generated by the trade of non-members.
Step 2 - Calculate each member’s contribution to the surplus. 
This can be done relatively simply using the amount of trade a member conducted with the  
co-operativeinagivenyear.Forconsumerco-operatives,thisfigurecanbetheamountofgoods 
or services a member purchased; for worker co-operatives, it can be the amount of hours worked 
or their salary. Once each member’s contribution is calculated, the principle of proportionality can 
be applied. An individual member’s share of the surplus is calculated by expressing their patronage 
(trade)fortheyearasapercentageofthetotalpatronage(inotherwords,totalsales).Soamember
with £4,000 of patronage, when the business had £40,000 worth of sales, would be entitled to ten 
per cent of the surplus available for distribution to members.
Step 3 - Decide how much of the patronage refund should be in cash.
As a way of retaining capital in the business, co-operatives often defer the payment of some of 
the refund to members for a number of years. Using the previous example, the member entitled 
totenpercentofthesurplusavailablefordistribution(say£100)mightonlyreceivetwentyper
cent of this in the form of cash, with the other eighty per cent being deferred for a period of time. 
This deferred amount would usually be held in the member’s capital or equity account, and can be 
thought of as a loan by the member to the co-operative. Although most co-operatives operating this 
system do not pay interest on the deferred patronage refund, there are examples of those who do 
and we shall discuss one in a later chapter.
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Figure 2-Example of surplus allocation (after tax) in a co-operative
Annual net surplus (profit) = £1,000,000
Retained earnings 
(reserves) = £400,000
Patronage refunds 
= £600,000
Deferred patronage re-
funds = £400,000
Cash patronage  
refunds = £200,000
Demonstration
In order to demonstrate the process of determining patronage refunds, we will use the example  
ofafictionalretailco-operative,DrumchapelFoodCo-op.Theco-operativehastenmembers 
and sells basic groceries. At the end of 2011, the co-operative generated a surplus of £20,000  
on sales of £100,000. The board of directors have decided to retain £10,000 of this surplus as 
retained earnings as there was quite a lot of trade with non-members throughout the year. Of the 
£10,000 available for distribution to members, the patronage refund was calculated as set out in 
the table below.
Table 2-Sample patronage refund calculation
Total sales = £100,000 | Sales generated through member trade = £50,000 
Surplus available for distribution to members = £10,000
Member Amount of groceries 
bought (£)
% of Total Sales to 
Members
Share of Surplus 
(surplus * % of Total 
Sales) £
A 2,500 5% 500
B 7,500 15% 1,500
C 5,000 10% 1,000
D 3,750 7.5% 750
E 5,000 10% 1,000
F 1,250 2.5% 250
G 10,000 20% 2,000
H 6,250 12.5% 1,250
I 1,250 2.5% 250
J 7,500 15% 1,500
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The co-operative business model
Theterm‘businessmodel’hasmanyconnotationsandmeaningsbutfewagreeddefinitions.14  
By business model, we are referring to the economic underpinning of a business, encompassing  
all of the activities that contribute to the economic success of the enterprise.15 This is the traditional 
interpretation of what a business model is but, as we have seen, a co-operative has unique 
characteristics that affect the way in which it does business. Co-operatives therefore have  
a particular business model, one that is based on satisfying member needs.
The co-operative business model has three core elements: the values and principles, the member-
based structure of the business, and the business processes relevant to the type of industry in which 
the co-operative operates. Each one of these elements is dependent on the other two. For instance, 
satisfying member needs can only be exercised with respect to the set of values and principles that 
guide the co-operative’s actions. Where all of these elements meet on a productive basis,  
a competitive advantage over other forms of enterprise is created.
Figure 3-The co-operative business model
Business 
processes
Values and 
principles
Member- 
based purpose, 
ownership, 
governance 
and beneficiary 
structure
Business model elements
To further our analysis of a co-operative business model, we must examine how the model operates 
in practice. It is helpful here to use a framework common to all organisations.16
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1. Revenue model
Revenue is the lifeblood of any company; without it, there ceases to be a business. A company’s 
revenue model is concerned with several fundamental questions. Who will buy your product?  
What will they buy? How soon, often, and how much will they buy? The unique business model  
of co-operative enterprises, based on internationally agreed values and principles, affects how these 
questions are answered for a co-operative.
Forinstance,somerevenuestreams(customers)arenotcompatiblewiththeethicsandvalues 
of some co-operatives. The Co-operative Bank’s ethical policy, discussed in chapter 1, meant that 
itwithheldover£1bnoffundingtopotentialcustomers,denyingthebusinesssignificantamounts
of revenue in the form of interest. Yet a co-operative’s values and principles can also open up new 
revenue streams that have the advantage of sustainability. Graphics.coop, a worker co-operative 
based in Edinburgh, Scotland, works with a diverse range of clients but it gives priority service  
to the co-operative, environmental, and charitable sectors. This allows graphics.coop both to target 
clients that are often overlooked by the market and to develop a leading share of a niche market. 
Mediaco-op,anindependantfilmanddigitalproductionbusiness,basedinGlasgow,hasasimilar
revenue model. Although it makes documentaries for broadcast companies, such as the BBC and Al 
Jazeera,onissuesthatchimewithitsvaluesandprinciples,MediaCo-op’scoreworkisspecifically
with organisations that share the same values and ethics.
What these examples show is that a co-operative’s values are of central importance to its revenue 
model.Thevaluesinfluencetheco-operative’sdecisionsaboutwhoitwillorwillnotdobusiness
with, and those values cannot be ignored by the members involved in managing the co-operative.
2. Gross margin model
Gross margin is the amount a business earns when it sells a product or service at a price that 
exceeds what it costs to produce and deliver the product or service. In accounting terms, it is sales 
less‘costofgoodssold’(COGS).Earningagrossmarginiscrucialforabusinesstonotonlycover
itsoperatingcostsbutalsomakeahealthyprofit.Therefore,acompany’sgrossmarginmodel
is concerned with selling a product or service for as much as the customer is willing to pay and 
keepingthecosts(forexamplethepriceofrawmaterialsinvolvedinmakingtheproduct)aslow 
as possible.
For a co-operative business, it is not always possible or desirable to develop a gross margin  
modelbasedonthetwoconcernsoutlinedabove,sincetodosomightconflictwithitsvalues. 
Other concerns might take priority. For example, The Co-operative Group’s food stores have  
beensupportersoftheFairtrademovementforovereighteenyears,stockingthefirstFairtrade
certifiedcoffee,Cafédirect,intheirstoresin1992.UndertheFairtradecertification,producers 
of primary goods such as coffee and bananas are guaranteed a price higher than the market price. 
The price paid has on occasion been double or even triple the global market price. In 2003,  
The Co-operative Group switched all of its own brand coffee to Fairtrade, a move praised by those 
in the Fairtrade movement.17 In business terms, however, the Group increased its cost of goods 
sold, reducing its gross margin on its own brand coffee. Not only that, but the group pledged  
to keep its prices competitive so as to encourage customers to purchase Fairtrade products.  
The Co-operative has gone one step further in 2011 by stating in its future operating plan that  
if any product ‘can be Fairtrade, it will be Fairtrade’.18
The Co-operative Group’s actions have shown that the pursuit of a healthy gross margin does  
not have to take precedence over a company’s values and principles. The Group accepted a  
decline in its gross margin for the sake of ensuring others in the supply chain were paid a fair price. 
Such actions contrast with the more common scenario whereby other large retailers relentlessly 
drive down their cost of goods sold by ‘squeezing’ their suppliers for the lowest price possible.19
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3. Operating model
Operatingcostsmaybedefinedasalltheotherdailycoststhatareincurredinadditiontothe
costs of goods sold. A company will have operating costs relating to labour, lighting and heating, 
premises and other elements that are fundamental to the successful operation of the business. It is 
therefore in a company’s interests to reduce or eliminate as many of its operating costs as possible.
How then, might a co-operative’s values and principles affect its operating model? This issue is best 
explored in relation to one of the most crucial operating costs a business incurs - and one which, 
conversely,isalsooneofthefirstcostsitseeksreducewhenconstructingitsoperatingmodel-
namely the cost of labour.
The worker co-operatives of Mondragón Corporation have implemented a system whereby labour 
costs can never be eliminated. A worker co-operative that subscribes to Mondragón must commit 
to a rule that states that no worker-member can be made redundant. This commitment to labour 
producessomeinterestingsituationsandissuesduringtimesofpoorfinancialperformance.
Whentheglobalfinancialcrisistookholdin2009,Mondragónmembersvotedforaninepercent
reduction in salary rather than making any workers redundant. This ensured that Mondragón 
protected the welfare of its worker-members by reducing business costs and ensuring sustainability.
Someyearsago,Orbea,whomanufacturehighspecificationbicyclesandrelatedaccessories, 
weresufferingfinanciallyandwereoverstaffed.InaccordancewithMondragónrules,halfof
Orbea’s 150 worker-members were transferred to another co-operative until the company had 
sufficientlyrecovered,whentheworker-membersthenreturnedtoOrbea.Mondragónhas 
created a safety net for its worker-members, ensuring that protecting the value and rights 
of labour is the foremost priority of each co-operative and the organisation as a whole.20
There are of course other operating costs that every business, whether investor-owned  
or co-operative, seeks to reduce or eliminate, such as energy, waste and maintenance.
4. Working capital model
Often overlooked and marginalised in favour of the other elements, working capital is vital  
to ensure that a company can survive day to day and cover the costs of operating. Mullins and 
Kumisardefineitasthecashacompanyneedsintheshort-termtokeepthebusinessrunning.21 
A company’s working capital relates to the ability of current assets to cover current liabilities, 
preferably with some cash left over. The ‘Holy Grail’ is to develop a negative working capital  
model, that is, the business gets in money faster than it has to pay it out. This can be achieved  
by negotiating generous credit terms with your suppliers and forcing customers to pay up front  
or even in advance.
What most businesses do not consider though is the wider economic and social impact of  
a negative working capital model. In 2003, Debenhams, one of Britain’s most recognisable  
and successful retailers, was bought by private investors and taken off the stock market.  
Soon afterwards, the company renegotiated its credit terms with suppliers. Debenhams went from 
paying its suppliers every twenty-seven days to paying them every two months.22 This freed up 
huge amounts of cash for the business as the suppliers were effectively granting Debenhams an 
interestfreeloan.Suchapolicycouldbearguedtodomoreharmthangoodtosociety.Theflow 
ofcashisrestrictedandthefinancialburdenistransferredfromalargeretailerto,inmanycases, 
a small supplier.
Co-operatives have been aware of this ‘beggar thy neighbour’ approach to working capital for years 
and have devised inventive solutions to counteract this problem. One of the earliest examples of 
an effective and equitable working capital model was devised by the Rochdale Society of Equitable 
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Pioneers. One of the core principles of the enterprise was to sell to members on a cash basis only; 
no credit terms were offered. This not only ensured that payment for goods occurred at the point 
of transaction – thereby contributing immediately to working capital and ensuring the business 
remained in liquidity – but it also prevented their members from becoming burdened by debt,  
a common problem around the time of the Industrial Revolution.
One of the more exploitative practices that arose in towns and cities across Britain as a result of the 
Industrial Revolution was the ‘truck’ system. Private shop owners often held a monopoly in factory 
towns and exploited villagers by providing poor quality goods at high prices. Shop owners also 
colluded with factory owners to ensure local workers were paid in tokens that could only be used  
in their shops; as a result many villagers became indebted to the factory and shop owners. 
Thissectionhasdemonstratedthattheco-operativevaluesandprincipleseveninfluence
theapproachaco-operativebusinesshastoitscash-flowstrategy,usuallyincontrasttoits
conventional business competitors.
5. Investment model
Capital is a vital element in every business. It is instrumental in the establishment of a company and 
essentialforfinancingprojects,expansion,anddailyfunctionswhenthebusinessisinoperation.
A company’s investment model therefore is concerned with how much capital is needed for the 
business, who the capital will be sourced from, and at which points in its development the business 
may need an injection of capital.
The traditional method for raising capital for a new business is by selling shares in the company 
toinvestors.Sincetheriskofthebusinessfailingisquitehigh,investorswilldemandasignificant
shareinthebusinessintermsofownershipandcontrol,alongwithadecentdividend(youcansee
this played out in the TV show Dragon’s Den). This method of raising capital is not an option for 
co-operatives because ownership and control of the business reside with members and cannot  
betransferred(althoughsomeco-operativeshaveraisedcapitalbyissuingnon-votingshares). 
The following two examples demonstrate the innovation displayed by co-operatives in seeking 
accesstocapitaltofinancetheirenterprises.
Example 1: Raising capital to establish the business
The Mondragón worker co-operatives have developed a systematic approach for raising capital  
fornewbusinesses.Thefirstco-operativesfounditdifficulttoaccesscapitalastraditionalbanks
were unwilling to deal with an organisation where everyone was an owner. To resolve this issue, 
three of the co-operatives formed the Caja Laboral Popular bank in 1959 to raise funds in the 
formofdepositsfromthecommunity,thusprovidingaccesstofinancenotonlyforexisting
co-operativesbutalsofornewones.By1963,CajaLaboralhadprovidedfinancefortwentyco-
operatives and has continued to do so right up until the present day. Usually, the bank provided 
sixty per cent of the start-up capital with the founding members providing twenty per cent with  
the remaining twenty per cent coming from a state fund.23
Example 2: Raising capital once the business has been established
In the mid 2000s, Manchester-based Unicorn Grocery, one of Britain’s largest worker co-
operatives, faced losing its store to property developers. Since the co-op’s formation in 1996,  
it had rented premises in South Manchester and quickly expanded. Revenues grew from £3,500  
to£3.5minthespaceofadecadeandmembershipgrewfromfourtofifty.Facedwiththe
seemingly imminent sale of the property from under them, Unicorn members realised that the 
best way to secure the co-op’s future was by purchasing the building themselves. To do this, they 
needed to raise £350,000. Rather than turning to institutional or private investors, Unicorn issued 
£350,000 worth of loan stock which was purchased by their customers. This enabled the business 
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EXERCISE - What is a business model?
Part 1 - 
Inyourownterms,whatdoyouthinkabusinessmodelis?Tryanddefinetheconcept 
in a paragraph or less. Having done that, what do you think are the essential elements  
of a business model?
Part 2 - 
Watch the video at the link below and answer the following questions:
1. What do you think a co-operative business model is?
2. Howdoesitcomparetoyourdefinitionofatraditionalbusinessmodel?Arethereany
similarities between the elements?
Video:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=96EOrGPJfk8(startat3:28)
to complete the purchase of the property and protect the ownership and control structure of the 
co-operative.24
Thesetwoexampleshighlightsomeofthedifficultiesco-operativesfacecomparedwithinvestor-
ownedfirmswhentryingtoaccesscapital.Thetraditionalmethodofraisingcapitalthrough
selling shares to outside investors is usually not an option and banks are less inclined to support 
co-operatives.Manyco-operativesthereforeseekcapitaleitherfromtheirmembers(who,under
currentUKlegislation,caninvestupto£20,000inthebusiness)orfromspecificloanfunds, 
such as those operated by Co-operative and Community Finance.25
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The co-operative business model compared 
with other enterprise models
The table below provides a basic framework for understanding how co-operatives differ from other 
organisational models, namely the investor-owned company and the social enterprise.26
Table 3-Comparison of enterprise models
Co-operative Investor-owned 
Company
Social Enterprise
Purpose Improve the quality of life  
for members
Create wealth  
for shareholders
Achieve a social purpose
Ownership Members Shareholders Usually a community, 
charity or quasi-
governmental body. 
Sometimes owned by 
individual entrepreneur
Control Democratic basis -  
one member, one vote
Property right basis -  
one share, one vote
Trustees or equivalent 
group that may or may not 
be democratically elected
Beneficiary Members Shareholders Target social group
Financed by 
(excluding
debtfinance)
Member contributions and 
retained earnings
Sale of shares and retained 
earnings
Retained earnings and 
grants
Motivational 
driver
Self-help and self-
responsibility
Personal wealth creation Altruism or public policy
Market-
oriented
Yes – market intervention  
tobenefitmembers
Yes Yes
Distribution 
of surplus
Three methods: 
•Members 
•Reinvestedinthebusiness 
•Allocatedtosocial/charitable
initiatives
Yes in form of dividend 
related to shareholding
Not to individuals, 
usually reinvested in the 
enterprise
Distribution 
of assets on 
dissolution
Yes - usually to members; 
however, controls can be put 
in place to prevent individual 
membersbenefitingfromthe
liquidation of the co-operative
Yes – to shareholders No– usually passed onto 
another community 
benefitcompanyorsocial
enterprise
Source: Adapted from E. Parnell, (2011). Enterprise Models27
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SEMINAR EXERCISE - Co-operate to succeed
Materials to support this exercise can be found on the VLE.
The purpose of this exercise is to discover participants’ ability to be co-operative  
or competitive in response to their environment and situation.
1. Dividethestudentsintofourgroups(ormoredependingonthenumberofparticipants).
Each group represents a department in the company.
2.  Explain the rules of the exercise to each group.
3. Allowthegroupstodiscusstheirdecisionforthefirstweekforashortwhile 
(twoorthreeminutes).Goaroundtoeachgroupandaskthemtheirdecision. 
Record the decision and repeat for the other groups.
4.  Once each group has made a decision, announce the results of the week to all of  
thegroups(e.g.2Black,2Red),recordtheresultsforeachgroupandthecompany 
asa whole, and begin the next week.
5.  Repeat steps 2 and 3 until you reach the end of the fourth week. Ask each group  
to appoint a representative and allow each representative to discuss the state of the 
company. Allow a few minutes before sending them back to their groups.
6.  The week after representative meetings is a bonus round where all of the scores are 
multiplied(seeworksheet).
7. Repeat steps 2 – 4 until the end of week 12.
8.  Announce the results of the exercise, with the decisions made by each group and  
theamountofprofitorlossofthecompany.
9.  Conclude the exercise by conducting a short discussion on the importance  
of co-operation and shared goals/objectives for organisational success.
SEMINAR EXERCISE - The meaning of ownership
Materials to support this exercise can be found on the VLE.
The purpose of this exercise is to explore the roles capital and labour play in the ownership  
of enterprises and also the effect each has on the distribution of rewards.
1.  Divide the students into a number of groups depending on class size. It is not important 
how many members there are in each group but try to keep them evenly spread.
2.  Run through the PowerPoint presentation until you get to the ‘The Decisions’ slide.  
At this point, ask the students to debate the decision to be made for a number of minutes 
(atthediscretionofthefacilitatorbutwerecommendaminimumoffiveminutes).
3. Whenthestudentshavefinisheddebating,askthemtovoteforoneofthefiveoptions
and record the results on the separate PowerPoint presentation.
4. Move onto the next decision and repeat the process: debate, vote, and record.
5. Whenthegroupshavefinishedmakingtheirdecisionsandthevoteshavebeenrecorded,
show the participants the results and conduct the discussion segment of the exercise.
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Summary of learning
This chapter has argued that:
•  Co-operatives are member-based organisations; their purpose is to satisfy member needs rather 
than to maximise the return on capital employed.
• Co-operativesseektomaximisememberbenefitsthroughtheachievementofone 
or more objectives.
•  Members own a co-operative on a collective rather than individual basis. Ownership of a co-
operative is dependent on a member’s willingness to use the business.
•  Members of a co-operative are entitled to a share of any surplus generated in proportion to their 
patronage of the co-operative.
• Capital is an instrument in a co-operative rather than a driver of business operations.
Essay/discussion questions
• ‘Co-operativeenterpriseswillfinditdifficulttoraisefinancefromexternalsources.’Analysethe
factorsthatwouldcontributetothisperceiveddifficulty.
•  Did the Rochdale Pioneers’ ‘no credit policy’ demonstrate concern for community in terms of 
not wanting citizens to get into debt or was it the opposite, showing a complete lack of concern 
for community by disregarding those who might not have cash resources to trade?
•  ‘An organisation’s business model is affected by its values, principles and ethics.’ Discuss this 
statementwithreferencetomultipleorganisationalforms(investor-owned,co-operatives, 
and social enterprises).
Useful resources
Scottish Agricultural Organisation Society - http://www.saos.co.uk/.
National Cooperative Business Association - http://www.ncba.coop/.
Co-operatives UK - http://www.uk.coop.
Understanding the Cooperative Business Model  - http://vimeo.com/6081590.
Global co-operative statistics - http://www.ica.coop/coop/statistics.html.
The Cooperative Curriculum - http://cooperative-curriculum.wikispaces.com/.
There is an Alternative - http://www.vimeo.com/22896857.
United Nations Year of Co-operatives 2012 - http://social.un.org/coopsyear/.
452. More than just profit: the co-operative business model
Endnotes
1.  There are examples of co-operatives that allow investors to become members, though it is not common. Ethical Consumer,  
a consumer research organisation, has both consumers and investors as members of the co-operative (this combination of two 
membership classes is known as a hybrid or ‘multi-stakeholder’ co-operative).
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...of the people, by the 
people, for the people:
co-operative governance
‘If liberty and equality, as is thought 
by some, are chiefly to be found in 
democracy, they will be best attained 
when all persons alike share in 
government to the utmost.’
Aristotle
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Learning objectives
This chapter introduces some of the key aspects to effective governance of co-operative enterprises. 
Co-operatives are member-owned and for this reason they need a system of governance that places 
members at the core of the business. Generation of a healthy surplus is crucial to co-operative 
governance because without economic viability there is nothing for the members to own or control. 
By the end of this chapter you will be able to:
• outline the core elements of co-operative governance;
• analyse the application of democratic theory of governance in co-operative enterprises;
•  explain the relationship between the roles of members, management, and the board of directors 
in a co-operative.
The key arguments that will be developed in this chapter are:
Co-operative governance is based on a system of personal rights, rather than property rights 
which is the case in an investor-owned company.
Members can exercise their right to participate in governance by voting directly on long-term 
business decisions and policy, as well as electing a board of directors to represent member 
interests. Election is conducted on a one member/one vote basis.
The effective governance of a co-operative is dependent on the members, board of directors, 
and management working together to achieve the co-operative’s objectives.
Education, training and information are vital for members to be able to participate effectively 
in the governance of the co-operative.
What is governance?
Owing to prominent corporate scandals in 2000–1, as well as the increasing size and complexity 
of publicly-owned organisations, corporate governance has been widely discussed in recent years. 
Broadlydefined,corporategovernancerefersto‘thestructures,processes,culturesandsystems
that engender the successful operation of the organisation’.1 In essence, corporate governance is 
concerned with ensuring that the objectives of the organisation are achieved in a manner that is 
acceptable to the owners. The following notions are central to any form of corporate governance:
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•  The purpose of the organisation is vital in determining an appropriate system of governance.
•  An effective system of corporate governance must balance the needs of accountability  
and performance.
• Good corporate governance must be based on principles rather than prescription.2
•  Good corporate governance is as much about supporting and enabling management  
as it is about directly controlling their behaviours.3
Co-operative governance
The most important asset to a co-operative is its members.4 Therefore, co-operatives place their 
members at the core of their governance structure, just as investor-owned companies place 
shareholders at the core of theirs. In one sense, there is not much difference between shareholder 
value theory, which states that an investor-owned company should be directed towards generating 
maximum value for its shareholders, and a co-operative’s attempts to direct its resources to satisfy 
memberneedsandprovidemaximumbenefits.Itisthemannerinwhichtheseorganisational
theories are formalised in their respective corporate governance structures that distinguishes  
co-operatives from investor-owned companies.
The most important aspect of co-operative governance is the effective relationship between the two 
core functions of the organisation:
• democraticparticipation(association)
• operationsmanagement(enterprise)
Of course it is very unlikely that these two functions will always be held strictly in balance or that 
theywillnevercomeintoconflict.5 A more accurate assessment of the relationship between the two 
functionsisprovidedbyKleerwhoarguesthat,inthemediumtolong-term,therewillbeconflict
betweentheinterestsoftheco-operative(economicexpansion)andtheinterestsofmembers
(extensiveparticipation).6 Generally the interests of one function will supersede the interests  
of the other during periods in the co-operative’s existence.
Figure 4 illustrates the governance system of a typical co-operative.7 It shows that members wield 
ultimateauthorityandcandirectlyinfluencetheoperationsofthebusinessbyclearlydefiningtheir
needs and communicating them via participation in govenance.
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Figure 4-Overview of co-operative governance
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Democratic theory of governance
Democratic theory asserts that ultimate control rights in an organisation lie with those who are 
directly affected by the operations of the enterprise. In the case of co-operatives this means the 
members. A democratic system of governance is based on the concept of personal rights as opposed 
topropertyrightsininvestor-ownedfirms.
Apersonalright,inthiscontext,isarightthatbelongstoanindividualbecausethepersonsatisfies
some objective criterion; for example, he or she plays a functional role in the organisation or uses 
the goods and services of the business. In a democratic election, a person is normally granted  
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a right to vote only when they are a citizen of that country. Co-operatives have adopted a system  
of governance based on personal rights.8 This is opposed to the system of property rights in 
investor-owned companies where voting is conducted on a one share/one vote basis.
It is vital that those who are entrusted with rights in an organisation are willing and able to accept 
the responsibilities that such rights entail.9 In the case of co-operatives, member participation 
in governance is a fundamental responsibility which comes from having the right to exercise 
democratic control over the business.
EXERCISE - Democratic theory of corporate governance
In the YouTube video at the link below, David Brown outlines one of the many theories 
relating to corporate governance including the one adopted by co-operatives, the democratic 
theory of governance. In his opinion, democratic governance leads to poor performance and 
a lack of organisational sustainability. Watch the video and consider the following questions:
1.  To what extent are you convinced by Brown’s argument that democratic governance will 
neglecttheinterestsofthefirm?
2. Whatfactorsaffectthechoiceofacorporategovernancetheoryforafirm?Consider 
the purpose and ownership structure of the business.
3. ‘Brown’sargumentissupportedbythelegalviewofanorganisationasprofit 
maximising in order to provide the greatest return to shareholders. Hence his  
assertion that democratic governance will lead to a deviation from the interests  
ofthefirm(profitmaximisation).Hedoesnotlegislateforotherformsoforganisation,
onesthatareprofitmakingbutnotprofitmaximising.’Doyouagreewiththis
statement? What evidence is there to support Brown’s argument?
Video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cEsPXA7pMNA
Decision-making
Co-operatives involve a wide-range of people in the decision-making and management process. 
Members work with the board of directors to make decisions regarding policy in the co-operative. 
The board works closely with the senior management team to develop strategic goals and objectives 
for the business. It is essential that all three groups – members, management, and the board of 
directors – work together effectively and understand their own and each other’s responsibilities.
Deciding how to decide
It is vitally important that the members of a co-operative explicitly state how decisions are to 
be made. This decision-making process can be formally stated in the co-operative’s governing 
document or else informally agreed by all members. The latter approach only works if there 
areveryfewmembers(andeventhenmaybreakdownintheeventofconflict).Thekeypoint
regarding the choice of an appropriate decision-making process is that the decision to use it must 
be possible using that same process.10 For instance, if decisions in the co-operative are to be made 
viamajorityvoting,thenthemembersmustagreetothisbyamajorityvote(thatis,amajority
of members must accept majority voting). The same goes for any of the other forms of decision-
making that can be used in co-operatives, as outlined below.11
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Consensus  -  everyone needs to agree on a matter before a decision can be taken. While this 
may seem to be the purest form of decision-making, relying on persuasion and 
discussion,itcanbedifficulttoimplementbecauseitrunstheriskofmembers
reachingadecisionthatnobodywanted(compromiseratherthanconsensus).
On the other hand, co-operatives are founded upon the members having a 
common interest, and consensus decision-making may be the best method 
of reinforcing this mutuality. Consensus decision-making can be especially 
difficulttoimplementinco-operativeswithalargemembershipbase.
Simple majority - foradecisiontobetaken,morethanfiftypercentofthevotingmembersmust
be in favour of a particular outcome. This method is generally quicker than 
consensus as there is no need for discussion or persuasion. A simple majority, 
however, can alienate a large proportion of the membership and the co-
operativecan,intheory,becontrolledandrunforthebenefitofslightly 
more than half of the members.
Supermajority -  requires a proportion of the membership exceeding a simple majority to vote 
in favour of a decision. It is at the discretion of the co-operative as to what this 
proportion may be. Decisions reached by this method are potentially fairer 
because they account for a large majority of members, though there is still 
the possibility of alienating a small section of the members. There is also the 
possibility of decisions being blocked by a minority of members. Supermajority 
decision-making is a better process for preventing the creation of factions 
withintheco-operative.Supermajorityvotingisusuallyonlyspecified 
for major decisions such as amending the name, rules or objects of the  
co-operative.
Speed and quality of decision-making in co-operatives
It is often argued that decision-making in co-operative enterprises is considerably slower  
than in other organisations, and therefore represents a competitive disadvantage. The slowness 
is attributed to the participatory nature of governance and the need to get members ‘on side’ 
whenmakingadecision.Anempiricalstudyoffourteenco-operativesintheUSconfirmedthat
co-operatives do take longer to make decisions than other forms of enterprise.12 The argument 
that labels slower decision-making as a competitive disadvantage, however, can be countered by 
introducing the concept of quality. Despite taking longer to make decisions, it can be argued that 
the decisions produced by the co-operative are of a higher quality as a result of a consultative 
and participatory governance structure; these decisions have been subject to a greater degree of 
scrutiny, using the knowledge of all of the members involved. In this paradigm of decision-making, 
co-operatives can be thought to have a competitive advantage over other forms of enterprise.  
The key point is that any decisions taken by the members, managers, and board of directors must 
balance the needs of democratic participation with the needs of the organisation.
The importance of the governing document
Co-operatives UK describe a governing document as:
a record of the governance arrangements of an organisation, typically detailing the purpose  
of the organisation and its relationship both to its members and to the outside world.13
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The document is a valuable resource for it clearly states how members can exercise their voting 
rights in the governance of the co-operative. Typically, a co-operative’s rules will contain details 
pertaining to the admission of members, the functions of the board, how meetings should be 
conducted, and other related governance issues. The rules of a co-operative should be accessible  
viathebodywithwhichitisregistered(intheUKthiscouldbetheFinancialServicesAuthority 
or Companies House) or by contacting the co-operative.
The role of the members,  
board and management
The effective governance of a co-operative is dependent on the members, board of directors,  
and management working together to achieve the co-operative’s objectives.14 There are three key 
aspects to ensure these groups function interdependently:
• each group needs to understand its roles and responsibilities;
• there needs to be effective communication between all three groups;
• each group needs to regularly engage in the governance system of the co-operative.
Table 4 below represents the most common and important responsibilities of each group.
Table 4-Responsibilities of governance participants
Group Responsibilities
Members15 Understand the co-operative: its purpose, objectives, structure, operations,  
benefitsandlimitations.
Elect, remove and evaluate directors.
Assist in the formulation of policy
Provide necessary capital.
Patronise the co-operative.
Participate in decision-making.
Provide information.
Help obtain new members.
Board of directors16 Formulate policies acceptable to members.
Hirethegeneralmanager(CEO)andholdthemaccountable.
Set long-term business objectives.
Evaluate the performance of the co-operative.
Act collectively not individually.
Source and manage capital.
Management17 Put into action the policies decided by the board.
Serve the best interests of the members.
General management functions.
Report to the board.
Hire employees.
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Owing to the interrelationship of each group’s responsibilities, communication within  
co-operatives must be continuous, effective, and involve all three groups.18
The role of the members
There are actions that the board of directors and the management can take to facilitate greater 
member involvement in governance. First, both parties must ensure that members have access to 
information relating to the co-operative’s objectives, policies, and operations. Second, both parties 
mustensurethattherearesufficientopportunities(outsideofmandatoryopportunitiessuchasthe
AGM) for members to participate in the running of the co-operative.
In a similar way to shareholders in investor-owned companies, the members of the co-operative 
havetheabilitytofulfiltheirgoverningroleviathreemechanisms:voice,vote,andexit.Voice
representsthewayinwhichmemberscaninfluencedecision-makingandpolicyintheco-operative
byexpressingtheirviewstotheboardandmanagement.Memberscanalsofulfiltheirroleby
votingonmajordecisions.Finally,memberscanusuallyexittheco-operativewithoutdifficulty.
Since member shares are usually non-transferable, there are few barriers preventing a member 
exiting the business, which then places the onus on the co-operative to recruit new members.19 
Member exit poses a greater risk to the co-operative than shareholder exit does to an investor-
ownedfirm,becausethesharesheldbymemberscanbewithdrawn.Thatis,theequitycapital
supplied by members to the co-operative can be reclaimed when a member leaves the co-operative. 
As a result, the threat of exit can be an effective way of reinforcing the co-operative’s purpose to the 
board and management.
The role of the board
Nearly all co-operative enterprises will have a board of directors to oversee the operations of the 
business and ensure the co-operative is directed towards achieving its objectives.20 It is generally 
muchtoocumbersomeandinefficientforeverymembertomakeeverydecisionregardingthe 
co-operative’s strategy and policies hence the need for a board of directors. The members of  
a co-operative’s board of directors are elected from the membership; the election of directors 
occurs at the AGM.
The board of directors in a co-operative has two main roles:
• represent member interests;
• provide strategic direction for the enterprise.
Like the two main functions of a co-operative enterprise, the relationship between both roles 
mustbemanaged,andequilibriumcanbedifficulttoachieve.Whilstthedemocraticnatureof
governanceinco-operativestendstoensurethatboardmembersfulfilthefirstrole,itisnotalways
the case that board members will possess the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to drive the 
business forward. Adequate training and education opportunities should be provided to prospective 
andnewlyappointedboardmemberstoensuretheycanfulfilbothroles.Table5belowoutlines
some of the issues co-operative board members must address as part of their dual role.
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Table 5-Corporate governance theories and their impact on the board
Democratic 
theory
This is the formal governance model that co-operatives and mutuals adopt. 
Democratic theory of governance is based on the concept of the board acting 
as representatives of the members and includes core principles such as one 
member/one vote, open elections, and accountability to the membership.  
The representatives that serve on the board of a co-operative are elected from  
the general membership.
Agency theory This is the model that is most common in private companies around the  
world(particularlytheUSandUK).Corporategovernancebasedonagency
theory is concerned with the board’s role in ensuring managerial compliance. 
The theory asserts that the interests of owners and managers differ and  
a mechanism is needed to ensure that managers act in the best interests  
of shareholders. In relation to co-operatives, it is essential that the board  
ensures that managers are acting in the best interests of members.
Stewardship 
theory
Thistheoryassumesthatthosewhocontroltheorganisation(managers)want
to do a good job acting as stewards of the organisation’s resources. Stewardship 
theory promotes a partner-style working relationship between the board and 
management. The role of the board is to add value in terms of strategic decision-
making to support management. This means that board members must possess 
some expertise in relation to the company’s operations.
Resource 
dependency 
theory
This theory of governance is based on the idea that the organisation is dependent 
on its external environment for its resources. The role of the board is to maintain 
effectiverelationshipswithstakeholderstoensurethereisaflowofresourcesin
and out of the organisation. Board members must possess external contacts and 
expertise to function effectively in relation to resource dependency theory.
Stakeholder 
theory
Stakeholder theory states that an organisation should be governed in the 
interests of multiple stakeholders. This theory requires boards to effectively 
manageconflictarisingbetweendifferentstakeholders.
Managerial 
hegemony 
theory
This theory asserts that managers effectively control organisations and the  
role of the board is merely to approve the decisions taken by management.  
While managers may be considered best placed to exercise control in the 
organisation,itisvitalthattheboardisabletoexercisepowerandinfluence 
over management when required. For co-operatives, this theory presents the 
danger of member interests being usurped by those of management.
Source: Adapted from C. Cornforth, ‘Making sense of co-operative governance: 
Competing models and tensions’ Review of International Co-operation 95 (2002): 51–7.
Each of the above theories is applicable to the boards of co-operatives. Cornforth argues that the 
board of a co-operative must not function according to just one theory. He highlights four key areas 
in which the simultaneous roles of a board may cause tension:
• The role of the board as representatives and experts.
• The role of the board in driving performance and ensuring conformance.
• The role of the board in controlling and supporting management.
• The accountability of the board to members and other stakeholders.21
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The role of management
The primary role of managers in a co-operative is to implement the strategic objectives of the 
business through the management of day-to-day operational activities. Management, in co-
operation with the board of directors, is responsible for ensuring the co-operative realises its 
purpose or mission. The activities managers pursue must be in the best interests of members.
The management training provided in business schools does not usually cater for the distinct 
competencies that are required to manage a co-operative successfully. In an analysis of core 
managementcompetenciesforconsumerco-operatives,Tuominen,JussilaandRantanenidentified
eleven elements of managerial competence. Despite their focus on consumer co-operatives, many 
of these competencies apply equally to the management of producer and worker co-operatives.
Table 6-Elements of managerial competence in consumer co-operatives
Type of competence Specific elements
Knowledge Information and understanding of co-operative value-based 
management22
Information and understanding of customer interface management
Information and understanding of multi-business management
Information and understanding of community development
Attitude Identificationwithco-operativevalues
Readiness to speak out
Skill Co-operative value-based management skills
Customer interface management skills
Community development skills
Collective and participative decision-making skills
Visionary leadership skills
Source: P. Tuominen, I. Jussila, and N. Rantanen, ‘Managerial Competence in Consumer Co-operatives: 
Inducing theory from empirical observations’ International Journal of Co-operative Management 5 (2010): 9–22.
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Ortegaoutlinessevenvariablesorfactorsthatinfluencetheprobabilityofaco-operativebeing
successfully managed:
Table 7-Factors that influence the success of co-operative management
Factors that  
influence the success 
of co-operative 
management
Endogenous
Compliance with co-operative values and principles
Co-operative identity
Leadership
Management ability to adapt to the needs and 
changes of the environment
Exogenous
Co-operative integration
Government policies
Co-operative legislation
Source: P. O. Ortega, ‘Agricultural Co-operation in Spain. Developing research goals and a literature 
review on the issue of success factors  for co-operative management applied in the case of an olive oil 
co-operative, The International Journal of Co-operative Management 5 (2010): 46–53.
These seven success factors need to be married with an effective corporate governance structure. 
Every organisation needs managers who are competent and principled, but this in itself is not 
sufficienttoensuretheenterpriseisruninawaythatisacceptabletotheowners.Arobust
corporate governance structure coupled with engaged owners is the best way of ensuring that the 
organisation operates appropriately. There are examples of co-operatives or mutuals that were 
‘hijacked’ by their managers and converted to private companies or public limited companies  
(noteinparticularthesurgeinprivatisationsofmutualorganisations,particularlybuilding
societies, in the early 1990s).23 It should not be assumed that the values and principles are  
enough to ensure that management acts in the best interests of members: an informed and  
engaged membership is just as important.24
Importance of engagement and participation
Members must understand their rights and responsibilities and have appropriate incentives  
to participate.25 Birchall and Simmons propose that member involvement and participation can  
be motivated by three factors, known as collectivistic incentives:
• shared goals;
• shared values;
• sense of community.26
A sensible membership strategy is needed in order for a co-operative to engage successfully with  
its members.27
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SEMINAR EXERCISE - Democratic decision-making
Materials to support this exercise can be found at the VLE.
The purpose of this exercise is to engage students in various methods of democratic decision-
making and ensure they understand the process, issues and outcomes of each method.
1.  Divide the students into groups based on the decision-making process they will use 
i.e. majority and consensus. The number of participants in each group is entirely up 
to the facilitator; we recommend that the majority group is uneven in number and the 
consensus group even in number.
2.  Assign the students in each group their role. The two roles are senior and junior. For the 
majority group, assign more students the role of senior employee than junior employee. 
With the consensus group, assign an even number of roles:
 Senior Employee - With the company >2 years
 Junior Employee - With the company <2 years
3. Record the time it takes each group to reach their decision and what their decision is.
4. Whenthegroupshavefinishedmakingtheirdecision,conductthediscussionsegment 
of the exercise.
Summary of learning
This chapter has argued that:
•  Co-operative governance is based on a system of personal rights rather than property rights 
which is distinct from the system in an investor-owned company.
•  Members can exercise their right to participate in governance by voting directly on major 
business decisions, as well as electing a board of directors to represent member interests.  
This is conducted on a one member/one vote basis.
•  The effective governance of a co-operative is dependent on the members, board of directors,  
and management working together to achieve the co-operative’s objectives.
•  Education, training, and access to information are vital for members to be able to participate 
effectively in the governance of the co-operative.
Essay/discussion questions
•  Should the board of a co-operative be accountable to the interests of non-member groups?
•  How would a co-operative go about addressing the tensions that can arise in the role  
of the board?
• Aretheredifficultieskeepingmembersengagedwhenaco-operativebecomesverylarge?
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•  Why is democracy not widespread in corporations, but is nonetheless something we strive for  
insociety(andforwhichpeopleinsomecountriessacrificetheirlives)?
• ‘Co-operativeswillfinditimpossibletosatisfactorilymanagetherelationshipbetweenmember
participation and control, and the business requirements of the co-operative.’ Discuss this 
statement with respect to your study of co-operative governance.
•  Does the free market economy facilitate democracy or is it the other way around?  
Are co-operatives a way of bringing democracy to the market?
Useful resources
UK Corporate Governance Code - http://www.frc.org.uk/corporate/ukcgcode.cfm.
University of Wisconsin Co-operative Governance resources -  
http://www.uworker co-operativec.wisc.edu/issues/Governance/index.aspx.
Co-operantics - http://www.cooperantics.co.uk/.
SAOS best practice guide to governance -  
http://www.saos.co.uk/home/documents/SAOSCGEFFP.pdf.
Co-operatives UK codes of practice -  
http://www.uk.coop/tags/resources/Codes%20of%20practice.
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Co-operative societies 
in society:
classifications and incorporations
‘Cooperatives, as economic 
enterprises and as self-help 
organizations, play a meaningful 
role in uplifting the socio-economic 
conditions of their members and their 
local communities.’
United Nations
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4. Co-operative societies in society: 
classifications and incorporation
Learning objectives
This chapter explains the three principal ways of classifying co-operatives: the area-based 
method, the membership-based method, and the group-served method. It then discusses the legal 
structures and regulation within which co-operatives in Britain operate. By the end of this chapter 
you will be able to:
• identify the different types of co-operatives;
• assesstheadvantagesanddisadvantagesofvariousmethodsofclassification;
• recognise the legal structures that apply to co-operatives.
The key arguments that will be developed in this chapter are:
Co-operatives are classed in different ways: by area, by membership, and by group served.
Co-operatives are most commonly classed according to the type of group served.
The group-served method distinguishes between consumer co-operatives, producer  
co-operatives, worker co-operatives, and hybrid co-operatives.
There is a legal framework for establishing and running a co-operative.
Area-based method of classification
Thearea-basedmethodofclassificationrelatestothegeographicalboundswithinwhichaservice
or product is provided. Examples appear in the table below.
Table 8-Area-based classification of co-operatives
Area served
Local:
Drumchapel Credit 
Union – serves a 
local community in 
the north-west of 
Glasgow.
Regional:
Heart of England –  
is a consumer society 
serving Leicestershire, 
Warwickshire and the 
West Midlands  
of England.
National:
The Co-operative 
Group – is the 
largest consumer 
co-operative in 
the UK and has a 
wide portfolio of 
businesses.
International
Mondragón 
Corporation –  
has plants in 18 
countries outside  
of Spain.
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Membership-based method of classification
Co-operativescanalsobeclassifiedintermsoftheirmembership.Classifyingco-operativesbytype
of membership refers to whether the members are individuals or other businesses/co-operatives.
Table 9-Membership-based classification of co-operatives
Type of membership
Primary co-operative 
(centralised):
Provides direct services to 
patron-users(i.e.members).
An example would be a local 
co-operative that sells groceries 
directly to its members.
Secondary co-operative 
(federated):
Membership of a secondary 
co-operative consists of other 
co-operatives.
Mixed:
Some co-operatives can supply 
services to individual members 
as well as other co-operative 
businesses.
An example of a ‘primary co-operative’ would be GreenCity Wholefoods, a worker co-operative 
based in Glasgow providing employment to its members.
Anexampleofa‘secondaryco-operative’istheCo-operativeRetailTradingGroup(CRTG), 
which acts as a central buying point for all co-operative retail societies in the UK.
An example of a ‘mixed co-operative’ would be The Co-operative Group, whose membership 
includes both individuals and other businesses.
Group-served method of classification
The ‘group-served’ method is the most widely-used method of classifying co-operatives.1 Within 
eachofthegroupcategories(producers,consumers,workers,andhybrid)thereareco-operatives
that focus on different areas of activity, such as marketing, housing, or insurance.
Table 10-Group-served classification of co-operatives
Group served
Producers:
Marketing 
Production supply 
Service 
Credit 
Mutual insurance 
Machinery ring
Consumers:
Retail 
Credit 
Housing 
Health 
Insurance 
Community
Workers:
Can be any form 
of business once 
it is owned and 
democratically 
controlled by its 
employees
Hybrid:
Serves two or more 
different groups
Source: M. A. Abrahamsen, Cooperative Business Enterprise (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976), pp. 44–5.
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Sometimesclassificationsofco-operativesforgodistinguishingbetweenproducersandworkers
and group them together under producers. There is, however, a sound argument for splitting 
producersandworkersintoseparateclasses.Producers(forexample,farmers)tendtoremain 
self-employed and autonomous. In contrast, workers are employed directly by the co-operative. 
This is an important distinction which explains why the two groups are usually split. Let us now 
consider each of these four group-served types with some case studies.
Producer co-operatives
Producer-owned businesses enable self-employed individuals and businesses to gain the strength 
in numbers they need to survive in the market. An example of a producer co-operative would be  
a group of farmers banding together to market their produce jointly.
Case study 4.1 - Ocean Spray
Ocean Spray is an agricultural co-operative owned by more than 600 cranberry growers in the 
northern USA and Canada along with over seventy Florida grapefruit growers. The co-operative 
was formed in 1930 by three cranberry growers who shared a common goal of expanding the 
market for their crops through innovative products.2 The growers are from diverse regions in 
North America including British Columbia, Oregon, Wisconsin, Massachusetts, New Jersey and 
Florida. Ocean Spray employs more than 2,000 people worldwide and in 2009 generated revenues 
of around $1.9bn.3 It is run from a headquarters surrounded by cranberry bogs in Lakeville-
Middleboro, Massachusetts.
Ocean Spray is a type of enterprise known as a marketing co-operative. This means that  
Ocean Spray’s owners use the co-operative for joint marketing and production operations.  
Each farmer will supply their produce to Ocean Spray, which offers the highest price it can as  
well as guaranteeing to purchase all of its members’ produce.4 Ocean Spray then markets and  
sells the farmers’ inputs through a wide range of products, including juices, dried fruit and sauces.  
As owners of the business, the farmers also share in the surplus generated by Ocean Spray.
Consumer co-operatives
Consumer-owned businesses provide people with goods at the lowest possible price, with  
a guarantee of good value, and so make their income go further. An example of a consumer  
co-operative would be a retailer serving a local community with food and toiletries.
Case study 4.2 - The Co-operative Group
The Co-operative Group, headquartered in Manchester, England, is the UK’s largest consumer  
co-operative.5 Operating across multiple industries and with revenues of £13.7bn in 2010,  
the group is one of the most successful retail co-operatives in the world. The group has operations 
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infood(producingandselling),financialservices,travel,pharmacy,funeralcare,legalservices,
electrical goods, and motor vehicles. Outlined below are some of the business’s key statistics,  
as of 2 July 2011:
Group revenue £13.7bn
Pre-taxprofit £545.7m
Member dividends £150.2m
No. of members 5.8m6
No. of outlets > 5,000
No. of employees 110,000
Central to the success of The Co-operative Group is the collective ownership structure of the 
business, whereby only those who trade with the co-operative can be owners. And as owners, 
membersareentitledtoashareoftheprofitsgeneratedbythebusinessbasedontheirpatronage.
Worker co-operatives
Worker-owned businesses provide people with an income, but are also a way of gaining 
control over the conditions under which they labour, providing what the International Labour 
Organisation calls ‘decent work’.
Case study 4.3 - Suma Wholefoods
Triangle Wholefoods Collective Limited, trading as Suma Wholefoods, is the UK’s largest worker 
co-operative. Based in Elland, near Halifax, the company has over 120 members and a turnover 
of £25m. Not only do the worker members collectively own the company and have the right to 
participateinashareoftheprofitsgenerated,theyalsoactastheultimategoverningbodyinthe
business through a non-hierarchical management structure.
Democratic governance
The organisation has a two tier structure for governance, with the members electing a Management 
CommitteeattheAnnualGeneralMeeting(AGM).TheManagementCommitteeconsistsofsix
members, with at least two places reserved for women, to ensure the Committee is representative 
of the broader worker membership. Half the Committee is re-elected each year. The Chair is 
termed a ‘functional’ Chair – conducting the roles of a Chair, without having any decision-making 
powers on the Committee. In addition to the six members and the functional Chair, the Committee 
alsohasaFinanceOfficer,PersonnelOfficerandOperationsCo-ordinator–allofwhomhold
advisory roles in a non-voting capacity on the Committee.
The Management Committee meets weekly, and has delegated decision-making powers that have 
been agreed internally, and which are not described in the governing document. The general 
meeting, involving all members, meets six times during the year and agrees strategies, business 
plans and major policy decisions. The Management Committee is then given delegated decision-
making to implement the plans and make recommendations to the general membership for future 
direction. Beyond the general meetings and meetings of the Management Committee, there are also 
Functional Area Co-ordinator meetings.
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Functional Area Co-ordinators meet daily to discuss and agree issues in distinct operational areas 
of the organisation. Minutes are taken at these meetings and forwarded to the Management 
Committee, as part of the Operations Co-ordinator’s report. These Functional Area Co-ordinator 
meetings ensure decisions are shared amongst as many worker members as possible, and provide 
another opportunity for decision-making involving worker members. The governance structure  
of the co-operative enables the full worker membership to have control and ownership of decisions 
of the co-operative.
The Management Committee has delegated powers within agreed limits, although it must report 
backtothegeneralmembershipovervariationstothebusinessplan,financesorpersonnelissues.
The co-operative states that the Management Committee is there to monitor progress, not to direct 
or enforce decisions.
Source: Co-operatives UK. Suma Wholefoods, case study no. 6. Manchester: Co-operatives UK, (n.d).
Hybrid co-operatives
Ahybridco-operative(alsoknownasamulti-stakeholderco-operative)isdefinedasamulti-
member class co-operative that has its own distinct rules regarding membership, governance and 
patronage. For example, Eroski supermarket, part of Mondragón Corporation, has both workers 
and consumers as its members. Hybrid co-operatives draw on the strengths and eliminate the 
weaknesses of different co-operative enterprises. For example, consumer co-operatives are scalable 
andhighlyadeptatraisingfinancewhereasworkerco-operativesarecommittedtoproviding
satisfying, rewarding employment for workers. There are three major factors in the structure  
of a hybrid co-operative:
Membership -  What are the rules governing how different stakeholders become members  
e.g. should worker members contribute more capital and undergo a period  
of probation?
Governance -  How should members be represented on the board, equally or by some other 
proportional mechanism?
Patronage -  Should each membership class receive the same proportion of the surplus 
generated?
Advantages:
• Moreaccesstocapital–widermembershipbaseprovidesgreaterscopetoraisefinance.
• Facilitate participation – better decision-making by involving more stakeholders.
• Encourage loyalty.
Challenges:
• Increased complexity.
• Differences between member classes.
• Possible domination by one member class.
Source: Adapted from L. Rodgers, Hybrid Cooperatives: Challenges and Advantages 
(Oakland: National Center for Employee Ownership, 2008).
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Legal regulation
Under UK legislation, co-operatives have a variety of options regarding the legal form for the 
enterprise. Three of the common legal forms are:7
• IndustrialandProvidentSociety(IPS)
• Private company limited by guarantee
• Private company limited by shares
Industrial and Provident Society8
An IPS is an organisation conducting an industry, business or trade, either as a co-operative or for 
thebenefitofthecommunity,andisregisteredundertheIndustrialandProvidentSocietiesAct
1965. Businesses that wish to set up as an industrial and provident society must register with the 
Financial Services Authority. Traditionally, co-operatives were set up under this Act because their 
unique ownership and governance structures were viewed as incompatible with registration under 
the Companies Act.
Historical perspective
The Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1852 provided a legal framework for co-operatives and 
mutual businesses in the UK. Prior to the 1852 Act, co-operatives were regulated by the Friendly 
Societies Acts of 1834 and 1846, which prevented co-operatives from selling to non-members.9  
In 1862, the Act was amended to provide incorporation and limited liability for IPS enterprises,  
as well as allowing co-operatives to invest in other societies.10 This Act preceded the incorporation 
ofjoint-stock(investorowned)companiesbyfouryears(theCompaniesAct1856).The1852Act
also made provision for certain features that were mandatory for societies to have in their articles 
ofincorporation.Forexample,theActstipulatedthatuptoonethirdoftheprofitsoftheco-
operative could be shared amongst the members, with the remainder used to build up the capital 
reserves of the business or for some other provident purpose.
Co-operative Fact
The term provident refers to the ability to foresee and make provision for the future, 
reflectingtheimportanceco-operativebusinessesplaceontheaccumulationofcapital
reservesthroughearningprofitandmembercontributions(principlethree).
Requirements
AsocietymayregisterasanIndustrialandProvidentSocietyifitsatisfieseitherofthetwo
conditionsfoundatSection1(2)oftheIndustrialandProvidentSocietiesAct1965:11
• Thesocietyisabonafideco-operative;or
• Inviewofthefactthatthebusinessofthesocietyisforthebenefitofthecommunity,there
are special reasons why the society should be registered under the Industrial and Provident 
Societies Act 1965 rather than as a company under the Companies Act.
EveryIndustrialandProvidentSocietymusthaveaminimumofthreemembers(originallyseven)
atthetimeofregistration,unlessitisasecondaryco-operativesociety(whosemembersconsistof
other co-operatives), in which case there must be at least two societies.
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A Bona Fide Co-operative
Thereisnolegalorstatutorydefinitionofwhatabonafideco-operativeis;however,thereisan
agreed set of conditions that normally applies to co-operative status:
•  The members of the co-operative must have a common economic, social or cultural need/
interest(notethesimilaritytotheICAdefinitionofaco-operative).
• Thepurposeoftheco-operativeistooperateforthemutualbenefitofitsmembers.
•  The co-operative is jointly-owned by the members and is democratically-controlled based 
on a system of one member/one vote, regardless of the amount of capital any one member 
contributestotheco-operative(democraticmembercontrolprinciple).
• Thereisalimitedreturn(ifany)onshareandloancapital.Thisappliestothecommoncapital
fundstheco-operativeholdsonbehalfofitsmembers(membereconomicparticipation
principle).
• Themembersoftheco-operativereceivetheirshareoftheco-operative’sprofitinproportionto
theirparticipationinthebusiness.Inaretailsociety(consumerco-operative)thiswouldreflect
their purchase of goods and services from the co-operative; in a worker-owned society, it would 
bebasedontheamountoflabourcontributedtothebusiness(whichcouldbedecidedbyhours
worked, salary, seniority or years spent working in the business).
• Thereshouldbenodiscriminatoryrestrictionsonmembership(openandvoluntary
membership principle).12
TheserequirementsweredesignedinsuchawaysoastoreflecttheICAStatementonthe 
Co-operative Identity.
Regulation
Industrial and Provident Societies are not subject to the same stringent regulations as other 
forms of enterprise. This is because ‘the FSA does not have wide-ranging regulatory or prudential 
supervisory powers in relation to Industrial And Provident Societies’.13 In order to comply with  
FSA regulations, industrial and provident societies must:
• fileanannualreturn,withaccompanyingaccounts;
• payanannualfee(calculatedonaslidingscalebasedonthevalueofassets);
• notifytheFSAofanysignificantchanges(name,rules,registeredoffice).
In return, the FSA has the authority to cancel the registration of the society if it breaches the 1965 
Actandcanalsocommissionarevieworinspectionofasociety’saccountsifaspecifiedproportion
of the members of that society request.14
Restrictions
IPS legislation contains a number of outdated clauses that affect the manner in which co-operatives 
can raise capital. An individual is restricted from providing more than £20,000 to a co-operative; 
members who are co-operatives are not subject to a limit.15 A co-operative society that wishes to 
operate as a bank is restricted from issuing share capital that can be withdrawn as it would affect 
the business’s ability to maintain adequate capital.
Example of an IPS co-operative
Lincolnshire Co-operative Limited, a consumer society based in the east of England,  
was established under the IPS Act in 1861 and is still trading.
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Private Company Limited by Guarantee (CLG)
Companies limited by guarantee do not have any share capital and members act as guarantors 
rather than shareholders – therefore they all have one vote. At the time of incorporation, members 
agreetoguaranteealimitedamounttocreditors(usually£1)intheeventofthebusinessbeing
wound up. This legal form is most common amongst charitable and voluntary organisations but 
has been utilised by co-operatives, particularly worker co-operatives, since it is thought to provide 
strong protection for the values and principles of the business.
Example of a co-operative
The Very People, a marketing co-operative based in Glasgow, Scotland, adopted the limited by 
guaranteemodelafteradviceandconsultationfromCo-operativeDevelopmentScotland(CDS).
The six members do not hold any shares in the business and operate a one member/one vote 
governance system.
Private Company Limited by Shares (CLS)
Private companies limited by shares are prohibited from offering their shares to the general public 
but still retain the ability to raise capital from external sources. The liability associated with these 
sharesonlyrelatestothevalueofthecapitaloriginallyinvested(includinganyunpaidamount 
on the shares) in the event of the company winding up.
Example of a co-operative
Harness Care Co-operative, a health care practice operating in the Brent area of Greater London, 
registered as a company limited by shares in 2008.16
Why choose a private company limited by shares rather than by guarantee? Companies limited 
by guarantee are unable to issue shares, restricting their ability to raise capital. While most co-
operatives do not choose the limited by shares legal form, it is possible to operate a one member/
one vote governance system by issuing one voting share and additional non-voting shares in the 
co-operative. There is a danger however, that members will seek to maximise the value of the  
co-operative in order to realise the capital gains accrued by their non-voting shares.
The role of articles of association
Every business that becomes incorporated must have a set of guidelines detailing how the  
business is to be run. In a company, procedures relating to governance, issuing of shares,  
and winding up are examples of issues that are explicitly documented in the articles of association.  
Ineffect,theyactastheconstitutionforthefirm,determiningwhatthepurposeofthecompany 
is and how it will govern itself.
Co-operatives incorporated under the IPS Act must also create a set of ‘rules’ outlining their 
purpose and procedures.17 For example, The Co-operative Group’s rules outline the procedures 
relating to the purpose of the society; the way it is to be governed; issues concerning membership; 
and the workings of the board of directors.18
Analysis of corporate legal structures
In order to provide a framework for understanding the co-operative legal identity, it is useful  
to compare the IPS form with other business legal identities. This allows us to note areas where the 
IPS co-operative identity compares either favourably or unfavourably with other legal forms.
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Table 11-Comparison of business structures
Sole trader Partnership Company Industrial & 
Provident Society
A
d
va
n
ta
ge
s
Easy and inexpensive  
to organise
Owner has complete 
control
Owner receives  
all income
Easy to organise
Partners share control
Partners receive  
all income
Owners have limited 
liability
Large pool of investors 
and easier to raise 
capital
Business life is 
perpetual
Owners have limited 
liability
Democratic governance 
structure
Business life is 
perpetual
D
is
ad
va
n
ta
ge
s Owner has unlimited 
liability
Owner is taxed on all 
businessprofits
Not suitable for large or 
complex businesses
Some partners have 
unlimited liability
Partners are taxed  
onallbusinessprofits
Personality differences 
may cause problems
Double taxation 
(corporateprofitsand
dividends)
Small investors have 
little control in a large 
plc
Limited return on 
capital
Difficulttoraiseexternal
capital in the form of 
equity
Limits on the amount 
members can invest
Source: Adapted from K. Zeuli and R. Cropp, Cooperatives: Principles and practices in the 21st century 
(Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Center for Cooperatives, 2004), chapter 5.
Factors influencing the choice of legal form
Abusinessmustcarefullyassessitsfinancialandadministrativeneedsbeforechoosingalegal
structure. For example, a capital intensive company, such as a manufacturer of electronic 
components, will most likely choose a CLS structure to facilitate capital investment in the business. 
Co-operatives tend not to select this legal form as they must protect the interests of members over 
externalinvestors.Ridley-DuffandBullarguethat‘thesocialidentityoftheowners(investors,
consumers or employees) radically transforms the way the organisation is run, and the way the 
benefitsofownershipandtradingaredistributed.’19Forexample,InfinityFoodsCo-operative
Ltd, a worker co-operative based in Brighton, England, registered as an IPS in 1979. A number 
of wholefood worker co-operatives emerged during this decade and they tended to share a close 
affinitywiththeICA’svaluesandprinciples.Thistrendhasbeensupersededbytheemergence 
of more service-oriented consortium co-operatives and these tend to select the CLG model  
(whichonlybecameavailableasanoptionforco-operativesinthe1980s)astheyaremore
concerned with pooling their resources and tendering for larger contracts than the values and 
principles. An example of such a co-operative would be Bridges: The Actors’ Agency based in 
Edinburgh, Scotland.20Thereare,ofcourse,morepracticalfactorsthatinfluencetheselection 
of a legal identity. Smaller co-operatives will tend to adopt a form that is relatively inexpensive to 
register;co-operativesofallsizeswillalsotakeintoaccountthefuturetaxefficientrewardoptions.
Conclusion
Thechoiceoflegalformisinfluencednotonlybythefinancialandadministrativeneedsofthe
businessbutbythesocialidentityoftheentrepreneur(s).Differentlegalstructuresreflectwho 
hastherightofpowerinorganisations(members,shareholdersorfounders).Itisvitalthat
whoever holds power as a result of the legal structure actively participates in the governance  
of the organisation. Otherwise, the legal structure merely complies with existing legislation and 
does not promote or facilitate active owner participation.
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Summary of learning
This chapter has argued that:
•  There are different ways of classifying co-operatives but the most common method  
is by group served.
• Co-operatives have a variety of legal forms under which to incorporate.
• Therearenumerousbenefitsanddisadvantagestoeachlegalformandaclear 
understandingoftheco-operative’sfinancialandadministrativeneedsisrequiredtoselect 
the appropriate structure.
•  Different legal forms protect the interests of the holders of power in an organisation;  
a co-operative must ensure that the members of the business are recognised by the chosen  
legal form.
Essay/discussion questions
• Whatarethedifficultiesofclassifyingco-operatives?
•  Identify the types of co-operatives operating in your community. How would you classify them?
•  Considering the restrictions placed on a business if it registers as an Industrial and Provident 
Society, are co-operatives better served by other legal forms?
• What advantages would a co-operative derive from registering as a CLS or CLG?
Useful resources
Mutuals Register - https://mutuals.fsa.gov.uk/.
Companies House - http://www.companieshouse.gov.uk.
Co-operativeandCommunityBenefitSocietiesandCreditUnionsAct2010- 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/7/contents.
754. Co-operative societies in society: classifications and incorporation
Endnotes
1.  J. Atherton, J. Birchall, E. Mayo, and G. Simon, Practical Tools for Defining Co-operatives (Manchester: Co-operatives UK, 2011), 
p. 9; J. Birchall, People-centred Businesses: Co-operatives, Mutuals and the Idea of Membership (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010).
2.  Ocean Spray, ‘Our Growers Cooperative’. http://www.oceanspray.co.uk/heritage/growers, accessed 14 June 2011.
3.  ‘Ocean Spray’s Creative Juices’ Businessweek 15 May 2006. http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_20/b3984097.
htm, accessed 14 June 2011.
4. Yahoo Finance. http://biz.yahoo.com/ic/40/40346.html, accessed 14 June 2011.
5.  Co-operatives UK, The UK Co-operative Economy 2011: Britain’s Return to Co-operation (Manchester: Co-operatives UK, 2011), 
p. 24.
6.  Reports from 2011 place this figure closer to 6.5 million.
7.  The sections that follow will mainly discuss the specific legal forms that co-operatives can adopt in the UK. There are other options 
though; for co-operatives operating in the European Union, there is the European Cooperative Society (SCE) legal form. This piece 
of legislation was created to give co-operatives who wish to operate across multiple European borders a common legal identity.
8.  Readers should note that the IPS Act has been superseded by The Co-operative and Community Benefit Societies and Credit 
Unions Act 2010; though the Act has been passed, it is not yet in force (a Legislative Reform Order to implement Act was 
approved 8 Nov 2011 and will come into effect in January 2012). This new Act seeks to modernise IPS legislation in the areas  
of registration, member capital contributions and corporate governance.  A pdf outlining the main features of the new act can  
be accessed on the VLE.
9.  K. Zeuli and R. Cropp, Cooperatives: Principles and Practices in the 21st century (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Center  
for Cooperatives, 2004.), p. 9.
10.  Zeuli and Cropp, Cooperatives: Principles and Practices in the 21st century, p. 9.
11.  HM Revenue & Customs, ‘Industrial and Provident Society: Background’. http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/ctmanual/CTM40505.
htm, accessed 2 April 2011.
12.  Financial Services Authority, Annual Report of the Registry of Friendly Societies 2000-2001 (London: Registry of Friendly Societies, 
2002).
13.  Financial Services Authority, Annual Report of the Registry of Friendly Societies 2000-2001.
14.  Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1965 ss47, 49.
15.  The newly named Co-operative and Community Benefit Societies and Credit Unions Act 2010 will, with the Legislative Reform 
Order (LRO) of January 2012,  abolish the limits on how much non-withdrawable (transferable) share capital a member can supply 
to a co-operative; the limits will still be in place for withdrawable share capital.
16.  For a detailed case study on Harness Care Co-operative see http://www.uk.coop/case-study/harness-care-co-operative.
17.  See R. Ridley-Duff, ‘Cooperative Social Enterprises: Company Rules, Access to Finance and Management Practice’ Social 
Enterprise Journal 5 (2009): 50–68, for a discussion on the importance of the company rules in co-operatives.
18.  The rules can be accessed from The Co-operative Group’s website: http://www.co-operative.coop.
19  R. Ridley-Duff and M. Bull, Understanding Social Enterprise: Theory & Practice (London: Sage, 2011), p. 138.
20.  This is not to say that co-operatives that register as a CLG are opposed to or unaware of the values and principles; rather,  
our argument is that the ideologies and values of the founding members of a business influence the legal form that is adopted.
76 Democratic Enterprise: Ethical business for the 21st century
Democracy in  
the workplace I:
worker co-operatives
‘The form of association, however, 
which if mankind continue to improve, 
must be expected in the end to 
predominate, is not that which can 
exist between a capitalist as chief, 
and workpeople without a voice in 
the management, but the association 
of the labourers themselves on 
terms of equality, collectively owning 
the capital with which they carry on 
their operations, and working under 
managers elected and removable  
by themselves.’
John Stuart Mill
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795. Democracy in the workplace I: worker co-operatives
5. Democracy in the workplace I: 
worker co-operatives
Learning objectives
This chapter begins a two-part analysis of employee-owned enterprises by looking at worker  
co-operatives. Considered to be one of the purest forms of employee ownership, the worker  
co-operativemodelplacesownership,control,andbeneficiaryrightsinthehandsofworkers. 
By the end of this chapter you will be able to:
• understand the economic reasoning behind the worker co-operative model;
• analyse key operational aspects of worker co-operatives;
• assesstheownership,governanceandbeneficiaryarrangementsofworkerco-operatives 
in relation to other forms of co-operative.
The key arguments that will be developed in this chapter are:
Worker co-operatives must ensure they balance the needs of democracy and operations  
in order to create and sustain a viable co-operative enterprise.
Profitmaximisationisapoortheoryfortheeconomicanalysisofaworkerco-operative.
The relationship between labour and capital in a worker co-operative is based on the primacy 
oflabour,withcapitalasthesubordinate(‘labourhirescapital’).
Therearespecificmanagementtheoriesthatareapplicabletoworkerco-operativesbut 
a new concept of the role of management is necessary for the implementation of these 
theories in practice.
Access to capital is crucial to the sustainability and growth of worker co-operatives;  
the importance of member contributions and retained earnings cannot be overstated  
in this regard.
What is a worker co-operative?
Ellermandefinesaworkerco-operativeas‘aco-operativewherethemembersarethepeople
working in the company, and where patronage is based on their labour as measured by hours  
or pay. Thus a worker co-operative is a company where the membership rights, voting rights,  
andtheprofitrightsareassignedtothepeopleworkinginthecompany.’1Wecanfurtherrefine
our concept of a worker co-operative by incorporating the internationally recognised co-operative 
principlesintoourdefinition,arrivingat:‘workerco-operativesarebusinessesthatareownedand
democratically-controlled by their employee members using co-operative principles.’2
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Economic theory of worker co-operatives
Theeconomictheoryofworkerco-operativesreplacesthetraditionalviewofthefirmasprofit
maximising with a different organisational purpose. For example, a worker co-operative may 
be established for the purpose of creating and sustaining jobs; to improve the quality of life of 
members; or to allow members to express democratic control over their working lives. Therefore, 
the underlying economic reasoning behind a worker co-operative is different from a conventional, 
profitmaximisingenterprise.3
Table 12 captures the relationship between labour and capital in a worker co-operative.
Table 12-Relationship between labour and capital in conventional and co-operative enterprises
Status of Factors of Production
Final Authority Tool
Conventional Enterprise Capital Labour
Worker Co-operative Enterprise Labour Capital
Inaworkerco-operativelabourhirescapital,meaningthattheownership,control,andbeneficiary
rightsaccruetolabourasopposedtocapitalinaconventionalfirm.Capitalisseenasaninstrument
forlabourtodirect;theworkerco-operativeoperatesforthebenefitoflabour,notcapital.
Inplaceoftheprofitmaximisingobjective,BenjaminWard(oneofthefirstworkerco-operative
economic theorists) proposed a theory based on maximisation of a different factor: dividend 
(surplusperworker).Ward’sformula,developedin1958,is:
(pQ-C)/Lwherep=priceofoutput,Qisoutput,Ciscosts,andLisnumberofworkers.4 
Ward’s theory states that worker co-operatives will seek to maximise surplus per worker by 
adjusting L. He further argues that when surplus increases, L will decrease as the members  
willlooktofire(oratleastceasehiring)othermemberstoincreasetheirshareofthesurplus.
Empirical studies have shown that this is not the case but Ward’s formula is still a useful theory  
for understanding the economic reasoning behind a worker co-operative.5
Now we come to an important aspect in the development of the economic theory of worker  
co-operatives: how does a worker co-operative compare with conventional models of enterprise  
in terms of organisational success? Measuring the performance of a conventional company  
isrelativelysimple:howprofitableisthebusiness?Cornforthandothersproposeadifferent
measure for worker co-operatives, one based on the concept of value-added. Value-added is the 
amount left over when costs are subtracted from revenue excluding the cost of labour. The authors 
arguethatthismeasureissuperiortoprofitability.6 For instance, paying members more in wages 
willresultinlessprofitbutthatdoesnotmeanthebusinessisperformingpoorly.
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Another measure of success uses a set of criteria based on internal and external objectives:7
• economic success;
• democratic aims;
• worker development;
• political/social objectives.
The criteria above demonstrate the need for a worker co-operative to separate and balance the 
democratic and economic aims of the business. The challenge this balancing act presents for  
aco-operativecanbebestsummarisedbydiscussingtheconceptofefficiency.Ineconomic 
terms,efficiencymeansextractingthemaximumvaluepossiblefromthefactorsofproduction. 
Analysingworkerco-operativesusingthismeasureisnotadequatebecauseefficiencyisdefined
purely in economic terms. For example, should worker co-operatives use environmentally 
damagingbutcheaperrawmaterialstoincreaseefficiency?Orreducetrainingbudgetstoboost
profitability?Workerco-operativesmustbeeconomicallyviablebutnotnecessarilyeconomically
superiortotheinvestor-ownedmodelofenterprise.Thebenefitsandobjectivesofworker 
co-operativescannotbereducedtoasimplemeasureofprofitabilityorefficiency.
Ownership rights
Membership
Worker co-operatives have traditionally been established and owned by two types of members. 
Each type generally correlates with the era in which the member became involved in the co-
operative movement.
Table 13-Specification of worker co-operative members
Ideological members (1970s) Pragmatists (1980s)
Predominantly middle class
Well educated
Able to experiment with various forms  
of worker democracy
Wholly committed to the principles  
and spirit of co-operation
Predominantly working class
Rely on the worker co-operative for their 
livelihood
The principles of co-operation are secondary  
to the need to sustain the business
Whilesuchaclassificationofmembersmayseemoverlysimplistic,itdoesprovideaframework
forunderstandingthemotivationsandbeliefsofmembers,factorsthatgreatlyinfluence
the governance of a worker co-operative. Some members wholly buy into the co-operative 
principles and spirit while others may be only interested in exercising control over their work 
and participating in the fruits of their labour. What links both types of member is the democratic 
decision-making governance of the co-operative.8
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IntheUK,therearenospecificlawsorregulationsrelatingtomembershippolicies.9 Prospective 
members usually undertake a probationary period of six to twelve months before the members vote 
on whether to accept this person into membership of the co-operative. The ratio of members  
to non-members in a worker co-operative is a contentious issue; one could argue that a low ratio  
is a sign that the organisation is not properly worker-owned and controlled.10
Finance
Thetraditionalinstrumentsusedbyfirmstofinancetheiroperationsaredividend-earningshares
(equity)andinterest-bearingdebt.Firmsrequireanoptimalmixofequityanddebtinorderto
attracttherightamountandtypeofcapitalattherighttime.Intheory,theonlyformoffinancing
not available to worker co-operatives is ordinary share capital. This is due to the fact that ordinary 
shares usually carry voting rights, contradicting the co-operative principle of one member/one 
vote.Itispossibleforco-operativestooffernon-votingordinaryshares(aswellaspreference
shares) to generate investment in the business, but there are problems associated with this method 
offinancing.11Mellor,Hannah,andStirlingidentifysixsourcesoffinanceforworkerco-operatives:
1. loans from members;
2. loans from other supportive individuals;
3.  loans from banks;
4.  grants and loans from local and national governments;
5. loans from within the co-operative movement;
6.  loans from other mutual aid agencies such as trade unions or friendly societies.12
Mellorandothersalsoarguethattheuniquefinancialchallengesfacedbyworkerco-operatives
canresultin‘aviciouscirclewhereundercapitalisationandlackofaccesstoinvestmentfinance
relegates them to a marginal existence’.13
Workerco-operativesareusuallyhighlydependentonloancapitalfortheirfinancingneeds.
This highlights the importance of a seventh source of capital for a worker co-operative: retained 
earnings(reserves).Themembersofaworkerco-operativehavearighttothesurplusofthe
business. In theory, once interest and tax have been paid, the workers can decide to distribute  
theentiresurplusamongstthemselves.Inpracticehowever,thissignificantlyreducesthecapacity
ofthebusinesstogrowordealwithanunexpectedcashflowemergency.Havingasizeableamount
of retained earnings negates these two issues. Retained earnings can also act as collateral when 
seekingdebtfinance.
Themostimportantsourceoffinanceforworkerco-operativesismembercontributions,
particularly during the start-up process. Finance provided by members is critical in generating 
commitment and loyalty in the co-operative.14 There are risks, however, associated with raising 
significantamountsoffinancethroughmemberequityorloans.First,thereistheriskthat
resentment might arise between members who commit differing amounts of capital to the  
co-operative. Second, there is the possibility that members expect a return on their capital  
thatdetractsfromthevaluesandprinciplesoftheco-operative(principlethreeinparticular).15 
Third, if the amount of capital needed to become a member is excessively high, a situation might 
arise whereby workers are hired but cannot afford to become members; this leads to an increase  
intheamountofprofittobedistributedtoexistingmembersbutclearlyviolatesprincipleone
(openandvoluntarymembership).16
835. Democracy in the workplace I: worker co-operatives
Thornleyidentifiedtwosignificantproblemsworkerco-operativeshaveinaccessingcapital:
•  They do not have enough collateral in the form of member shares, loans and reserves  
to secure loans.
•  Financial institutions are not adept at assessing the risk of lending to a collectively  
owned organisation.17
The second point is one of utmost importance for the employee ownership movement  
in the UK and is a priority for the major co-operative and employee ownership trade bodies  
(Co-operativesUKandtheEmployeeOwnershipAssociation).
Control rights
Governance
Finalcontrolofthefirminaworkerco-operativerestswiththeworkers.Thetwokeyareaswhere
employees exercise control over the worker co-operative are:
• decision-making;
• profitdistribution.
This does not mean that every employee is consulted and votes on each decision relating  
tothecompany.Rather,finalauthorityonallimportantdecisions,suchaspolicymaking, 
appointing management, and deciding on appropriate levels of pay lies with the workers.  
Ineffect,theemployeesfulfiltheroleofshareholdersinaconventionalfirm,wieldingultimate
control over the enterprise.
Figure 5-Typical governance structure of a worker co-operative 
Management
General Committee
Members
elect
accountable 
to
hire report to
co-ordinate participate
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The AGM of a worker co-operative plays a critical role in the exercise of member control.18 
Worker co-operatives tend to delegate decision-making responsibility to a General Com-
mittee once they reach a certain size and it becomes impractical to involve every member 
in policy and operations decision-making. The General Committee will then hire or elect  
a management team to oversee the day-to-day operations of the business. This separation 
of policy and operations is a key aspect in the smooth democratic functioning of a worker 
co-operative.Theneedsofmembersandtheneedsofthebusinessmustbeclearlydefined
and a system put in place to ensure all needs are met.
Case study 5.1 -  
The Worker Co-operative Code of Governance
Co-operatives UK, the representative body for consumer and worker co-operatives in the UK, 
produced a guide on governance for worker co-operatives. While accepting that the seven co-
operative principles must be central to any code of governance, the report acknowledges that  
thereareanumberofguidelinesspecifictotheworkerco-operativemodel:
1. Theyarebusinessesthatgeneratewealthtofulfiltheirprincipalobjectives: 
•Tocreateandmaintainsustainablejobs 
•Toimprovethequalityoflifeofthemembers 
•Toallowdemocraticself-managementbymembers 
•Toallowallworkerstoworkwithdignity 
•Topromotecommunityandlocaldevelopment
2.  The membership of a worker co-operative is free and voluntary, but is governed by the number 
of sustainable jobs the business can support.
3.  Whilst not all workers have to become members of the co-operative, the majority should  
be members. And, although some non-workers may be permitted to be members of the  
co-operative, in a worker co-operative the majority of the members ought to be workers.
4.  Members of a co-operative have a different working relationship with the co-operative  
than either workers in a conventionally managed business or the self-employed contractor. 
But, note, this relationship is not recognised by UK employment legislation.
5.  The internal regulation of a worker co-operative is determined by procedures that are agreed 
democratically by the members.
6.  The worker co-operative must be autonomous and independent. A co-operative is obviously 
subject to UK law and regulation, but must not be subordinate to a third party in any aspect 
of its management, trade, employment, and ownership of the means of production. Further 
tothat,aco-operativewhichissetupexpresslytohiveoffanunprofitablebranchofanother
business, or to provide labour for another business, is not a co-operative under the terms  
of this declaration.
Source: Co-operatives UK, Worker Co-operative Code of Governance (Manchester: Co-operatives UK, 2009).
855. Democracy in the workplace I: worker co-operatives
Management
The premise of a worker co-operative is that it gives control of the enterprise to the employees  
of the business. Workers usually exercise this control democratically at the AGM, but some 
choose to extend this level of control to the area of management. The traditional argument is 
that managers in a conventional company have a right to manage; this contrasts with worker 
co-operatives where the members have a responsibility to manage the enterprise, not a right. 
Depending on the size and complexity of the business, as well as the ideological orientation  
of the members, a worker co-operative will usually conform to one of the following managerial 
theories shown in Table 14.19
Table 14-Management theories for worker co-operatives
Collective management Representative democracy
No organisational hierarchy
The majority of business decisions are taken by 
all the members
Consensus decision-making
Suitable for small, simple worker  
co-operatives
Advantage – true worker democracy
Disadvantage – high transaction costs21
Traditional organisational hierarchy
Board of directors and management accountable 
to the members
Majority decision-making
Suitable for more complex worker  
co-operatives
Advantage–moreefficientoperations
Disadvantage – potential for management 
dominance over policy and operations
Management in a worker co-operative needs to be viewed as a function rather than a position.20 
For example, Suma Wholefoods, a worker co-operative in West Yorkshire, assigns managerial 
responsibilityforbook-keepingandfinancetoseveralmemberswhoundertakethistaskalong 
with their other responsibilities. Therefore, management ceases to be a power institution and 
simplyafunctionnecessarytoensuretheenterpriseoperatesefficiently.
Achieving a system of management similar to Suma requires the functions of management  
to be broken up into two areas:
Horizontal  -  vocationalortechnicalmanagemente.g.finance,supplychain,marketing.
Vertical  -  powerbasedi.e.humanresourcemanagement,hiringandfiring,discipline.
Itistheverticalaspectofmanagementthatcausesdifficultiesamongstthemembersofaworker
co-operative.21Thesedifficultiescanbealleviatedbydelegatingdecision-makingresponsibility
to several managers for horizontal areas of management, while involving all of the members for 
verticalissuessuchashiringandfiringmembers.Theterm‘co-ordinators’mightbeadoptedfor
‘managers’ within worker co-operatives.
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Case study 5.2 - GreenCity Wholefoods
GreenCity Wholefoods is a non-exploitative workplace that takes into consideration the interests 
of workers, the community and the environment as a whole.
GreenCity Wholefoods Mission Statement
GreenCity Wholefoods was established on 6 June 1978 by four founding members along with 
threeadditionalpersons(atthetime,IPSlawrequiredthatsevenpeoplewereneededtoestablish
a worker co-operative). Like many young enterprises, the co-operative progressed slowly, 
experiencingdifficultiesalongtheway(mainlycapitalrelated),buteventuallyestablisheditselfas
aprofitableandethicalbusiness.TodayGreenCitygeneratesover£4mperannuminrevenueand
hasthirty-threemembers.FromitshumblebeginningsoperatingoutofasmallflatintheWestEnd
of Glasgow to its current commercial success, the business has retained and improved an equitable 
and co-operative system of governance, management and membership development.
Governance
GreenCity is jointly-owned and democratically-controlled by its members and therefore operates  
a system of governance based on one member/one vote. Like most worker-co-operatives, GreenCity 
hasablendedapproachtodecision-making;directdemocracy(whereeverymemberisrequired 
to vote on a decision) is only called upon to deal with issues relating to policy or membership,  
whileasystemofdelegatedoperationalmanagement(wherethememberselectamanagement
team to make decisions on their behalf) is in place to deal with the majority of strategic and 
operational business issues. Any decision taken, whether at a monthly meeting or the AGM,  
needs an eighty per cent majority for it to be approved.
Management
GreenCityoperatesaflatmanagementstructure(thenorminmostbusinessesisahierarchical
management structure), where individual members are elected to a management team to oversee 
the strategic operations of the business. The members serving on the management team are drawn 
from each of the functional areas, ensuring fair representation.
At an operational level, GreenCity is organised by functional area: accounts, sales, purchasing, 
manufacturing, warehousing and transport. Each of these departments operates largely 
autonomously(e.g.havetheirownmeetingsandtargets)anddecisionsrelatingtoday-to-day
operations are entrusted to each department.
Membership
A committed and homogeneous membership is critical for the success of a worker co-operative. 
InGreenCity,everymemberisentitledtothesamepayandbenefits,apracticethatiscommon
inworkerco-operativeswithaflatmanagementstructure.Theco-operativehasasixmonth
probationary period for new workers before offering them full membership, to ensure that the 
person is right for the business and vice versa. The Personnel and Training department plays  
an important role in the company; it encourages members to get involved in areas of the business 
outside of their specialism and facilitates this process.
The co-operative believes strongly in the importance of sharing information with every member. 
This not only ensures that members are kept up-to-date with developments in the business, 
but helps to generate high levels of member commitment. Some examples of this policy include 
ensuringeverymemberisliterateinfinancialmatters(sotheycanparticipateeffectivelyatthe
AGM), and disseminating company developments through a digital notice board to which every 
member can contribute.
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Beneficiary rights
Pay
The issue of pay in an organisation is traditionally determined using a wage or salary model,  
which is linked to one or a number of factors such as hours worked, importance of role or seniority. 
In theoretical terms, members of a worker co-operative do not receive a wage or salary since they 
are the owners of the business and as such are entitled to the surplus generated by its activities.  
Inpractice,valueaddediscalculatedattheendofatradingorfinancialyearandsoitisunrealistic
for members to receive the fruits of their labours only once a year. Therefore, some system of 
payment based on wage or salary must be implemented in the co-operative. How that is achieved 
depends on a variety of factors: ideological worker co-operatives tend to have equal pay while 
co-operatives that arose out of conversions or rescues are more likely to have traditional payment 
methods such as compensation based on role. The key point is that there are no hard and fast rules 
governing how a worker co-operative should compensate its members through wages or salaries;  
it is for the members to decide.
Case study 5.3 - Edinburgh Bicycle Co-operative
Edinburgh Bicycle Co-operative is a highly successful worker co-operative with outlets across 
theUKincludingEdinburgh,Aberdeen,Manchester,Newcastle,SheffieldandLeeds.Whenthe
business was founded in 1977, the members were committed to the ideological beliefs of worker 
co-operation and decided to express this solidarity by adopting an equal pay structure. As the 
co-operative grew, many of the members felt that this pay structure was unfair and a vote was 
takentomovetoasystemofpaybasedonamember’sneeds(forexample,childrentosupport).
This structure lasted a few years before the members again felt that this system was unfair and 
so reverted back to equal pay. This was not to be the end of the evolution of Edinburgh Bicycle 
Co-operative’s pay structure; it was changed another three times before the members eventually 
settled for pay based on an employee’s position in the organisational hierarchy - but with limited 
pay differentials. A summary of Edinburgh Bicycle Co-operative’s pay structure evolution  
is provided below:
• equal pay;
• to each according to their need;
• equal pay;
• pay based on seniority;
• payreflectingpositioninhierarchicalstructure;
• payreflectingpositioninhierarchicalstructurewithexplicitlylimiteddifferentials.
Surplus
Once the members have received their advance of the surplus in either wage or salary all that  
is left to do is allocate the remaining surplus amongst the members and the business. In theory,  
the members have a right to the entire surplus; this may be split for instance between wages and  
an end of year bonus. In practice, however, it is inadvisable to distribute the entire surplus to 
workers because it may expose the company to unforeseen risks and inhibit growth.23 Therefore,  
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most worker co-operatives determine an appropriate allocation of the surplus between indivisible 
reserves(meaningnoindividualhasanyclaimtothiscapitalandremainsthepropertyofthe
business), the members, and, very often, a social or charitable cause. For example, a Mondragón 
co-operativemighttypicallyallocateforty-fivepercentofsurplustomembers,fortyfivepercent 
to collective reserves, and ten per cent to a social/charitable fund. It is at the discretion of the 
workerco-operativehowtoallocatesurplusandthemethodusedwillprobablyreflectthe
members’ social, cultural and economic values and beliefs.
For the proportion of surplus allocated to members, a formula must be used to determine how 
much each individual member is to receive. This is usually done on a proportional basis, just like 
other co-operatives, but the criteria used may differ. For example, a worker may be entitled to a 
share of the surplus based on the number of hours that member worked in the year or the level 
of salary they received. Alternatively, some worker co-operatives distribute the surplus equally 
amongst the members.
Net assets
Oneoftheotherfundamentalrightsofownershiprelatestothenetassetsofthefirm(orthevalue
of the business). The owners of a business are entitled to participate in the growth of the value of 
the business; the owners of a conventional company, for example, participate via the increase in the 
value of their shares. Also, if a company is wound up, the owners are entitled to the value of the net 
assetsofthebusiness(afteranyoutstandingdebthasbeenrepaid).IntheUS,workerco-operatives
haveusuallyallocatedthisrighttothemembershipshare,alongwithvotingandprofitrights.24  
The problem of bundling all the ownership rights up in one share occurs when the value of the 
business increases dramatically, with an equally dramatic rise in the value of the membership 
share. This poses two serious issues:26
•  Members may seek to realise the increase in the value of the company by distributing the assets 
amongstthemselvesorbyhiringnon-members(therebyincreasingtheirshareoftheprofit).
•  It becomes too expensive for a prospective member to join the co-operative as the value of the 
shares has increased exponentially.27
Most UK worker co-operatives have sought to eradicate this risk by designating the net assets of the 
company as being commonly owned; that means no individual worker has any right to the value of 
these assets. Ellerman proposes a solution to these problems by ‘unbundling’ the net asset rights 
from the membership and voting rights. Membership and voting rights are assigned to people 
basedontheirlabour(personalrights)whilethesurplusandnetassetrightsbecomeproperty
rights; the most successful example would be the Mondragón system of internal capital accounts 
(seetheextendedcasestudyattheendofthechapter).
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EXERCISE - Conversion to a worker co-operative
You have been given a brief by the Managing Director of a capital intensive manufacturing 
firmmakingadvancedelectronicgoods(thereare175 employees) to look into the possibility 
of converting the company from a family-ownedfirm to a worker co-operative. Drawing 
on your reading, and making use of the Worker Co-operative Code of Governance, what 
argumentswouldyoumakeforandagainstthiscourseofaction?Whatwouldyourfinal
recommendation be and why?
Note: the underlined terms are the variables in this exercise. It is possible to substitute these 
variablestoproduceadifferentexerciseforstudents.Forexample,thefirminquestion
couldbealabourintensivemediacompanywithtwenty-fiveemployeesorthefirmcould
be publicly listed. Changing the variables this way could be used as the basis of a group 
discussion on the different recommendations of students.
Thanks are given to Professor Andrew Pendleton of the University of York for his permission 
to use this exercise in the text.
Extended Case Study Mondragón Corporation
‘Our attempt at co-operative enterprise is nothing more than a kind of formal association, 
oriented toward solidarity, created by workers in an environment of liberty and justice.’
Don José María Arizmendiarrieta
Historical development
‘In 1941, a young Basque priest, Father Jose Maria Arizmendiarrieta, came to Mondragón,  
a small working-class town in the Basque province of Guipuzcoa in Northern Spain. He began 
his teaching work in the apprentice school of the Union Cerrajera, the industrial company which 
dominated the town of Mondragón. This school however, was not large enough to provide 
adequate training to the local youth. Failing to enlarge the school, Father Arizmendi gathered 
the support of the townspeople and opened a technical training school in 1943 with twenty 
students.’27
Thefirstgraduatesofthetechnicalcollege(EscuelaProfesional)begantheircareersat 
Union Cerrajera but some had a falling out with management after they were refused the right  
to purchase shares in the company. Five of these graduates – Luis Usatorre, Jesús Larrañaga, 
Alfonso Gorroñogoitia, José Ormaechea and Javier Ortubay – encouraged by the continuing 
support and guidance of Father Arizmendi, decided to put his teachings into practice and in 1955 
acquiredabankruptfactoryinVitoria,nearMondragón,andalicencetoproducesmallparaffin
heaters and stoves.28ThebusinesswasnamedULGOR(afterthefounders’initials)andin1956
developed a constitution that was to become the template for other worker co-operatives in the 
Basque country.
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ULGOR grew rapidly and employed 143 workers by the end of 1958. The period of 1956–59  
was characterised by the entrepreneurial drive of ULGOR’s founders, resulting in the creation  
ofanumberofnewco-operativesincludingArrasate(theBasquenameforMondragón),Funcor
(anironsmeltingbusiness),SanJose(whichmergedwithotherconsumerco-operativestoform
Eroski, now one of the largest retailers in Spain), Copreci and Ederlan.29
Themovementgrewrapidly.By1982therewereovereighty-fiveindustrialco-operativesaswell
as a host of agricultural, retail, housing and education co-operatives. One of Father Arizmendi’s 
core beliefs regarding co-operativism lay in the strength of association. He believed that a solitary 
worker co-operative would be inherently weak and vulnerable to other forces outside of its control. 
Strengthlayinfederationsofworkerco-operatives,sharingresourcesandprofits,aswellasrisk.
Initially,workerco-operativesfoundedregionalfederations;thefirstfederationwasestablished 
in 1965 by ULGOR, Arrasate, Ederlan and Copreci. Known as ULARCO, its purpose was to provide 
shared marketing, product and sales resources, as well as having a common pool of capital.30 
Variousfederationswereestablishedbetweenthenand1987,whenthefirstco-operativecongress
tookplace.TheMondragónCorporation(MC)wasborn.
Individual co-operative structure
Figure 6-Organisational structure of an individual Mondragón co-operative
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Basic Organisational Chart for a Mondragón Cooperative
Source: D. P. Ellerman, The Mondragón Cooperative Movement. 
Harvard Business School Case No. 1-384-270. (Boston: Harvard Business School, 1984).
The above diagram is a conceptual view of the governance structure of an individual Mondragón 
workerco-operative.Theultimateauthorityintheco-operativeistheGeneralAssembly(GA), 
theannualmeetingofthemembers.TheAssemblyelects(onaonemember/onevotebasis) 
the board of directors or the Junta Rectora. The board of directors appoints the president  
(chiefexecutiveofficer)andthemanagementteam.Themanagementteamthendirectsthe 
staff(members)inthepursuitoftheco-operative’sobjectives.Thereisaclearlineofaccountability
to the members in the operations of the co-operative.
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The role of the councils31
Management Council
The Management Council acts as an advisory body to the board of directors. Its membership 
consists of the management team and the president of the co-operative.
Social Council
The Social Council is concerned with issues directly affecting members such as pay structures, 
health and safety, and conditions of employment. Members are directly elected to the council  
bydividingworkersintosections(usuallyoffifteentotwentypeople)andthenvotingforasection
representative. The section representatives then form the Social Council which meets at least once 
every three months. While the council is mainly an advisory body, it does have some decision-
making powers relating to pay scales, safety and social security.
Audit Council
Directly elected by the GA, the Audit Council performs an auditing role in the co-operative,  
forexamplebyensuringfinancialstatementsareaccurate.TheGAcanrequestinformationfrom
themanagementteamwhichisthenpassedontotheAuditCouncilforverification.
The other important aspect of an individual Mondragón co-operative that deserves attention  
is its treatment of the growth in the value of the business. A co-operative allows each member  
to participate in this growth through an internal capital account. This account contains the 
member’scapitalcontribution(membershipfee)andeveryyearinterestispaidonthisamount,
assumingthebusinessisprofitable.Theamountinthiscapitalaccountisalsoincreasedusing 
the surplus generated at the end of a trading year. Up to seventy per cent of the surplus generated 
is allocated to the members’ capital accounts on a proportional basis. Of the remainder, a minimum 
of twenty per cent is allocated to the collective reserves of the business and ten per cent for social/
charitable causes.32 There are rules however, governing access to the capital accounts. Members 
can only access the full amount in their capital accounts upon retirement. If a member resigns  
orisfired,theyareonlyentitledtoseventypercentofthevalueoftheircapitalaccount.33
In the next section we will encounter the Mondragón Principles of Co-operation, one of which  
is Wage Solidarity. This principle is of particular importance in individual co-operatives as it sets 
a wage differential limit between the highest earner in the company and the lowest. The ratio 
wasoriginally3:1buthasnowrisentoaround6:1(thoughthescalecanriseto8inexceptional
circumstances), meaning the director or highest paid manager of a co-operative cannot earn more 
than six times the wage of the lowest paid worker. This principle has obvious implications for 
recruitmentpolicies,makingitmoredifficulttoretainandattractseniormanagement.
Mondragón Corporation structure
Thefirstco-operativecongresstookplacein1987anddecideduponthebasicprinciplesofthe 
co-operative experience and the group solidarity fund.35 The co-operative congress is equivalent  
to the General Assembly in an individual worker co-operative. The aim of the congress is to 
establish the strategic criteria by which the Corporation is to be administered, through the  
planning and co-ordination of its business units. It is made up of 650 members delegated  
by the various co-operatives.
The Standing Committee governs under a mandate of the co-operative congress. Its basic function 
is to promote and oversee the implementation of the policies and agreements adopted by the 
congress, while constantly monitoring the evolution of the group. The rest of the organisational 
structure can be seen in Figure 7. The group is divided into four key areas and these divisions 
are overseen by the General Council, which is responsible for the development and application 
of corporate strategies and objectives, as well as co-ordinating the policies of the different 
divisions and co-operatives.
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Figure 7-Mondragón Corporation Organisational Structure
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Table 15-Mondragón Principles of Co-operation
Open Membership
This principle declares that we are open to all men and women who  
can demonstrate their professional capabilities for the jobs we are able 
to create.
Democratic 
Organisation
Based on the equality of all our worker members, this principle 
establishes ‘one person one vote’ as the basis of our democratic 
organisation.
Worker Sovereignty
The main agent for transforming nature, society and people themselves, 
and therefore deserving of the distribution of the wealth produced.
Instrumental and 
Subordinate Nature 
of Capital
Capital is an instrument subordinate to labour, and necessary  
for business development. It is deserving of limited remuneration,  
not directly linked to the results obtained.
Management 
Participation
This implies the progressive development of self-management with the 
participation of members in business management.
Wage Solidarity
In accordance with the actual possibilities of each co-operative 
enterprise and in solidarity with the rest of the Corporation and the 
social environment.
Interco-operation
This involves searching for potential synergies derived from overall size: 
thepoolingofprofitsandthetransferofworker-members
Social 
Transformation
The creation of new co-operative jobs and support for  
community development initiatives through the majority reinvestment 
ofprofits.
Universal Nature
Supportive of all those who work for social democracy,  
sharing objectives of peace, justice and development.
Education
Thededicationofsufficienthumanandeconomicresources 
for co-operative and professional training.
Superstructures
Key to the development of Mondragón was the establishment of a support structure of organisations 
(manyofthemco-operativesthemselves).Knownas‘superstructures’,theseinstitutionsinclude
banks, insurance businesses, social security, research centres, schools, and many others. Scholars 
and practitioners agree that similar support structures are vital for other national co-operative 
movements as well, including the UK movement. Some of the most important Mondragón 
superstructures are outlined below.
Caja Laboral Popular
Between1956and1959,thefivefoundersofULGORestablishedorassistedinthecreation 
of several co-operatives, some of which were spun out from ULGOR. Father Arizmendi realised 
thatthefinancialdemandsoftheseenterpriseshadoutgrownconventionalfinancialinstitutions
andpersuadedtheco-operativestoestablishabank,theCajaLaboralPopular(CLP),in1959.35  
The CLP was to have a profound effect on the sustainability and growth of the Mondragón  
co-operatives.Notonlydidthebankactasavitalsourceofcreditandotherfinancialservices,
but it also assisted in the development of new co-operatives through its entrepreneurship and 
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managementdepartment(knownastheEmpresarialDivision).36 Between 1961 and 1970, over 
forty industrial worker co-operatives were established as result of the CLP.37Thebankfinanced
the growth of the co-operatives through its deposits, the majority of which came from the savings 
of local Basque people.38 The CLP continues to play a vital role in the Mondragón Corporation and 
currently has total assets of over €21bn.39
Lagun-Aro
In 1958, Spanish government legislation decreed that members of worker co-operatives were 
ineligibletoreceivesocialsecurity(astheyweredeemedtobeself-employed).Thischangein
circumstances led to the creation of an insurance, welfare, and pensions institution, Lagun-Aro,  
in 1967.40 Today, Lagun-Aro’s Endowment Fund stands at nearly €4.5bn and supports thousands  
of members and their families.41
Research, Training and Education Centres
Some 3,438 students were enrolled in Mondragón University in 2010 and there are fourteen 
technology centres with an R&D budget of €144m. The role of research, particularly in the  
area of production technology, has played a vital part in the growth and evolution of the  
worker co-operatives, allowing them to weather economic recessions by innovating to create  
new product lines.
Mondragón Corporation today42
The Mondragón Corporation is the largest business group in the Basque country and the tenth 
largest in Spain, with turnover of €14.75bn. Perhaps the greatest success lies in its employment 
levels:fromtheinitialULGORfactorywithastaffoftwenty-five,thegroupnowemploysover
80,000 people worldwide. There are around 140 worker co-operatives that are members of the 
Corporation, and there are over 250 businesses in the group. The difference is explained by a large 
number of overseas factories which are not worker co-operatives. One of the current priorities is to 
introduce employee ownership in these subsidiaries over a period of time, with a view to eventually 
converting them into co-operative enterprises. One of the group’s other pressing concerns is the 
education of the latest generation of Basque young people in the co-operative model of enterprise,  
a vital task in ensuring its sustainability in the region.
The Mondragón Corporation stands as the world’s greatest example of industrial democracy  
and worker co-operativism. The group’s success can be attributed to its culture of innovation  
and autonomy; largely cut off from the rest of the co-operative movement, the Mondragón  
co-operatives developed their own vision of co-operation, based on a unique set of principles  
and processes.
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Summary of learning
This chapter has argued that:
•  Worker co-operatives are businesses that are owned and democratically-controlled by their 
employee members using co-operative principles.
• Thetheoryoftheconventionalfirm(profitmaximisation)isill-suitedtoworkerco-operatives.
•  While they are founded on the seven internationally recognised co-operative principles,  
workerco-operativeshaveanumberofspecificpracticesthatformpartoftheircode 
of governance.
•  Worker co-operatives must balance the democratic and operational needs of the business  
to achieve their objectives.
•  Management must be conceptualised in a different manner in worker co-operatives,  
based on functionality rather than power.
Essay/discussion questions
•  ‘Worker co-operatives are the purest form of employee ownership.’ Drawing on material  
from this chapter and your own research, argue either for or against this statement.
• WhydoyouthinkthereissolittleworkerownershipintheUK?Whatfactors(economic, 
social or political) affect the development of the worker co-operative sector?
EXERCISE - Sharing wealth: lessons from Ohio
Inthevideoatthelinkbelow,avarietyofcommunityfiguresandleadersdiscussaworker
co-operative initiative in Cleveland, Ohio. Drawing on inspiration from the Mondragón 
system of worker co-operatives, the Evergreen Cooperatives aim to generate jobs and more 
importantly wealth for the local residents. Watch the video and consider the following 
questions:
1. How applicable is this model of worker ownership in areas with high levels of poverty?
2.  What would be your recommendations if asked to assess how this model could grow  
and be replicated elsewhere?
Video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gt_ZHUDhKjs
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Useful resources
Co-operative and Community Finance - http://www.coopfinance.coop/.
Campaign for Sustainable Employment - http://www.sustainableemployment.eu/?lang=en.
Co-operatives UK Worker Co-operatives group -  
http://www.uk.coop/groups/worker-co-operatives.
Worker cooperative, Wikipedia article -  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Worker_cooperative#An_economic_model:_The_labor-managed_
firm.
The European Confederation of Workers’ Cooperatives, Social Cooperatives and Social and 
Participative Enterprises -  http://www.cecop.coop/?lang=en.
The International Organisation of Industrial, Artisanal and Service Producers’ Cooperatives -  
http://www.cicopa.coop/?lang=en.
US Federation of Worker Cooperatives - http://www.usworker.coop/education.
Mondragón Corporation - http://www.mondragon-corporation.com/ENG.aspx.
American Worker Co-operative - http://american.coop/.
International Labour Organisation - http://www.ilo.org/.
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Democracy in the 
workplace II:
employee ownership
‘The employee is regarded by the 
employer merely in the light of his 
value as an operative. His productive 
capacity alone is taken into account.’
Leland Stanford
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employee ownership
Learning objectives
This chapter shows that the spectrum of employee ownership is broad and there are key 
distinctions between various models within that spectrum. By the end of this chapter you will  
be able to:
• critically assess the main features of employee ownership;
• explaintherightsofworkersinanemployee-ownedfirm;
• understand the nature and characteristics of the main forms of employee ownership.
The key arguments that will be developed in this chapter are:
Employee ownership encompasses a wide variety of organisational forms.
Inanemployee-ownedfirm,workershavetherighttoparticipateinownership,governance
andprofit,aswellasaccesstoinformationandparticipationinmanagement.
Employee-ownedfirmshavedevelopedamultitudeofgovernancestructurestofacilitate
employee participation in decision-making.
What is employee ownership?
‘Companies where employees own a significant stake in the company they work for – sometimes 
termed ‘co-owned’ businesses – now account for combined annual turnover in excess of £25 
billion, more than 2% of GDP and growing.’1
‘Employee owned companies outperformed the FTSE All-Share in 2010 ... Employee owned 
companies’ share prices were up 16.3%, performing better than the FTSE All Share companies’ 
share prices which went up by 11.3% over the year.’2
13.6m workers in the US participate in employee ownership plans worth around $901bn.3
Thetermemployeeownership(EO)hasbeenusedtoencapsulatetheentirespectrumofworker
participationintheownershipofafirm.Thisisadiverseandcomplexphenomenon,sothereare
different understandings of what employee ownership means in practice. For example, employee 
ownershipcanrefertoaminorityshareholdingbyaminorityofemployeesinacompany(share
plans such as the ones found in large publicly listed companies), or to one hundred per cent 
ownershipandcontrolofanorganisationbyallofitsemployees(workerco-operatives). 
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TheEmployeeOwnershipAssociation(EOA),therepresentativebodyforemployee-owned
companiesintheUK,definesemployeeownershipinthefollowingterms:
  Employee-owned businesses are companies where employees own a controlling stake in the 
business,i.e.morethanfiftypercent.Anemployee-ownedcompanymayinvolveemployees
owning shares, but may instead or as well involve ownership via one or more trusts – for 
example, no employees own ordinary voting shares in the UK’s largest employee-owned 
company: the John Lewis Partnership.
The EOA also supports another form of employee ownership known as ‘co-ownership’. A ‘co- 
ownedcompany’isawiderdefinitionwhichincludesemployee-ownedcompanies(asabove)
but also companies where employees own a substantial but minority stake in the business, say 
morethantwenty-fivepercent.Hereagain,employeeownershipmaybebasedondirectshare
ownership by staff, or indirect ownership via one or more trusts, or a combination of both shares 
and trust[s].4
Anotherdefinitiondescribesemployeeownershipas:‘anorganisationalarrangementinwhich 
asignificantproportion(thoughnotnecessarilyall)ofthepeoplewhoworkinthefirm(regardless
of whether they are salaried or hourly workers) hold rights to organisational equity, information 
andinfluence.’5Evenwithinthisdefinition,therearestillareasoftheemployeeownership
spectrum that have not been addressed, such as minority share plans in large, public companies.6 
Althoughtheequitystakeofemployeesinthesecompaniesissmall(usuallybetweenoneandfive
per cent), the value of the equity can be quite high as a result of the large market capitalisations  
of these companies.7
For the purposes of this study, the ideal form of employee ownership is any company that is 
majority-owned by its non-managerial employees, has some form of participation and democracy, 
and where employees exercise some form of control over the business.
Features of employee ownership
According to Rousseau and Shperling, employee ownership gives employees additional rights 
tothosenormallyexpected:arighttoshareinthecompany’sprofits,accesstoinformationon
companyfinancesandoperations,andrightstoparticipateinthemanagementofthecompany.8 
Allowingemployeestoparticipateintheserightsinfluencestheirbehaviourandattitudes, 
which then translates to better company performance and employee productivity.9 It is the  
extent to which employees participate in these ownership rights that distinguishes the different 
forms of employee ownership.
Rationale
The rationale for transferring the ownership of a business to its employees will have a crucial 
impact on the success of such an initiative. There are a variety of motivations and circumstances 
that lead to a company becoming employee-owned: aligning employee interests with those of the 
firm;co-operationandmutuality;creatingandsustainingmeaningfuljobs;preventingtheclosure
ofafirm;andideologicalbeliefsofthecurrentowner.
Ownership
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Overandabovetheformofownership(trust,directshares,collectiveownership),therearetwokey
issuestoaddresswhenanalysingtheownershipstructureofanemployee-ownedfirm:
1. How much of the company is owned by the employees?
2. How many employees participate in the ownership of the company?
Someemployee-ownedfirmsareonehundredpercentownedbytheiremployeesbutonlysixty 
percentofemployeesareowners(asmayhappenwithadirectsharemodel),whileothersare 
sixtypercentownedbytheiremployeesandalloftheemployeesareowners(usuallyfoundin 
an employee-owned company that uses a trust). Once a company has addressed the two questions 
above, there remain a number of other issues, such as the distribution of ownership amongst 
employees(equalorunequalshareholdings)andhowemployeesparticipateinownership
(voluntary/compulsoryandfreeshares/contributingcapital).
EXERCISE - Assessing an ownership structure
Assume that you are a director of a company that is considering transferring ownership  
to its employees. You have been asked to assess the different ownership options available  
tothecompanyandgivearecommendationtotheboard.Specifically,theboardwantadvice
regarding how ownership should be distributed amongst employees and how the employees 
aretoparticipateinownership.Provideanassessment(strengthsandweaknesses)ofthe
different options that are available to the company.
Governance
Pendletonandothersarguethatinfirmswhicharemajorityemployee-owned,employees 
mayhaveastrongsenseofownershipandwillexpectasignificantroleingovernanceand
management.10Accordingtoourdefinitionofemployeeownership,employeesshouldhave
ultimateauthorityinanorganisation(fulfillingtheroleofshareholdersinaconventional
company).Unfortunately,employeeparticipationingovernanceisnotguaranteedinafirm 
that is employee-owned, as we shall see in examples below. Many companies design systems  
to exclude employees from governance and management or else only offer cursory opportunities  
to participate.11
Once an employee ownership structure is chosen, it is then at the discretion of the company  
to select an appropriate governance structure. There is an abundance of options available, 
including worker representation on the board, quality circles, participation in monthly 
management meetings, partnership councils, and outright decision-making and  
management control.
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Beneficiary
Thelevelofparticipationinthesurplusgeneratedbythefirmdiffersdependingontheform 
ofemployeeownership.Inaworkerco-operative,employeesare(intheory)entitledtotheentire
surplusgeneratedbythebusiness;inotherfirmsemployeesreceiveashareoftheprofitbasedon
salary; while in others again, the employees do not participate at all. Employee-owners are also 
entitledtobenefitfromthenetassetsofthebusiness.
Forms of employee ownership
Direct shares
Directshareownershipofabusinessbyitsemployeesisfacilitatedbyaspecificlegalstructure: 
aprivatecompanylimitedbyshares(CLS).Foracompanytobeclassedasemployee-ownedusing
this model, the majority of shares must be held by the majority of employees. The share capital 
modelprovidesanumberofbenefitstoemployee-owners:
• direct participation in the growth of the value of the company;
• attractivemodelforoutsideinvestors(raisingcapital);
• flexiblemodelthatcanincorporateavarietyofownershipoptions(itcanbeusedwithatrust
and gives ability to grant stock options).
Distributing shares
There are numerous options available for including employees in the ownership of company 
shares.Thefirstissuetobedecidedishowmanyemployeesaretoparticipateinshareownership.
Ideally, every employee should be included through some sort of subscription or donation of shares 
(financedusingcompanyprofits),withtheoptionforindividualemployeestoacquiremoreshares
if possible. Unfortunately, some companies prevent certain employees from participating in share 
ownershipbyrequiringthemtopurchasethesharesdirectly,whichinvolvesasignificantcapital
investment(somethingwhichisoftenbeyondthemeansoflowerpaidworkers).Thisleadsto 
asituationwherewealthyemployees(oftenmanagers)acquirethemajorityofshares,creating 
an inequitable system of ownership and governance. It is generally accepted that when employees 
contributeorsacrificecapitaltoparticipateinshareownership,theirlevelsofcommitmentand
feelings of psychological ownership are increased.12 The task is to ensure that share offerings 
are affordable to the vast majority of employees. The company must also decide whether other 
stakeholderscanownshares(sincethestrengthofhavingaCLSlegalformistheabilitytoattract
external investment). Many companies include provisions in their articles of association to limit 
the amount of shares that can be held by non-employees.
Transferring shares
Most employee-owned companies will stipulate that a certain majority of shares must remain 
with employees and cannot be sold to external stakeholders. How then does the company allow 
employees to realise the value of their shares? One solution is to create an internal stock market  
so employees can cash in on their shares whilst preserving the employee ownership structure  
of the business. In the event of there not being enough buyers or sellers, the company can create  
atrust(coveredinthenextsection)toactasamarketregulator,purchasingsharesandselling
them as the situation dictates. Provisions must be in place to prevent individual employees 
acquiring a majority of shares through the internal stock market; some companies place a 
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maximumshareholdingoffivepercentforanindividual.Ontheotherhand,someemployee–
owned companies forbid the transfer of shares between employees, mainly to prevent large 
inequalities amongst individual shareholdings.13
Another issue to consider is what happens when an employee leaves a business: should they  
be permitted to retain the shares or be obligated to sell them back to the company? Many private 
limited companies implement a policy where they have a right to buy back the shares when the 
employee leaves but in a manner that suits the company, either the full amount up front or over 
a period of months or years.14 The company may also arrange for another employee to purchase 
the shares if that is possible. Valuing these shares is done via a formula approved by Her Majesty’s 
RevenueandCustoms(HMRC).UsuallyaPrice/Earningsratioforacomparablelistedcompanyis
usedandthendiscountsareappliedtoreflectthefactthatthecompanyisprivate(ifthecompany
is public then the shares are valued according to the stock market on which they are listed).
Sustaining employee ownership
Firmswithsharecapitalthatcanbeeasilyandfreelytraded(suchasthosethatarelistedonastock
exchange or market place) are not the best model for ensuring the longevity of employee ownership 
and control in a company:
•  Employee shareholdings can become very valuable after a number of years in a successful 
business and this can prevent new employees from becoming shareholders. This leads to 
a situation where the company remains employee-owned and controlled but by a rapidly 
decreasingnumberofworkers(thecompanyisessentiallydegeneratingintoacapitalist
company).15
• Cashinginonthevalueofthecompanyhasbeenaproblemforemployee-ownedfirmsthat 
do not make provisions for protecting the net assets from being distributed amongst employees. 
Employee-ownersofavaluablecompanycanliquidatethefirmanddistributethevalueofthe
assets amongst themselves.16
The accumulation of collective reserves and an employee trust help to prevent either of the above 
scenarios from occurring by reducing the value of an employee’s individual shareholding.
Voting rights
Traditionally, companies with share capital operate a governance system based on one share/one 
vote.Itispossible,howevertooperateamoredemocraticsystemofgovernance(oneperson/one
vote) by altering the articles of association. It is at the discretion of the company to decide the best 
system of governance to adopt.
Case study 6.1-  
Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC)
Founded by Bob Beyster, a physicist, in 1969, SAIC was for a time the largest employee-owned 
researchandengineeringfirmintheUS,withrevenuereaching$8bnand45,000employee-
owners by 2006.17 Key to the company’s success throughout the years was its commitment to 
grantingsharestoasmanyemployeesaspossible(knownasbroad-basedemployeeownership).
For large parts of its existence, the company was entirely owned by its employees and over ninety 
per cent of employees participated in share ownership.18 The company used a combination of stock 
options and direct shareholding in its employee ownership structure.19 The use of cash bonuses, 
sharesandoptions(sharesthatcanbeboughtinanumberofyears’timeatcurrentprices)were
used as a means to engender commitment and promote a long-term outlook amongst employees. 
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Of course, employees who wished to cash in on the value of their shares or purchase additional 
shares needed a medium to do so. To facilitate trading, the company established an internal share 
market(managedbyaspeciallycreatedsubsidiary)thatoperatedquarterly,offeringemployees
the opportunity to trade. If no other employees wished to purchase available stock, the subsidiary 
would buy them.20
Of course, simply handing employees stock does not engender loyalty or a long-term outlook, 
features that were key to the success of the company. Employees were given ownership training  
by their peers to get across what it means to be an owner of a company - evidence of the importance 
ofcreatinganownershipculturetocomplementfinancialparticipation.
The founder, Bob Beyster, was convinced that employee ownership drove the performance of the 
company, claiming that if he had not given away so much of the stock to employees, he ‘would own 
a much larger percentage of a far less valuable company.’21
The story of SAIC also reveals an important point regarding leadership succession in employee-
owned companies. A robust leadership succession strategy is crucial in employee-owned companies 
because you need someone who is passionate and committed to creating an ownership culture  
as well as an ownership structure. Unfortunately, upon the retirement of Bob Beyster in 2006,  
the board appointed someone without any enthusiasm for or knowledge of employee ownership 
andthecompanywassubsequentlyfloatedonthestockexchange,whereitssharepricehas
remainedlargelystatictothepresentday(itdoubledeveryfiveyearswhilethecompanywas
employee-owned).22
Employee Benefit Trust
EmployeeBenefitTrusts(EBT)astheyarenowknownareapopularmeansoftransferring
ownership of a business to employees using a special trust as the vehicle. A trust is ‘a legal 
arrangement by which one person owns assets on behalf of somebody else.’23 An EBT owns  
sharesinacompanyforthebenefitofcurrent,andsometimesformer,employees.TheEBTthat
contains the shares is controlled by one or a number of trustees, usually appointed by the company. 
The trustees perform a number of important functions, such as deciding how to distribute the 
shares in the trust, how many each employee should receive, and when the distribution is to occur. 
Similarly, the trustees can decide to refrain from distributing shares, deciding that this approach  
is in the best interests of the employees of the company.24
The trustees are required to act in accordance with the trust deed, the document that establishes 
howthetrusteesareappointed,whothebeneficiariesare,andwhatpowersthetrusteeshave. 
Most trust deeds require that the trustees hold all or most of the trust’s shares in the company  
until the end of the trust period, usually eighty years.25 This prevents a situation arising whereby 
the trust distributes most of the shares in the company and the employees cease to be majority 
owners. At the end of the trust period, the trustees have a number of options regarding the shares 
held in the trust. They can choose to distribute the shares directly to the employees; establish 
another EBT and transfer the company’s shares to it; or, in extreme cases, donate the value  
of the assets to a charitable organisation.
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An EBT can be utilised in a number of ways in a company:
  Market maker in an internal market –  
An EBT can be used as a mechanism to recycle shares in a private company. An EBT can 
facilitate the purchasing and selling of shares amongst employees, ensuring the shares remain 
in the company, thus preserving the ownership stake of the employees and providing them 
with an outlet to realise the value of their shares.
  Warehouse for shares –  
An EBT is often used to hold all or a majority of the shares in a company for the purpose  
of ensuring the company remains employee-owned. The shares are ‘locked’ in the trust for  
the duration of the trust period, often with restrictions on how and when the shares may  
be distributed to employees.
  Providing an exit –  
An EBT provides an opportunity for the founders or owners of a company to exit the business, 
ensuringthecompanyisnotboughtbyacompetitororfloatedonastockmarket.Theowner’s
shares can be purchased by the EBT using a loan secured on the future earnings of the 
companyorfinanceddirectlybythecompany.26
  Mechanism for employee share plans –  
The EBT can be used as a vehicle for purchasing shares in a company for the purpose  
ofanemployeeshareplansuchasashareincentiveplan(SIP).Thisisthesimplestuseof 
an EBT and is commonly used by quoted companies with little interest in majority employee 
ownership or participation.27
It is important that a company assesses the following considerations before deciding on the use  
it is going to make of the EBT:
Is the trust going to hold all of the shares or just some?  
An EBT that owns one hundred per cent of the shares protects the employee ownership structure  
of the company but does not cater for participation in decision-making or realisation of gains  
(i.e.adividendorcapitalgain).ItispossibleforanEBTtobeusedinconjunctionwithaninternal
stock market to both protect the employee ownership structure of the company and offer individual 
employeesamediumtorealisefinancialgains.
How much control will the employees have in the company?  
WithanEBT,theemployeesdonotusuallyhaveanydirectpower(intheformofvotingatAGMs
or sitting on the board of directors). Companies such as John Lewis and Scott Bader realise 
thatemployeefinancialparticipationwithoutinvolvementingovernanceisnottrueemployee
ownership and have introduced democratic mechanisms to ensure employees can participate  
intheeffectivegovernanceofthecompany(seecasestudy6.2).
Howwilltheprofitofthecompanybedistributed? 
Asowners,employeesareentitledtoashareoftheprofitgeneratedbythecompany.Theamount
they are entitled to is a matter for each individual company, but reinvestment in the business 
usuallyaccountsforthemajorityoftheprofit,withacertainamountdistributedtoemployees 
and the remainder to a charitable cause.28
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Case study 6.2 - John Lewis Partnership
The Partnership’s ultimate purpose is the happiness of all its members, through their worthwhile 
and satisfying employment in a successful business.
Principle 1 of the John Lewis Partnership Constitution
The John Lewis Partnership is one of the UK’s most recognisable and successful retailers  
with 35 John Lewis shops, 271 Waitrose supermarkets, and an online and catalogue business  
www.johnlewis.com. It is also one of the UK’s largest and oldest employee-owned companies, 
combining a common ownership structure with a governance system based on democracy and  
a culture of participation.29
Ownership
Ownership of the John Lewis group of businesses resides in an employee trust, the John Lewis 
PartnershipTrust,whichisrunforthebenefitofthecompany’s76,500employees,or‘partners’. 
In 1929, John Spedan Lewis, the son of the founder of the original John Lewis store in Oxford 
Street,London,transferredthemajorityofhissharestoanemployeebenefittrust,‘tobeowned
intrustforthebenefitofitsmembers’.SpedanLewisbecamethesoletrusteeofthebusinessuntil
1950 when he transferred his remaining shares into the Trust and appointed three trustees;  
John Lewis had now become one hundred per cent employee-owned.
Employees do not hold the shares directly: one hundred per cent of the shares are held in the  
Trust which is governed by three trustees and the Chairman of John Lewis. The voting rights 
attachedtothesharesintheTrustaredividedbetweenthetrustees(sixtypercent)andthe
Chairman(fortypercent).ThetrusteesareelectedannuallybythePartnershipCouncil,the
highest, mainly elected, representative body of the company’s partners. Therefore, employees  
do not hold direct voting rights in the company, resulting in the need to create democratic 
structures to enable the partners to exercise one of their fundamental rights of ownership.30
Governance
Governance in the partnership is exercised by three authorities: the Chairman, the Partnership 
Board(equivalenttoaboardofdirectors)andthePartnershipCouncil.ThePartnershipCouncil 
is the mainly elected body of partners in the company, comprising partners elected from the branch 
councils and a number of individuals appointed by the Chairman. The Partnership Council has 
three key roles to play in the governance of the Partnership:
• to hold the Chairman to account and remove him if necessary;
• toinfluencepolicybymakingrecommendationstotheChairmanandPartnershipBoard;
•  to participate in making key governance decisions, including the election of non-executive 
directors to the Partnership Board.
The Chairman and Partnership Board operate similarly to a CEO and board of directors  
in an investor-owned company. The Partnership Board represents the highest form of employee 
participation in the governance of the business.
The rights and responsibilities of partners
Ownership of a company bestows a number of rights and responsibilities on the owners;  
the partners in John Lewis are no different. These rights and responsibilities are enshrined  
in the Partnership’s constitution, and are outlined below.
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EXERCISE - Rights and responsibilities of ownership
In the video at the link below, the ownership structure of John Lewis is outlined. Watch the 
video and consider the following questions:
1. As owners, what do you think are the responsibilities of the partners?
2.  Why is a culture of democratic participation and engagement so important in an 
employee-owned company? Do you think it is enough for employees to simply own the 
businessandjustparticipatefinancially?
Video:http://www.mcmproductions-partnerconnect.com/johnlewis/index.asp?fn=JLP_
Partnership_Model___JLP_Partnership_Model
Hybrid
This form of employee ownership is based on some combination of direct shareholding and  
the use of a trust to hold shares collectively on behalf of the employees. This model reconciles  
the need for liquidity and stability in an employee-owned organisation.31 The stability of employee 
ownershipinthecompanyisensuredbyplacingthemajorityofshares(orfiftypercent)in 
an EBT, while also allowing employees to participate in the growth of the value of the company  
by owning shares directly. Some employee-owned companies create an internal stock market 
(similartoSAIC)tofacilitatethetradingofsharesbetweenemployeesandthecompany, 
while others sell shares to external investors as a means of raising capital. The hybrid model does 
require a robust governance structure to ensure that the employees and other stakeholders are 
fairly represented in the decision-making process. Considerations include how voting rights are 
distributed between the trust and direct shareholders, and whether employees ‘vote twice’ through 
their own shares and those of the trust.
Rights:
• Profit:toshareintheprofitcreatedbythebusiness.
•  Knowledge: to work in a transparent and open environment and to be made aware of the 
performance of the business.
•  Power: to determine who runs the business and to hold management to account.
Responsibilities:
• To take responsibility for the performance of the business.
• To build relationships powered by the company’s principles.
• Createrealinfluenceovertheirworkinglives.
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Case study 6.3 - Loch Fyne Oysters
The founders of Loch Fyne Oysters seem on the face of it an unlikely pair: Johnny Noble, a wine 
merchant and owner of the Ardkinglas estate on the shores of the loch, and Andy Lane, a marine 
biologist and a passionate environmentalist. The two men met in a pub in the local village near 
Loch Fyne and it was there that they came up with the concept of Loch Fyne Oysters. They began 
farming oysters in 1979 and painstakingly built up the business. In the early 2000s, the business 
was generating turnover in the millions and employed over one hundred people. Both founders  
had begun discussing succession strategies and were interested in selling the company to the 
employees as one of several possible options. However, they had some reservations about this 
option, namely the costs that employees would have to bear if they were to purchase the company 
themselves(theeventualsalepriceequatedto£32,400peremployee),andtheywerealso
concerned about realising the value of their efforts in building the business from scratch.32
A solution was found where the company could be sold to the employees for a fair price. Sadly,  
thissolutionwasfoundonlyafterthedeathofJohnnyNoble(itwasthiseventthatforcedAndy
Lane to implement a succession strategy). The company was sold to the employees using an EBT; 
thetrustborrowed£3.5m(£1.5mfromthebankand£2mfromBaxiPartnership).Fiftypercent 
oftheshareswerethendepositedinthetrustwhiletheotherfiftypercentweredistributed
amongst the employees. It was a fundamental tenet of the share distribution that every  
employeewastoparticipateintheownershipofshares(thiswasfundedusingaportion 
ofthecompany’sprofit).34
This combination of using a trust and individual shareholdings has a number of advantages  
thathavebenefitedthecompany.First,thecompanyislikelytoremainemployee-ownedin
perpetuitysincefiftypercentofthesharesarelockedintothetrust,withnoprovisionforthem
to be distributed amongst employees. Second, the trust enabled the employees to purchase the 
companywithouthavingtosupplyanyoftheirowncapital(somethingtheyneverwouldhave 
been able to afford). Third, the distribution of shares to employees tends to unlock a deeper  
senseofownershipamongstthemastherearetangiblebenefitsassociatedwithholdingshares
directly. Finally, every employee in the company was able to participate in the ownership of the 
shares,asaportionofannualprofitswasusedtopurchasethesharesandthendistributethem 
to employees.
ESOPs
AnEmployeeStockOwnershipPlanorESOPisatypeofemployeebenefitplanthatusesatrust 
to accumulate and then distribute shares to employees. Originating in the US, but used in the  
UKaswell,itbearsmanysimilaritiestoaprofitsharingplan.Thefirstemployeeownership
structure that would eventually become the ESOP was established in 1953 at Peninsula Newspapers 
Incorporated in the US by Louis Kelso, who with the help of Russell Long, a Louisiana senator, 
convinced the United States Congress to pass legislation governing the creation of ESOPs.35  
ESOPs were primarily conceived as retirement savings plans for workers, with the threefold 
purpose of widening share ownership, facilitating capital formation, and improving company 
performance.36 Our discussion of the ESOP model of employee ownership will focus on the 
American experience.37 There are over 10,500 plans in the US covering more than thirteen  
million employees.
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How do ESOPs work?
Thefirststepisforthecompanytoestablishatrust;thisactsasavehicleforthetransferofshares
between the owners and employees. The trust then accumulates the shares of the owner in one  
of three ways:
• thecompanymakesacontributionoutofpre-taxprofitstothetrust,whichthenusesthefunds
to purchase the owner’s shares;
• the company issues new shares into the trust;
• thetrustsecuresaloanfromabankorfinancialserviceproviderandusesittopurchase 
thesharesfromtheowner.Theloanisthenrepaidusingpre-taxprofits.Thisisknown 
as a leveraged ESOP.38
The next stage involves the transfer of company shares to individual employees. The shares that 
reside in the trust are divided up and allocated into individual employee accounts. The formula 
used to decide how many shares each employee receives is at the discretion of the company.  
Some companies allocate shares equally amongst employees, some base it on hours worked,  
but the most common formula is based on an employee’s salary.39
When can the employee access the shares?
North American legislation mandates that an ESOP must distribute shares to an employee within 
seven years of the employee joining the ESOP. Typically, a company will require an employee to 
bepartoftheschemeforfiveyearsbeforebeingeligibletoreceivetheirfullallocationofshares.
Companies usually adopt a process called ‘vesting’ to determine how many shares an employee  
is entitled to after a number of years.40
Table 16-Sample ESOP vesting process
No. of years in the ESOP % vested
1 year 20
2 years 40
3 years 60
4 years 80
5 years or retires, dies or is disabled 100
An employee has one of two options when they receive their shares, depending on the type  
of company they work for:
•  in a public company, the employee receives their shares and can sell them on the stock market;
• inaprivateorganisation,thecompanyislegallyrequired(underUSlegislation)topurchasethe
employee’s shares.
Voting rights
Despite their effectiveness in spreading wealth and capital more broadly in companies,  
ESOPs are not automatically a successful mechanism for transferring control to employees. 
Legislation allows companies to place voting rights with the trustees of the ESOP and employees 
only receive voting rights for supermajority issues, such as decisions relating to mergers, 
acquisitions or a sale.41 Employees typically have no input to decision-making about the 
appointment of directors and play only a marginal role in governance issues. That is not to say  
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that companies do not offer some opportunities for employees to participate in decision-making, 
but the extent of input is at the discretion of the directors of the business.
Uses of ESOPs:
• to buy shares from a departing owner;
• toborrowmoneymoretaxefficiently;
• tocreateadditionalemployeebenefit.
Rationale for ESOPs
Many ESOPs are established for tax purposes; ESOP legislation provides generous tax incentives 
for businesses wishing to establish a plan:
• contributions of shares to the ESOP are tax-deductible;
• cash contributions to the ESOP are tax-deductible;
• contributions used to pay off the loan are tax-deductible.42
Issues to note
ESOPs are not automatically an effective means of involving employees in the governance of  
an organisation. There are also concerns that the minority ESOP form of employee ownership  
isnotassignificanttoemployeesasholdingsharesdirectly.Thiscanbeattributedtothefactthat
employees do not contribute any personal wealth to the accumulation of company shares in an 
ESOP. An ESOP plan can be expensive from the employer’s perspective; most plans typically cost 
between $30,000 and $50,000 to establish and accrue annual administration costs. Coupled with 
the legal requirement to repurchase shares when an employee decides to sell them, organisations 
underfinancialpressurearenotprimecandidatesforanESOP.
Case study 6.3 - Allied Plywood
Allied Plywood is a wholesaler and manufacturer of plywood and related building materials. 
Established in 1951 by Ed and Phyllis Sanders, the company is now headquartered in Virginia  
andoperatesacrossmultiplestatesinthesoutheastofAmerica.Itwasoneofthefirstcompanies 
to establish an ESOP and has managed to combine one hundred per cent employee ownership with 
auniquefinancialandgovernanceparticipationstructure.
ESOP
ThefirstESOPwasestablishedin1977asameansfortheownerstoretire.Acknowledgingthat 
theemployeeshadplayedasignificantroleinthedevelopmentofthebusiness,theowners
felt strongly that the employees should be given the option to purchase the company. By 1981, 
theESOPheldalmostfiftypercentofthecompany’sshares.Thisprocessdidnotinvolvethe
employees providing any of the funding needed to purchase the shares; a portion of the company’s 
pre-taxprofitswasplacedintheESOPannuallyandusedtopurchasethesharesfromtheoriginal
owners(knownasanunleveragedESOP).In1982,theESOPtrusteestookoutabankloanand
purchased the remaining shares from the owners, meaning Allied Plywood had now become  
one hundred per cent employee-owned.
From 1981 onwards, the company’s performance improved dramatically. Sales increased ten times 
while the number of employees increased seven fold. Even in 1990, a year of severe recession in the 
housing industry, productivity was over seventeen per cent higher than before the ESOP. Once the 
company repaid the loan it took out to enable the ESOP to purchase the shares in 1985, it issued 
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new shares to the ESOP to enable current and future employees to participate in the ownership  
of the company. The net value of the equity in the company increased from $1.3m in 1981 to $7.4m 
in1995andthebenefitstoemployeesaresubstantial;allemployeeswhohavebeenontheAllied
payroll since the ESOP was installed have accumulated accounts close to or exceeding $100,000.
A note on vesting
Employees become eligible for shares in the ESOP from the day they are hired. Most ESOP 
companies have a probationary period of one year before employees are allowed to participate  
in the scheme. Employees are not entitled to the full value of their shares immediately, however; 
the process of vesting occurs over a number of years.
ESOPaccountsofthosewhoquitorarefiredbeforethreeyearsofservicearezeropercentvested,
meaningthatwhentheyleave,theyforfeitalltheiraccumulatedESOPbenefits.Uponcompletion
of three years of service, vesting begins at twenty per cent, with twenty per cent added each 
following year. In year seven, an employee’s account becomes one hundred per cent vested and 
is no longer subject to any forfeiture. Those who reach retirement age, become disabled, or die 
become one hundred per cent vested automatically.
Combining financial reward with participation in governance
Sincethe1960s,thecompanyhasoperatedaprofit-relatedpaysystemwherebyemployeesarepaid
lessthanthemarketrate(byaroundtwentypercent)butareentitledtoanequalshareofthirtyper
centofoperatingprofit,paidmonthlyinarrears.Thissignificantfinancialparticipationiscoupled
withapracticeofsharingcompanyperformanceinformation.Thereisalsoanannualcashprofit
distribution based on a weighted formula according to the individual performance of the employee 
(forexample,numberofdaysworked,apeerreview,orimportanceoftherole).
Thereissomethingreminiscentofaworkerco-operativeaboutAlliedPlywood’sprofit-relatedpay
system.Theemployeesaremotivatedbyindividualinterest(annualbonusbasedonperformance)
aswellasamutualinterestinensuringthatthecompanyisprofitablelong-term(boostingtheir
ESOP accounts and the ability of future employees to participate in the ESOP).
Thecompanyhasfiveboardmemberswhogovernthebusinessandalsoactasthetrusteesof
theESOP.Twoofthemembersareelected(onaoneshare/onevotesystem)bymanagement
representativesandtwofromworkerrepresentatives.Thefifthmemberisanindependent
candidate chosen by both groups. The ESOP facilitates the sharing of risk and reward amongst  
the employees of the company, creating an ownership structure that allows employees to share  
in the rights and responsibilities of ownership.
Source: R. Oakeshott, Jobs & Fairness: The Logic and Experience of Employee Ownership 
(Norwich: Michael Russell Ltd, 2000).
Summary of employee ownership forms
Readers should note that we have only covered some of the main forms of employee ownership;  
aswiththeco-operativemodelofenterprise,employee-ownedfirmscantakeavarietyofformsand
candifferintermsoftheirownership,governanceandbeneficiarystructures.Thematerialcovered
in this chapter, as well as the information presented in the Table 17, represents a stylised view of 
employeeownershipandreadersareencouragedtobearthisinmindastheyreflectonthistopic.
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EXERCISE - Analysing employee-owned companies45
Choose an employee-owned company to research. Use sources such as the company’s website 
andanyotherpublicationsorweb-basedresourcesyoucanfind.Drawingonyourresearch,
address the following questions:
1. What proportion of the company is owned by the employees?
2. How is ownership distributed amongst the employees?
3. What is the nature of governance at this company?
4. How and why did the company become employee-owned?
Table 17-The three forms of employee ownership
Minority share 
plans
Workers’  
co-operatives
Majority employee 
ownership (direct, trusts 
and ESOPs)
Amount of 
equity held by 
employees
1–50% 100% 51–100%
Ownership Minority + 
unequal
Majority + equal Majority + equal/unequal
Governance One share/ 
one vote
One member/ 
one vote
Varies43
Rationale Align employee 
interests with  
thefirm
Co-operation and 
mutuality
Business succession
Protect jobs
To turn around a failing 
business
Industrial democracy reasons 
(sharedcapitalism)44
 
Source: Adapted from Andrew Pendleton, The three forms of worker ownership: 
summary, Introduction to employee ownership.
Source: Employee Ownership and Governance module, University of York
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Summary of learning
This chapter has argued that:
•  Employee ownership takes a variety of forms. There are differences, for example, between 
the EBT model in the UK and the ESOP model in the US, and between minority and majority 
ESOPs.
• Inanemployee-ownedfirm,workershavetherighttoparticipateinownership,governanceand
profit,aswellasaccesstoinformationandparticipationinmanagement.
•  The selection of an appropriate governance structure is a crucial aspect of employee ownership.
•  The extent to which employees participate in the rights of ownership differs for each form  
of employee ownership.
Essay/discussion questions
•  Of the models of employee ownership analysed in this chapter, which one do you think 
best represents the ideal form of employee ownership? Is there an ideal form of employee 
ownership?
• Doyouthinkthatonemodelismorestable(intermsoforganisationalsustainabilityand 
in terms of preserving employee ownership) than the others?
• Is1980sstyleemployeeownership(meansofdistributingwealthmorewidelyandsustaining
employment) simply an acceptable face of capitalism or a genuine alternative economic 
paradigm?
Useful resources
Employee Ownership Association - http://www.employeeownership.co.uk/home/.
The Ohio Employee Ownership Center -  http://www.oeockent.org/.
John Lewis Partnership -  
http://www.johnlewispartnership.co.uk/media/webcasts-and-videos.html.
The ESOP Association - http://www.esopassociation.org/.
National Centre for Employee Ownership - http://www.nceo.org/.
European Federation of Employee Share Ownership - http://www.efesonline.org/.
Ownership Associates - http://www.ownershipassociates.com/abt.shtm.
Venture Capitalist - http://www.avc.com/a_vc/stocks/.
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An acceptable face  
of capitalism?:
arguments for and against  
employee ownership
‘...the ultimate conclusion on the 
labour-managed firm is clear. 
Whatever its contribution to industrial 
democracy, it is not an inherently 
efficient economic organisation.’
Eirek Furobotn1
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7. An acceptable face of 
capitalism?: arguments for  
and against employee ownership
Learning objectives
This chapter explores the arguments for and against employee ownership at both theoretical  
and practical levels. By the end of this chapter you will be able to:
• distinguish the economic, social, and political reasoning behind employee ownership;
•  critically assess the theoretical and practical arguments for and against employee ownership.
The key arguments that will be developed in this chapter are:
The case for employee ownership must be argued on economic, social, and political bases.
The form of employee ownership in question must be taken into account when analysing the 
arguments for and against employee ownership.
The level of risk borne by workers in an organisation is a key component in most arguments.
Themajorityofbenefitsassociatedwithemployeeownershipareonlyrealisablethrough 
anownershipstructurethatcombinesmeaningfulfinancialparticipationwithparticipation
in management, decision-making, and governance.
The case for employee ownership
‘On the face of it, shareholder value is the dumbest idea in the world.’
Jack Welch
The following analysis is comprised of four parts:
• the case for employee ownership based on rights;
• thecaseforemployeeownershipbasedoneconomicbenefits;
• the case for employee ownership based on social reasons;
• the case for employee ownership based on political reasons.
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Rights
The property argument of employee ownership rests on the inalienable right of workers to control 
their own actions; in essence, this means that it is impossible for a person to ‘rent’ themselves 
toacompany.Workersalsohavetherighttoappropriatethefruits(positiveandnegative)of
their labour.2This idea is combined with the notion that employees bear risk in the organisation 
andshouldpossessarighttothevaluegeneratedbythefirmaswellastherighttoparticipatein
governance, to produce a strong argument for employee ownership based on organisational rights.
Dahlarguedthatdemocraticemployeeownership,onceitisefficienteconomically,issuperior
tootherformsoforganisationsimplybyvirtueofitsbeneficial‘consequencesfordemocracyand
justice’.3
Economic 
Efficiency
Despitebeingoneofthemajorargumentsagainstemployeeownership,increasedefficiency
has also been used as a potential advantage of the model. Hansmann contends that there are 
efficiencyadvantagestobegainedbyhavingaworkforcethathashighlyhomogeneousinterests.
Homogeneousinterestshelptoreduceagencycosts(monitoringandsupervision)andpreventthe
exploitation of employees by the company.6
Case study 7.1 -  
Economic benefits of employee ownership
Astudypublishedin2010oftheeconomicbenefitsofemployeeownershipwasconducted 
onbehalfoftheEmployeeOwnershipAssociation(EOA)byresearchersintheCASSBusiness
School,London.Thereportisbasedonasurveyof41Employee-ownedBusinesses(EOBs)and 
22 non-EOBs in the UK. It also draws upon secondary data on the commercial performance of  
49EOBsand204non-EOBsintheUK.Thefollowingisasummaryofsomeofthemainfindings 
of the report.4
•  The employee ownership model offers particular advantages to small and medium-sized 
businesses.EOBswithfewerthanseventy-fiveemployeesdosignificantlybetterthannon-EOBs
ofthesamesizemeasuredbybothProfitBeforeTaxandProfitBeforeTaxperemployee.
• TheprofitabilityofEOBscorrelateswithgivingemployeesgreaterautonomyindecision-
making. EOBs that adapt their organisational structure and empower their front-end employees 
are more likely to sustain their performance as their size increases.
• AsEOBsgrowinsizetheyneedtofindinnovativewaystoinvolvestaff.EOBswithhigher
employee numbers experience lower levels of employee involvement in new product decisions 
and strategy. As EOBs grow in size, it is vital to seek new ideas from staff and involve them  
in key business area decisions.
• EOBsandnon-EOBsareonaparforprofitability,measuredbyProfitBeforeInterestand
Taxes(PBIT)5: non-EOBs performed slightly better on this measure between 2005 and 2008, 
but EOBs outperformed non-EOBs in the period of recession during 2008–09. Non-EOBs 
performedsignificantlybetterthanEOBsonPBITperemployeeduringtheperiod2005–8, 
butthegapnarrowedin2008–9.AnalysisofsurveyresponsesshowsthatEOBswithhighprofit
per employee give employees greater autonomy in the workplace and are more likely to seek 
innovative ideas from employees.
Source: J. Lampel, A. Bhalla, and J. Pushkar, Model Growth: Do Employee-Owned Businesses Deliver Sustainable 
Performance? (CASS Business School London. EOA Report, 2010)
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Productivity
The strongest economic argument for employee ownership focuses on the increases in productivity 
whichresultfrommeaningfulfinancialandgovernanceparticipationinanorganisation.Jones
investigated the effects of worker representation on the boards of British consumer co-operatives 
and found that productivity increased between 0.78 per cent and 1.4 per cent. These increases were 
achievedwithoutanyfinancialownershiponthepartoftheworkerrepresentatives.Inasimilar
study, Doucouliagos found that:
workerparticipationindecision-makinginLMFs(labour-managedfirms)hasasmall,positive, 
andstatisticallysignificantassociationwithproductivity,rejectingthetraditionalviewthat
democraticmanagementofthefirmisassociatedwithreducedefficiency.7
This argument is echoed by Ricketts:
The principle advantage of the cooperative enterprise has long been considered the more 
positivemotivationoftheworkforceandtheabsenceof‘alienation’thatissaidtoafflictworkers
in joint-stock enterprises.8
Thekeypointregardingtheproductivityandperformancebenefitsofemployeeownership 
istheimportanceofcombiningfinancialparticipation(thatis,sharinginprofitorowningstock)
with participation in management, decision-making and governance.9 Various studies and reports 
have highlighted this requirement as the single most important factor in harnessing the power  
ofemployeeownership.Notonlyisparticipationingovernancecentraltoachievingthebenefits 
of employee ownership, it also acts as a deterrent for negative behaviours. According to Pérotin  
and Robinson:
Insufficientinformationandparticipationingovernancemightleaveemployeesvulnerable 
tomoralhazardandleadtoconflictwithmanagement.10
One of the crucial elements in achieving employee participation in management, governance and 
decision-making is creating what is known as an ownership culture; employees need to feel they 
are owners.
Case study 7.2 - The Essentials of an Ownership Culture
Research shows that employee ownership is a powerful tool to improve corporate performance, 
butonlywhenpairedwithwhattheNationalCenterforEmployeeOwnership(NCEO)callsan
‘ownershipculture’.Tounleashthebenefitsofemployeeownershipsixessential‘rules’should 
be followed:
1. Provideafinanciallymeaningfulownershipstake,enoughtobeanimportantpartofemployee
financialsecurity.
2.  Provide ownership education that teaches people how the company makes money and their 
role in making that happen.
3.  Share performance data about how the company is doing overall and how each work group 
contributes to that performance.
4.  Train people in business literacy so they understand the numbers the company shares.
5. Shareprofitsthroughbonuses,profitsharingorothertools.
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6.  Build employee involvement not just by allowing employees to contribute ideas and 
information but making that part of their everyday work organization through teams,  
feedback opportunities, devolution of authority, and other structures.
Source: http://www.nceo.org/main/article.php/id/27/
Alignment of employee interests with the firm
For organisational theorists and management specialists, employee ownership is often put forward 
as a means of aligning the interests of workers with those of the shareholders.11 This argument 
aroseoutofthePrincipal/Agenttheoryofemploymentrelationships.Theprincipal(owner) 
needstheagent(employee)todosomethingforhim/her,suchastocompleteatask.Theagent
possessesmoreinformationthantheprincipalandhasdifferentinterests(moralhazard).
Therefore the agent must be rewarded with appropriate incentives or subjected to strict  
monitoring(whichiscostly)toensureheorsheperformsthetask.Disseminatingapiece 
of ownership amongst employees helps to reduce these agency costs. This argument is widely  
used as the basis for minority employee ownership most commonly found in companies whose 
shares are tradable on a stock market.
Reduced supervision costs
It is widely believed that raised levels of employee ownership, where the majority of workers 
participate in ownership, help to foster a culture of peer supervision, driven by the need to ensure 
everyone is contributing to the success of the business. Rather than use management authority  
or direct commands, employees will use social pressure to encourage each other to perform  
to a high level.12
Employment
Blair, Kruse, and Blasi proposed that employee-owned companies will tend to maintain 
employment levels better during periods of economic hardship:
An alternative argument in favour of employee ownership comes out of the idea that 
participatoryfirms,forculturalandeconomicreasons,willhavelesstendencytolayoffworkers
during economic downturns.13
Lampel, Bhalla, and Pushkar extend this argument by empirically demonstrating that employee-
ownedfirmsnotonlyretainemploymentlevelsbetter,butalsocreatejobsatafasterrate:
EOBs create jobs faster. EOBs experienced greater employment growth than their non-
employee-owned counterparts in the period of economic growth from 2005 to 2008  
(anaverageincreaseinemploymentofnearly7.5%perannuminEOBscomparedwithless 
than 3.9% in non-EOBs). After the recession set in during 2008–09, this rate increased even 
faster, with EOBs increasing employment numbers by more than 12.9% compared with 2.7%  
innon-EOBs.ThisisreflectedinthebeliefofEOBsthatstaffrecruitmentandretentionare
crucial in economic recovery: nearly three-quarters of EOBs strongly believe that employee 
commitment is a central advantage of the employee-owned model.14
Stability
ResearchintheUShasshownthatemployeeownershipcan‘stabilise’afirmbyloweringthe
probabilityofthefirmbeingtakenover,goingbankrupt,ortakenprivate;itcanalsomaintain
employmentlevels.Noneofthiscomesatanyeconomiccost(forexample,lowerproductivity).
Blair,Kruse,andBlasicomparedtwenty-sevenpublicfirmswhichhadatleasttwentypercent
employeeownershipwithforty-fivesimilar-sizednon-employee-ownedfirms.Theyfoundthatonly
oneemployee-ownedcompanywastakenoverbynewownerscomparedwithtenoftheforty-five
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non-employee-ownedfirms.TheyalsofoundthatEOfirmsperformedatleastasefficientlyasthe
non-EOfirms.15
ThefindingsofthisresearchwerecorroboratedbyasimilarstudyintheUK.Lampel,Bhallaand
Pushkar concluded:
EOBs(employee-ownedbusinesses)aremoreresilient:theirperformanceismorestableover
business cycles, displaying less sales variability. During the period of growth from 2005 to 2008, 
non-EOBsexperiencedhigheraveragesalesgrowthperannum(12.1%)thanEOBs(10.0%).
However,theaveragesalesgrowthofEOBsbetween2008and2009was11.08%,significantly
surpassingthatofnon-EOBs(0.61%)duringthisperiodofrecession.16
Innovation
A common argument against employee ownership concerns the perception of barriers to 
innovation. The empirical evidence, however, suggests that employee-owned companies are  
more likely to be innovative than not. A report by the All Party Parliamentary Group on Employee 
Ownership conducted in 2008 states:
co-owned companies are more likely to adopt human resource practices of employee 
participation and representation, and these in turn have been found to be positively and 
statisticallysignificantlycorrelatedwiththeprobabilityoffirmsinnovating.17
The report highlights that employee-owned companies are more likely to adopt participatory 
management practices as well as granting greater autonomy to employees. This in turn helps  
to create a working environment which is more conducive to innovation and creativity. There  
isalsoatangiblebenefitforemployeestobeinnovativebecausetheywillsharefinanciallyinthe
commercialisation of new ideas.
UBH International, one of the world’s leading specialist manufacturers of transportable tanks 
for bulk liquids, is an excellent example of the entrepreneurial nature of workers in an employee-
owned company. UBH presented evidence to the same parliamentary report on the effects 
employee ownership had on innovation within the company:
In general [we] have found that change can be implemented more successfully and with high 
levels of employee participation in co-owned companies because there is a clear linkage between 
innovationandchangeandindividualbenefit.18
Another empirical example of the innovative nature of employee-owned companies is the American 
companyEBO(ExcellencebyOwners):
Wearea100%employeeownedcompanyguidedbyadefiningsetofsharedvalues. 
Our unique ownership culture empowers us to strive for excellence and achieve extraordinary 
customer service. We encourage and promote the incubation of new ideas, processes and 
products. For over 30 years, we’ve all shared in the successful creation and growth of our 
companies. Our employee owners enjoy investing their time, talents, energy and passion  
in becoming entrepreneurs and venture capitalists in each new opportunity.19
From one business in 1978, EBO has grown to four companies, all of which were created using 
a unique innovation framework consisting of an ownership culture, shared values, and the EBO 
process for generating new ideas.
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Case study 7.3 -  
Financial performance of employee-owned companies  
in the UK
The UK Employee Ownership Index, maintained by legal advisors Field Fisher Waterhouse,  
is an index of the share prices of UK public companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange and 
AIM which have ten per cent or more of their issued share capital held by or on behalf of employees 
other than main board directors. The performance of the index is calculated quarterly. Started in 
1995,theindexhasoutperformedtheFTSEAll-Share(LondonStockExchange)indexoverthree,
fiveandtenyears.In2010,forexample,employee-ownedcompanies’sharepriceswereup16.3per
cent over the year, compared with 11.3 per cent for the FTSE-All Share companies’ share prices.
Source: http://www.ffw.com/practices/employment-pensions-incentives 
/equity-incentives/uk-employee-ownership-index.aspx.
Social
A more equitable society?
One of the key issues in developed countries today is the growing divide between the richest and  
the poorest individuals in society. Wilkinson and Pickett suggest that employee ownership may  
be a way of alleviating these wealth inequalities. They argue that employee ownership is a way  
of creating a more egalitarian society based on the following advantages:
• itisaformofsocialemancipation(givingrightstoemployees);
• democratic control of pay differentials;
• redistribution of wealth and income;
• improved productivity; possible competitive advantage;
• increases experiences of community;
• improves sociability in society.20
The role of employee ownership in community regeneration, both socially and economically, should 
not be underestimated. Employee ownership grounds local businesses in the community, providing 
employment as well as distributing wealth in the local economy. Case study 7.4 provides empirical 
evidenceofthesocialbenefitsofhavingmoreemployeeownershipincommunities.
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Case study 7.4 -  
Social impact of employee ownership: 
evidence from Italy
In 1999 David Erdal conducted a study of three Italian towns in the region of Bologna:  
Imola, Faenza, and Sassuolo. These towns had twenty-six per cent, thirteen per cent and zero  
per cent respectively of the working population employed in worker co-operatives. He sought  
to explore the effects of having a more egalitarian society by studying the effect worker ownership 
had on each town based on the following metrics:
Crime 
 victimisation;policing;confidence;feelingofsecurity;anddomesticviolence.
Education 
 level attained; age leaving school; truancy; expected truancy; post-school training; and perceived 
importance of education.
Health 
 physical health; emotional health; and mortality.
Social environment  
perceived gap between rich and poor; helpfulness of authorities; and supportiveness of social 
networks.
Social participation metrics 
membership of clubs; voting rates; and blood donation.
Erdal found that the towns with a greater percentage of citizens working in co-operatives 
performedbetterintermsofmortality(theylived2.5yearslonger),donatingblood,andvoting 
at local and national elections, as well as in all of the other metrics bar one. He concluded that  
‘aneconomywithamoderatetohighlevelofworkerco-operatives’producessignificantbeneficial
effects in the wider community - better health and education, lower levels of crime, higher levels  
of social participation and increased appreciation of the social environment.
Source: D. Erdal, Beyond the Corporation: Humanity Working (London: The Bodley Head, 2011), pp. 239-241. 
Erdal, D. (1999). The wider social effects of worker co-operatives. Extract from PhD thesis.
Benefits to individual employees
Kleinidentifiedthreewaysinwhichemployeeownershipaffectsattitudes:
 Intrinsic satisfaction 
ownershipperseissufficienttobringaboutattitudinalandbehaviouralchange;
 Extrinsic satisfaction 
ownershipleadstoattitudinalandbehaviouralchangebecauseitisfinanciallyrewarding;and
 Instrumental satisfaction 
 ownership brings about attitudinal and behavioural change by facilitating other outcomes that are 
desired by employees such as participation in decision-making.21
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Allofthesebehaviouralchangescanleadtomoreproductive,satisfiedandlessstressedemployees.
Employee ownership also tends to remove the one-dimensional authority relationship between 
managersandworkerscommonlyfoundinmoreconventionalfirms.22
Political
Dahlarguesthateconomicdemocracyisjustifiedontwotheoreticalgroundswhichrequiremore
extensive empirical testing:
•  Democratising enterprises will produce more politically conscious and active citizens,  
resulting in numerous ‘positive externalities’.23
•  If the democratic process is deemed necessary at a state level, then it should also be the de facto 
governance system for enterprises. 24
ThesecondpointisechoedbyDow,whoalsoclaimsthatfirmsshouldmirrorthegovernment
in terms of their democratic governance structures. Increased participation in community and 
politicallifewillgeneratepositiveexternalitiesforsociety(seesomeofthesocialarguments
above).25 Dow provided a caveat, however, stating that direct democracy in the governance  
ofacompanycansometimesforceatrade-offwitheconomicefficiency.
The case against employee ownership
Most arguments against employee ownership derive from the theories of economists who 
have applied models normally used for the study of investor-owned businesses. Some of these 
argumentsarenotspecifictoemployee-ownedcompanies,whileothersraiseimportantissues 
of which employee-owners should be aware.
Horizon problem
According to some analysts, employee-owned companies are liable to under-invest in the business 
for a reason known as the horizon problem. Take a worker co-operative with a sizeable proportion 
of the membership approaching retirement age. The horizon problem states that these members 
would oppose any investment decisions in the business where the return-on-investment period is 
greater than the remaining years of their employment. Put simply, why should an employee-owner 
forgo participating in the surplus of the business in the present for an investment that they will not 
benefitfrombecausetheywillhaveleftthecompany?ThispointwasfirstraisedbyJaroslavVanek
in 1970 and has since been echoed by other researchers.26
A counter-argument to this problem was put forward by Dahl. He argues that workers stand to lose 
alotmorethaninvestorsinaconventionalcompanybyextractingallofthevalue(surplus)ofthe
firm.Generally,itismucheasierforaninvestortoenterandexitthestockmarketthanitisfora
worker to enter and exit the job market.27 There is also the argument, reinforced by the economic 
crisis enveloping the global economy at the time of writing, that the need for employee-owners to 
secure their employment is an incentive to invest for the future. Although the horizon problem can 
be associated with employee-owned businesses, it is certainly not exclusive to them.28
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Shirking
Another argument against worker co-operatives and employee-owned businesses was advanced by 
Alchian and Demsetz. According to these authors, workers in an employee-owned company have 
anincentivetoshirk(notperform)becausetheireffortonlyhasaproportionaleffectonthework
completed by the members. We have seen that a member of a worker co-operative shares in the 
surplus of the business on a proportional basis; they get 1/n of the surplus, where n is the number 
of members. The same logic applies to a worker whose efforts or productivity cannot be easily 
distinguished from the work of the group; that worker will only share in the cost of shirking on  
aproportionalbasis(1/n)ratherthanbearingthefullcosts.29 While theoretically plausible, it is  
alsoaproblemlikelytoafflictconventionalmodelsofenterprise.Workersinaninvestor-owned
firmpossessanincentivetoshirkbecausetheireffortsdonotproduceanytangiblereturnoutside 
oftheirwages(hencetheneedforstrictsupervision).
Inefficient
Oneofthemostcommonandfiercelydebatedcriticismsofemployeeownershipfocusesonits
apparenteconomicinefficiencies.Efficiencyinaneconomicsensereferstotheabilityofabusiness
to utilise the fewest amounts of inputs to produce an output. Commentators argue that employee-
ownedbusinesseswillnotbeefficientinthismanner.Twoofthecritics,JensenandMeckling,
base their argument on the fact that employee ownership and industrial democracy rarely occur 
spontaneously and need legislative support to develop.30
Interestingly, however, these authors do note that the businesses would not exist if they were 
inherentlyinefficient:
competition in the establishment of organizational forms coupled with voluntary choice on the 
part of workers and capital suppliers regarding which organization they “join” will ensure that 
neitherorganizationalformwillbesignificantlylessproductivethantheother—otherwiseit
would be driven out of existence.31
Thepointtobearinmindisthatemployeeownershipisonlyconsideredinefficientbecauseitdoes
not add any value for shareholders. Employee ownership does not need to be economically superior 
(thoughevidencehasalreadybeenprovidedthatitcanbe);insteadindustrialdemocracyand
employee ownership can be seen as worthwhile objectives in themselves.
Control
The term control in this context refers to the ability of the employee-owners to reach decisions 
effectivelyandtodirectthefirminpursuitofcommonobjectives.Hansmannarguesthatcollective
decision-making costs for employee-owned companies will be high, due to the heterogeneous 
interestsoftheworkers,makingemployeeownershipimpracticalandinefficient.32 Ricketts 
supportsthisargument,statingthatthecostsofreachingagreementinthefirmarehigh.33  
For employee-owned businesses, it is important to ensure that a proper governance system  
is in place, as well as employee participation practices. Case study 7.5 highlights one of the more 
successful experiences of collective decision-making in an employee-owned company.
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Case study 7.5 - The power of sharing information
The extended version of this case study can be found on the VLE.
Tullis Russell, a paper manufacturer based in Fife, is one of Scotland’s largest and most successful 
employee-owned companies. In 2002, the company was faced with a tough decision regarding the 
fate of one of its factories in Stoke. The company’s culture of employee participation, engagement, 
and most importantly sharing of information, allowed it to reach a decision that not only 
minimised the impact of the factory closure but was actually endorsed by the employees.
Background
OneofTullisRussell’smostprofitableandsuccessfulproductofferingswasahighlyspecialised
premium paper used to transfer designs onto ceramic objects, such as cups and plates. The 
company established a manufacturing plant to develop this type of paper in Stoke-on-Trent,  
an area in the west midlands of England famous for its pottery factories. During the 1990s, 
however, this division of the company came under increased competition from manufacturers 
in South Korea, who had rapidly expanded to capture a large segment of the enormous Chinese 
ceramics market. In order to stay competitive and expand the business, the board of directors  
knewtheyhadtocapturesomeoftheChinesemarket,astheUKmarket(inparticularthe 
Stoke-on-Trent potteries) had shrunk in the face of intense competition from the east. In 2002, 
eight years after the company became employee-owned, an opportunity arose to acquire a Korean 
manufacturer which had recently declared itself bankrupt. The board felt that the acquisition made 
good economic sense for the company, but was aware of the impact it would have on the Stoke 
plant and its employee-owners. Their decision could be vetoed by the elected body of employees, 
consistingoffourteenemployee-owners(includingtwofromtheStokeplant)representingevery
employee in the company. How would the employees vote?
The power of engaged employees
The decision surprised the board. The elected body voted unanimously in favour of the acquisition. 
Thisdecisionwouldbaffletraditionaleconomistsandtradeunionleaders.Surelytheemployees
would preserve their self-interest by vetoing the decision and protecting the Stoke factory?  
The unanimous decision by the elected body put paid to this notion; and to prove that this was not 
an aberration, the elected body made the exact same decision when asked to vote on the board’s 
suggestion to close the Stoke plant altogether. The elected body again acted in the best interest 
of the company. This can only be explained by the employees’ high level of engagement with the 
company.ManagingDirector(MD)FredBowden,whosubsequentlywentontobecomechairman,
had instilled in the company’s management the need to inform and engage employees at every 
level. Information regarding the company’s performance, strategic decisions and other important 
policy matters was shared with every employee at regular intervals. The relationship between  
the company and its employees was underlined further when, after setting a timescale of fourteen 
months for the closure, it was agreed to brief the employees in Stoke immediately to allow as much 
time as possible for assistance with retraining and employment opportunities.
Source: D. Erdal, Beyond the Corporation: Humanity Working (London: The Bodley Head, 2011), pp. 79–83.
Raising finance
Another common argument against co-operative and employee-owned enterprises is the perceived 
inabilityofthesebusinessestoraisesufficientlevelsofcapital.AccordingtoBlair,Kruse,andBlasi:
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Since employees as a class are generally not wealthy, they are likely to be risk averse and 
liquidity constrained. Hence they might have trouble assembling enough equity capital to 
providesufficientfinancingfortheirfirm,especiallyincapital-intensiveindustries.Andifthey
trytofinancetheirfirmwithdebtcapital,theyarelikelytofaceahighercostofcapitalthan
asimilarlysituatedfirmfinancedwithequitycapitalbecauseoftheinherentmoralhazard
problemsdebtfinancingwouldinvolve.Thesefactorssuggestthat,ifemployeeownership 
is viable at all, it is likely to be in low capital-intensity industries.34
JensenandMecklingexpressdoubtoverwhetheraninvestorwouldtrustanemployee-ownedfirm
with its capital:
It is highly unlikely that potential investor demands for the residual claims on a labor-managed 
firmwouldbelargewithoutsomesacrificeofthecontrolrightbytheworkers.Itseemsto
us unlikely that outside investors would voluntarily entrust their funds to a labor-managed 
enterprise in which the workers maintained complete control and the investors were allowed to 
hope that the worker-managers would behave in such a way as to leave something for them, the 
residual claimants.35
Theproblemofraisingfinanceisintensifiedbythelackofspecialistadviceandunderstanding
amongstfinancial,legalandpoliticalexperts:
EOBshavedifficultiesobtainingfavourablefinancingfrominstitutionsthataremore
accustomed to dealing with listed companies. Lack of specialist support from business advisers 
during transition to employee ownership is also a problem.36
Ricketts provides a counter argument, highlighting the fact that employee-owned businesses 
should have no problem raising debt as the payment of interest on the capital ranks ahead of the 
workers’ claim on the surplus. He suggests that employee-owned businesses will have no problem 
raisingfinanceiftheyhavenon-firm-specificassets,sincetheseassetscanbeeasilysold,andhave
firm-specificskillsmakingitdifficultfortheworkerstomovetoanothercompany.37
Common property
Commonly known as the ‘free-rider’ problem, this argument stems from the collective ownership 
natureofanemployee-ownedfirm.Takeacompanythathasbeeninoperationforfiveyears.
The original members have built up the value and assets of the company. When a new member/
employeeishired,theyhavethesameclaimaspreviousmembers/employeestothecashflows 
of any previous investment made by the business. New members/employees, in a sense,  
are ‘free riding’ on the back of the hard work of other members/employees.38
This argument lacks context, however, as it does not make reference to the time horizon of free 
riding.Consideranemployeewhohasworkedinacompanyforfifteenyears;itisreasonable
toassumethattheemployeehascontributedtothecashflowsofthebusinessandisnot‘free
riding’anymore.Thisissueonlyreallyappliesinthefirstnumberofyearsinanemployee-owned
company’s existence and there is an argument for ensuring the founders are adequately rewarded 
for their entrepreneurial drive and investment.
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Portfolio problem
Workersinanemployee-ownedbusinesscommitcapitaltothefirminordertopurchase 
ownership or support operations. The argument for investor-owned businesses lies with their 
efficient,risk-bearingmodelofownership.Investorsareabletospreadtheircapitalamongst 
a number of businesses, thereby reducing the impact of one of their investments failing. This key 
tenetofinvestingisknownasdiversification.Foranemployee-ownedbusiness,criticsarguethat
workerscannotdiversifytheirinvestmentinthecompany(atbest,theycanonlyworkforafew
companies at one time) and so are fully exposed to the risk of the business failing. Coupled with  
the fact that employees generally have very little capital with which to commit to the company,  
wearriveataveryinefficientmodelofrisk-bearing.39
In companies where employees use their share of the surplus to invest further in the business, 
the risk exposure of the workers does increase compared to using the money to create a diverse 
portfolio of investments. As with any form of investment, competent advice should be sought.
Summary of learning
This chapter has argued that:
•  Employee-owned enterprises represent a sound model of ownership on social and political 
grounds.
• Employee-ownedcompaniesareatleastasefficienteconomicallyasinvestor-ownedbusinesses.
• Themajoreconomicbenefitsofemployeeownershipcanonlyberealisedbycombining
financialparticipationinownershipwithparticipatorymanagementpracticesandaroleinthe
governance of the organisation.
•  Risk is a major aspect of the arguments for and against employee ownership. Arguments for 
employee ownership centre on the risk to employees of supplying labour to the organisation. 
Arguments against focus on the unsuitability of employees to bear risk due to capital constraints 
and an adverse attitude to risk.
•  Many of the theoretical arguments for and against employee ownership are only applicable  
to certain forms of employee ownership, and cannot be used as a ‘broad brush’ treatment  
of the topic.
Essay/discussion questions
•  ‘Employee ownership is a positive thing for society.’ Discuss this statement with reference to the 
normative and empirical arguments outlined in this chapter, as well as evidence derived from 
your own research.
• Is there a case to be made for political support for employee ownership?
•  Could it be argued that certain forms of employee ownership are only a means of reducing trade 
union power and encouraging employees to generate even more wealth for shareholders?
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Useful resources
The Carey Center for Democratic Capitalism - http://www.democratic-capitalism.com/.
The MIT Community Innovators Lab - http://colabradio.mit.edu/.
The Capital Ownership Group - http://cog.kent.edu/.
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‘If you want to be incrementally better: 
Be competitive. If you want to be 
exponentially better: Be cooperative.’
Anon.
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8. The rise and fall of industrial 
democracy: employee ownership 
and the business cycle
Learning objectives
This chapter examines aspects of the employee ownership lifecycle, particularly what happens at 
the formation and decline phases. There are various theories relating to supposed weaknesses of 
employee-ownedfirmsandthesewillbeassessedwithreferencetoempiricalevidence.Bytheend
of this chapter you will be able to:
•  demonstrate understanding of the mechanisms and rationale of establishing employee-owned 
firms;
•  analyse core concepts and theories relating to the demise of employee-owned companies;
• articulatehowemployee-ownedfirmsprogressthroughthebusinesscycle.
The key arguments that will be developed in this chapter are:
The rationale and mechanisms for establishing employee-owned companies differ depending 
on the form of employee ownership.
Employee-ownedfirmsfacespecificproblemsattheformationstagecomparedwithother
forms of enterprise.
Employee-ownedfirmsdonotpossesscertaintraitsthatmakebusinessfailureinevitable.
Democratic structures and worker control do not necessarily diminish as a result of adopting 
more conventional organisational characteristics.
Formation
Employee-ownedfirmsareoftenestablishedusingthesamemechanismsasconventionalforms
ofenterprise:theyareestablishedasnewfirmsbyagroupofentrepreneurs,throughconversions
of existing businesses, and as viable succession strategies when existing owners wish to retire. 
However, the rationale underpinning employee ownership formation is different from that in 
conventionalcompanies.Thissectionwillpresentsomeexamplesofhowemployee-ownedfirms
are formed and also the reasoning behind their formation.
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Start-up
Like other forms of enterprise, employee-owned companies can be formed as new businesses. 
However, the drivers behind establishing an employee-owned company tend to be different from 
thoseinconventionalfirms.Ideologicalreasons,suchasastrongbeliefinindustrialdemocracy 
orethicalbusinesspractices,areusuallytherationaleforestablishinganemployee-ownedfirm 
as a new business. Correcting a market failure is often the rationale for establishing a worker  
co-operative; many SME worker co-operatives were established as a means to share risk and  
pool skills and resources during periods of high unemployment. The process and circumstances  
of creating an employee-owned business are also distinct from other forms of enterprise  
(forexample,thereneedstobeagroupofentrepreneursratherthanasoleindividual). 
Annualformationratesofemployee-ownedfirmsasnewbusinessesaredifficulttoestimate 
due to the absence of consistent and robust statistics. It is safe to say, however, that the annual  
rate of formation of employee-owned businesses is a small fraction of that for conventional 
companies. Some possible explanations for this will be put forward later in the chapter.
Business succession
This method of employee ownership formation is promoted as one of the better opportunities 
for establishing employee-owned companies by many of the development agencies in the UK, 
Europe, and the US. Business succession is a crucial topic for existing owners of SMEs. Employee 
ownership offers a well-established succession strategy for existing owners who wish to see the 
business continue trading in its current form and location. Formation rates via this method are 
rising; in most cases an altruistic or philanthropic owner is involved.
Employee ownership through business succession could play a vital role in the UK as a means 
of ensuring organisational sustainability. Statistics from 2009, published by the Department 
for Business, Innovation, and Skills, show that 99.9 per cent of businesses in the UK are SMEs. 
This accounts for 59.4 per cent of total private sector employment.1 The vast majority of these 
enterprises have less than nine employees. This represents an opportunity for business owners  
to reward their close network of employees and ensure business continuity by transferring 
ownership of the company to staff.
Case study 8.1 - Childbase
Childbase, an operator of children’s nurseries in the south of England, successfully transferred 
ownership of the company to employees using a dual approach. In 2007, a new memorandum  
andarticlesofassociationweredraftedidentifyingtheemployeesastheprimarybeneficiaries 
of the business. An employee ownership structure was created using a combination of an employee-
benefittrust(EBT)andindividualemployeeshareholdings(maximumindividualholdingof2.5 
percent).Childbasehasfinancedtheacquisitionanddistributionofcompanysharestoemployees
byusingprofitstopurchasesharesfromthepreviousowners.
Source: A. Bibby, From colleagues to owners: transferring ownership to employees 
(London: Employee Ownership Association, 2009).
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Worker takeover
Therationaleforemployeeownershipthroughworkertakeoversofexistingfirmsisusually 
based on the need to protect local economies and levels of employment. Worker takeovers are  
morelikelytooccurinconventionalfirmsthatarestrugglingfinanciallyorgenerating
aninsufficientlevelofprofit.Thisisbecausethevalueofthecompanyisreducedinsuch
circumstances(meaningtheemployeesneedlesscapitaltofinancethetakeover),andalsobecause
firmsgeneratinglargeprofitsareunlikelytoberelinquishedbytheirowners.Employeesmore
commonlydemandwageincreasesratherthanequityinaprofitablefirm;thishighlightsthelack 
ofeducationandknowledgeaboutthestructureandbenefitsofemployeeownership.2
There are three types of worker takeover:
Conversions -  where workers take over a business before it begins to fail, but often when 
itsfinancialpositionisbeginningtoweaken.Conversionsusuallyoccurin
response to crises in business succession, such as the death of an owner.
Phoenix -  refers to worker takeovers where a new business is created using some  
or all of the residual assets of a failed company.
Rescue -  the company becomes worker-owned in response to a crisis such as 
bankruptcy.3
There is another form of employee ownership conversion similar to that of a worker takeover  
but is instigated not by the workers but by the current owners of the business. For example, 
Clansman Dynamics, an engineering and manufacturing business based in East Kilbride,  
a suburb of Glasgow, converted to employee ownership not in response to worker demand  
or outrage at the current plight of the business but rather by one of the founders and majority 
shareholders. Very often, the owner will be ideologically disposed to the concept of employee 
ownership,ratherthandrivenbytheneedtogeneratebenefitsforthemselvesthrough 
employee ownership.
Case study 8.2 -  
Occupy, Resist, and Produce: the case of Argentinean 
worker co-operatives
The most notable recent example of worker takeovers of bankrupt or defunct businesses took  
place in Argentina during the early 2000s. The growth of worker co-operatives in Argentina  
was fuelled by the economic hardships created by the capitalist policies of then president  
Carlos Menem. When Argentina defaulted on its sovereign debt in 2002, protests occurred  
across the country and a worker movement was born.
The worker co-operative movement expressed its anger at the current capitalist system  
byoccupyingfactories,theownersofwhichhadabandonedwhenprofitsdeclinedsharply 
(orceasedtoexist)inresponsetotheneweconomicclimate.Theworkerswagedaprotracted  
and emotionally draining battle in the courts, campaigning for the right to take over their factories 
and run them as co-operatives. They faced innumerable challenges to establish their co-operatives 
including hostility from existing factory owners and a legal system that protected the primacy  
of private ownership of property. Despite this resistance, the workers eventually won their legal 
battle and a range of worker co-operatives were formed throughout Argentina. The movement 
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wasbasedonworkersolidarityandthisprinciplewasreflectedintheequalpaypoliciesadopted
by most co-operatives. Many workers even felt the need to guard the factories 24/7 to prevent the 
owners reclaiming and disposing of the assets. The worker co-operative movement in Argentina  
is characterised by a ‘bottom-up’ approach to development, as opposed to being driven by socialist 
policies, an approach adopted by the Yugoslavian government in the 1970s.
Source: A. Lewis and N. Klein, The Take, 2004.
Why employee-owned firms are formed
Tax reasons, savings and concessions
Employee ownership, particularly in the form of direct or trust share ownership, is often used  
asamechanismtogeneratetaxand/ororganisationalefficiencies.PierceandFuroobserve:
financialandtaxincentivesprovidedbytheESOParrangement(considerthatmoretaxbreaks
exist for an ESOP than for any other type of pension plan) have dominated management 
thinking and motivated companies to adopt employee-ownership systems.4
PierceandFuroraiseconcernsthatemployeeownershipbasedontherationaleoffinancialortax
efficiencieswillnotgeneratethesamecommitmentfromemployees,particularlyifopportunities
for participation in management and governance are absent.5
Case study 8.3 - United Airlines
An extended version of this case study can be found on the VLE.
InJuly1994,UnitedAirlines(UA),whichhasnowmergedwithContinentalAirlinestoform
UnitedContinentalHoldings,publiclylauncheditsEmployeeStockOwnershipPlan(ESOP). 
TheESOPpurchasedfifty-fivepercentofthecompany’sshares,makingUA’s85,000employees
the company’s largest shareholders and UA became, for a time, the largest employee-owned 
companyintheworld.InDecember2002,withsharesinthecompanyonlyworth$0.82,UAfiled
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the US, resulting in the biggest bankruptcy in American airline history 
andbringinganendtothecompany’sbriefflirtationwithemployeeownership.
How the ESOP came about
The eventual launch of the ESOP in 1994 was actually the fourth attempt to introduce employee 
ownershiptoUA.Duringthemid1980s,theAirLinePilotsAssociation(ALPA),theunionthat
represented the pilots in UA, mooted the possibility of employee ownership in response to a strike 
around that time.
The ESOP implemented in 1994 arose out of a need to restructure labour contracts in the face  
of economic turbulence in the airline industry. Southwest Airlines, with its disruptive new business 
modelofhighvolumeflightsandlowcosts(replicatedbyairlinessuchasRyanairandEasyjet),
forced other airlines to adapt or face ruin. The management of UA saw a need to cut their labour 
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costs, among other initiatives, to remain competitive in a rapidly evolving industry. Anticipating 
thislossinwagesandbenefits,anumberofthemorepowerfulunionsinUA,particularlyALPA
andtheInternationalAssociationofMachinistsandAerospaceWorkers(IAM),proposedto
transfer some of the equity to the employees of the company. After negotiations with senior 
management, a deal was agreed in July 1994 and the ESOP was publicly announced. In exchange 
forafifty-fivepercentequitystakeinthecompany,theunionsagreedtowagesandbenefits
concessions of $4.88bn.
Source: C. Rosen, United Airlines, ESOPs, and Employee Ownership. Oakland: 
National Center for Employee Ownership, 2002. C. Mackin, United It Was Not. Cambridge: Ownership Associates, 2003.
Organisational stability/sustainability
Employee ownership provides a proven mechanism for ensuring organisational sustainability  
andstability.InastudyofUSfirmswithsomeformofemployeeownership,Blair,Kruse, 
and Blasi found that employee-owned companies were much less likely to be converted to private 
organisations, and suggested that employee ownership was an important factor in preventing 
hostile takeovers.6
Case study 8.4 - Voestalpine AG
The largest employee-owned company by voting rights and market value in Austria, Voestalpine 
AG is a steel manufacturer and has operations in over sixty countries. Central to the stability 
andongoingperformanceofthegroup(saleswerealmost€11bnin2010)isitscommitmentto
employee share ownership. Thirteen per cent of the group’s shares are held by 21,700 employees, 
totalling 22.4m shares. Employees are the second largest shareholder and have a unique role in the 
governance of the company. Whilst the shares are held individually by the employees, the voting 
rights are bundled together, meaning the employee-owners vote as one. By holding more than ten 
per cent of the group’s shares and voting as one body, Voestalpine’s employees have the ability  
to block hostile takeovers of the group. Voestalpine AG refers to this form of employee ownership 
as ‘strategic ownership’.
Source: Voestalpine AG. ‘The basic principles of Employee Participation’. http://www.voestalpine.com/group/en/
group/employee-participation/grundsaetze-der-mitarbeiterbeteiligung.html, accessed 15 August 2011.
Decline
Anemployee-ownedfirmcanbesaidtohavedeclined–thatis,ceasedoperatingasanemployee-
owned business – in three ways:
1. Cessation of trading activity
2. Takeoverbyaconventionalfirm
3. Conversiontoaconventionalfirm
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Variouscharacteristicsinherenttoemployee-ownedfirms,suchastheirstructureanddemocratic
nature, may contribute to their decline. Many of the arguments that follow relate to worker co-
operatives, but where appropriate mention of other forms of employee ownership will be made.
Degeneration
There are two sides to the theory of degeneration:
Democratic degeneration:  
accordingtothisside,whatstartsoutasademocraticfirm(whetheraworkerco-operativeor
an employee-owned enterprise) will eventually become less democratic as a result of economic 
pressures/improvement in performance and the adoption of traditional organisational structures 
such as management hierarchies.7 The company may remain employee-owned in terms of its 
ownership structure and legal identity but, in fact, it is more similar to a conventional company. 
Thisproblemismorelikelytoafflictlargeremployee-ownedcompanies.Insuchscenarios, 
thereisoftenconflictbetweenmanageriallogicandgovernanceinstitutions.
Conventional degeneration:  
firstproposedbytheWebbsintheearlytwentiethcentury,thissideproposesthatworker 
co-operatives will eventually convert to a conventional form of enterprise. These ‘associations  
ofcapitalists’,astheWebbsreferredtothem,wouldeventuallyreverttoaninvestor-ownedfirm 
by the increasing hiring of non-members. The argument is made that members tend to maximise 
their individual share of the surplus, therefore workers are less expensive to hire than new 
members.Therateofdegenerationcorrelateswiththeamountofprofitthefirmgenerates: 
themoreprofit,themorelikelytheworkerco-operativeistoconverttoaconventionalfirm.
Case study 8.5 - Olympia Veneer co-operative
Established in January 1921 with two hundred shares worth $500 each, Olympia Veneer is one 
ofthemostsuccessfulworkerco-operativesinUShistoryinfinancialterms,andpioneeredthe
developmentofarobustandprofitableplywoodco-operativesectorinthenorthwestofAmerica
between the 1920s and 1950s.8 The co-operative had around 120 members originally and swiftly 
establisheditselfasaprofitablebusiness.Itbeganhiringnon-membersin1922,andthispractice
continued apace for the rest of the co-operative’s existence. The company operated successfully for 
more than thirty years and was bought out in 1955. By the time it was sold, however, there were 
one thousand non-member workers and only sixty-nine members. Of those sixty-nine members, 
twenty-three realised an average return on their shares of $652,000.9 The degeneration of the 
company arose due to the rapid increase in the value of the shares over the lifetime of the co-
operative. It simply became too expensive for prospective members to purchase shares in the 
company and so membership levels were gradually diluted.
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The Webbs also proposed that the worker co-operative structure had inherent weaknesses that 
wouldcontributetoitseconomicdecline(i.e.ceasingtotrade):
• a lack of business administration skills;
• inward-looking;
• will not adopt new technologies if they threaten jobs.10
The Webbs’ theory is supported by the work of Ben-Ner who proposes that worker co-operatives 
are an unstable form of enterprise. He argues that a worker co-operative would eventually 
degenerate into a capitalist company since members would seek to hire non-member workers 
rather replace ‘expensive’ members. Ben-Ner concludes that worker co-operatives will only survive 
inthisformiftheyoperateinmarginalindustriesinwhichcapitalistfirmsdonotcompete.11 
Finally, Cornforth proposes that there are other factors that could contribute to the eventual 
degeneration of worker co-operatives, in addition to those proposed by the Webbs:
1. under capitalisation;
2. lack of management/business skills;
3. lack of discipline;
4. poor relationships between management and workers;
5. lack of political support;
6. top-down development.12
However the Webbs’ rather pessimistic outlook on the performance of worker co-operatives  
(andassumptionthatmemberswerecapitalisticintheiroutlook)hasbeenchallengedand
disproven by the empirical work of Jones, as well as by the continued success of Mondragón 
Corporation.13
Theconventionaldegenerationthesisalsoappliestootherformsofemployee-ownedfirms, 
as the work of Pérotin and Robinson illustrates:
Employee-ownedfirmscanbesetupasconventionaljointstockcompaniesinwhichemployees
owntheshares(thoughnotallemployeesnecessarilyownshares)andmaysellthemoutside.
ThisistheruleforexampleintheUSandinthemajorityofemployee-ownedfirmsthat
resulted from privatisation in Western as in Eastern Europe. This structure makes it possible 
for employees to accumulate some wealth as the value of the shares appreciates and makes the 
shares liquid. However, it also implies that employee ownership is potentially unstable. If the 
sharevaluerisesalot,itmayalsobecomedifficultfornewemployeestojointhefirmasco-
employee-owners.Employee-ownedfirmsstructuredinthiswayhavebeenrepeatedlyobserved
toturnintoconventionalfirmsastheproportionofownersamongemployeesdwindledover
time and/or employee owners sold the business to a conventional owner. While this is not 
necessarilyaproblemiftheemployeeacquisitionofthefirmwasaccidental,asitwere, 
or resulted from a scheme with primarily distributional objectives, it is a potentially serious  
risk if employee ownership or industrial democracy is in itself an objective.14
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Stability and sustainability of worker co-operatives
In light of the arguments discussing the apparent weaknesses of the employee-owned model  
of enterprise, it is worth drawing upon some empirical studies to see if these theories are correct. 
SurvivalfiguresforSMEsintheUKandacrosstheworldarelow,especiallyinthefirstthreeyears
of an organisation’s life. Empirical analysis conducted by Thomas and Cornforth found that worker 
co-operativeshadasurvivalrateofsixty-sixpercentfortheyears1978–86(aperiodofrapid
growth for worker co-operatives in the UK); they found that this compared favourably with the 
survivalrate(sixtypercent)ofallsmallbusinessesforasimilartimeperiod.15
In a similar study, Estrin and Jones found that the degeneration thesis was incorrect from their 
analysis of French worker co-operatives. Their research found that French worker co-operatives 
were economically successful as well as stable, dispelling the hypothesis that they would eventually 
morphintoacapitalistfirm.16
Lifecycle
In this section, we examine employee-owned companies and their formation and decline in relation 
to the business cycle – that is, periods of economic expansion and recession.17 The traditional 
businesscycletheoryisthatfirmsaremorelikelytobeestablishedintimesofeconomicstability
and more likely to decline in recessions. Employee-owned companies, on the other hand, have 
beenpredictedtoformanddeclinecounter-cyclically(thatis,toforminperiodsofrecessionand
degenerateintocapitalistfirmsinperiodsofeconomicprosperity).Theoreticalandempiricalwork
by Pérotin and Miyazaki has revealed that part of this hypothesis is correct, that employee-owned 
firmsaremorelikelytoforminperiodsofeconomicrecessionthanintimesofeconomicstability.18 
Reasons for such a response to the business cycle are based on the greater opportunities to convert 
ailing businesses to employee ownership, as well as the threat and high levels of incidence of 
unemployment.19 Staber, on the other hand, questions whether there is any link between employee 
ownership and the business cycle:
There is no compelling evidence for the argument that the founding and failure rates of worker 
cooperatives are systematically related to the business cycle. The empirical results of this study 
suggest that worker cooperatives are founded and survive independently of general economic 
conditions, as measured by unemployment and recession cycles.20
Theresponseofemployee-ownedfirmsinrelationtothedeclinephaseofthebusinesscycle 
is the same as for conventional enterprises, rather than being counter-cyclical. In times of 
recession,employee-ownedfirms,inparticularworkerco-operatives,arejustaslikelytodecline 
as conventional companies.
Returningtoanearlierpoint,thatemployee-ownedfirmsarevastlyoutnumberedbyconventional
organisations at the formation phase, Pérotin found that:
Problemswithfirmcreation,ratherthandissolution,mayexplainthelimitedincidence 
oflabor-managedfirmsevenincountrieswhereissuesofstructuralviabilityhave 
been resolved.21
Finally, Dow provides a theory as to why levels of formation greatly lag behind those  
of conventional organisations:
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Butinaworldwheremostfirmsarecreatedinordertobringmaterialbenefitstotheirfounders,
LMFs(LabourManagedFirms)areclearlytheunderdogs.22
Democracy and the lifecycle of worker co-operatives
Oneofthefirststudiestoexploretheevolutionofdemocracyinemployee-ownedfirmswaswritten
by Meister in 1961. Echoing the assertions of the Webbs, Meister argues that there are four phases 
of a worker co-operative’s lifecycle:
1. Formation:  
direct democracy is central to the operations of the business. There is a lack of capital and the 
economic functions of the organisation are poorly developed.
2. Transition:  
theco-operativebeginstoadoptmoreconventionalorganisationalpractices.Conflictarises
between management and the democratic nature of the co-operative.
3. Establishment:  
the co-operative has now accepted market values and traditional management hierarchy.  
Begins to hire more non-members and representative democracy emerges.
4. Decline:  
management hierarchy assumes control of the co-operative.23
Meister’s lifecycle is based on the degeneration thesis of worker co-operatives; that is, that these 
businesses will eventually succumb to market pressures and convert to the capitalist enterprise 
model.
To conclude, the degeneration thesis is overly pessimistic and has not been supported by empirical 
evidence. Therefore, we need a more accurate theory of the lifecycle of worker co-operatives. 
Batstone counters Meister’s theoretical lifecycle by proposing an alternative process of worker 
co-operative development based on his empirical analysis of sixty French worker co-operatives. 
Batstone proposes that there are three distinct stages in a worker co-operative’s lifecycle:
1. Establishment:  
theco-operativewillhavefewmembers(andalmostallworkerswillbemembers)andashortage 
of funds. Direct democracy will be the norm and there will be high levels of consensus amongst  
the members.
2. Growth:  
the co-operative begins to adopt more traditional organisational elements such as management 
hierarchies and adherence to market forces. This stage is also characterised by a growth in the 
capital available to the co-operative and in the number of workers. The strength of professional 
management grows and democratic interests become secondary to the needs of the business.
3. Maturity:  
thisstageischaracterisedbyaresurgenceofthedemocraticprocess(representativeratherthan
direct),agrowthinmembership,andrenewedfocusontheinterestsoflabour(members)rather
than capital or management. Unlike Meister’s model, the co-operative does not degenerate into  
acapitalistfirmbutratherrediscoverstheimportanceofthedemocraticnatureofthebusiness.24
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The effects of increasing organisational complexity and the adoption of traditional hierarchies have 
long been scrutinised. In an empirical study of Canadian worker co-operatives, Hunt found that 
thedivisionoflabour(taskspecialisation)hadnonegativeeffectsonthedemocraticorganisation
of three worker co-operatives; in fact, he asserted that task specialisation strengthened workers’ 
control over work activities. This was due to the creation of horizontal hierarchies that promoted 
greater autonomy amongst small groups of workers. Hunt suggested that the design of work 
in worker co-operatives evolves as the business progresses through its lifecycle.25 Worker co-
operatives begin as collective decision-making entities with job rotation, and equality of pay and 
benefits.Aseconomicfactorsbecomemoreprominent,taskspecialisationoccursandcollective
decision-making becomes less effective, precipitating a move toward representative democracy  
and semi-autonomous work groups.
To sum up, the evidence suggests that democracy does not decline over the lifecycle of the  
worker co-operative but rather evolves to suit the structure of the business as it progresses through 
its lifecycle.26
Summary of learning
This chapter has argued that:
•  The rationale and mechanisms for establishing employee-owned companies differ according  
to the form of employee ownership.
•  The economic, social, and political environments are relevant to understanding the formation 
and decline of employee-owned companies.
• Employee-ownedfirmsfacespecificproblemsattheformationstagecomparedwithotherforms
of enterprise.
• Employee-ownedfirmsdonotpossesscertaintraitsthatresultintheirinevitablefailure 
as businesses.
•  Democratic structures and worker control do not necessarily diminish as a result of adopting 
more conventional organisational characteristics.
Essay/discussion questions
• Whyaretheresofewemployee-ownedfirmsintheUK?
• What are the barriers to the formation of and conversion to employee ownership?
• Discussthetheoreticalexplanationsforthesmallnumberofemployee-ownedfirms?
• Areemployee-ownedfirmsdestinedtofailordegenerateintoconventionalcompanies?
• Whatfactorsareassociatedwiththeconversionofemployee-ownedfirmsinto 
conventional companies?
•  Do you agree with the theory that management and organisational issues supersede those  
of democracy and commitment to employee ownership?
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Useful resources
Ohio Employee Ownership Center -  
http://oeockent.org/index.php/component/content/article/136.
Co-operative Development Scotland - http://www.cdscotland.co.uk/.
Baxi Partnership - http://www.baxipartnership.co.uk/.
The Co-operative Enterprise Hub - http://www.co-operative.coop/enterprisehub/.
Ownership Associates - http://www.ownershipassociates.com/index.shtm.
Foundation for Enterprise Development - http://www.fed.org/.
Co-operative Business Consultants - http://www.cbc.coop/.
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Democratic enterprise:
the invisible giant?
‘What could be important in this 
co-operative initiative is not what is 
accomplished but what it is intended 
to do.’
Don José María Arizmendiarrieta
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9. Democratic enterprise:  
the invisible giant?
Learning objectives
This chapter begins with an overview of global and national statistics relating to co-operatives  
and employee-owned businesses. It then considers the social, political, and economic environments 
in which these enterprises currently operate, and analyses the factors that promote or inhibit the 
growth of this sector. The chapter concludes by outlining a ‘roadmap’ for the future development  
of the democratic enterprise movement. By the end of this chapter you will be able to:
•  understand the prevalence of co-operatives and employee-ownership at local, national,  
and international levels;
• appraise the environment in which democratic enterprises currently operate;
• analyse the factors that promote or inhibit growth of the democratic enterprise sector;
• explain the steps needed to develop the sector at local, national, and international levels.
The key arguments that will be developed in this chapter are:
Co-operativeandemployee-ownedbusinessesmakeasignificantcontributiontothe 
world economy.
Globalisation presents both threats and opportunities for democratic enterprise.
There is an increasing public appetite for democratic enterprise development which favours  
a ground-up rather than top-down approach.
Actionandeducationareneededtoensuresocietybenefitsfromavibrantdemocratic
enterprise sector in the future.
Democratic enterprise today
Co-operatives
The co-operative model of enterprise plays a much bigger role in the world’s economy than  
is generally recognised. Internationally, there are over one billion people who are members  
of co-operatives. In 1994, the United Nations estimated that the livelihood of nearly three billion 
people, or half of the world’s population, was made secure by co-operative enterprises.
152 Democratic Enterprise: Ethical business for the 21st century
Figure 8-Global membership of co-operatives
Over 1 Billion people are members of co-operatives around the world
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180 million
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239 million
Malaysia 
6.78 million
Singapore  
1 of 2 people
Source: ‘Statistical Information on the Co-operative Movement’ ICA. 
 http://www.ica.coop/coop/statistics.html, accessed 29 September 2011.
The Global300 project
The Global300 project was initiated to capture the size of the co-operative movement globally, 
measured in terms of turnover. Analysis of the largest three hundred co-operatives and mutuals 
reveals that turnover was around $1.6 trillion at the end of 2008, equivalent to the ninth largest 
economy in the world.1 
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Figure 9-Global300 project
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According to the Global300 List, in 2008 the 
world's largest 300 co-operatives generated 
revenues of USD 1.6 trillion (1,600 billion), 
which is comparable to the GDP of the 
word's ninth largest economy.
Source: International Co-operative Alliance. Global 300: 2010 Report 
(Geneva: International Co-operative Alliance), 2001. p. 2.
The UK co-operative sector
ThelatestfiguresreleasedbyCo-operativesUKshowthatalmostoneinfivecitizensinBritainare
members of a co-operative. In economic terms the UK co-operative sector has performed strongly 
in recent years. There has been a 21 per cent growth in turnover for the co-operative sector between 
2008 and 2010. This has been coupled with an 18 per cent growth in membership, and a 15.1 per 
cent growth in the number of co-operatives.
Table 18-Summary of co-operative sector in UK
No. of co-operative businesses in the UK: 5,450
No. of members: 12.8m
Turnover of co-operatives: £32.2bn
No. of people employed by co-operatives: 236,000
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Figure 10-Number of co-ops by country (UK)
4352
473
386
239
England
Scotland
Wales
Northern Ireland
Source: Co-operatives UK. The UK co-operative economy 2011: 
Britain’s return to co-operation (Manchester: Co-operatives UK, 2011), p. 23.
Figure 11-Percentage growth of the UK movement
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Worker co-operatives
The worker co-operative sector in the UK is quite small, particularly in comparison to other 
European countries. It is estimated that there are around 450 worker co-operatives in the UK, 
ofwhichperhapsfortytofiftyarebasedinScotland.2 The number of members of worker co-
operatives has risen from 2,048 members in 2009 to 5,234 members in 2010.3
By comparison, the Italian region of Emilia-Romagna is home to over 8,000 worker co-operatives 
operating in industries as diverse as ceramics, construction, fashion, social care and cheese 
production. The co-operatives survive and prosper through the formation of federations, the largest 
being Legacoop with one million members and turnover of almost $8bn.4Asignificantportion
of these 8,000 worker co-operatives are known as ‘social co-operatives’, including some that are 
mainly focused on providing jobs for disadvantaged people.5
Theworkerco-operativesectorintheUS(knownas‘democraticworkplaces’)issmaller,inpartdue
to the proliferation of another form of employee ownership, the ESOP. It is estimated that there are 
over 300 worker co-operatives in the US, employing 3,500 people and generating over $400m in 
revenue.6 The majority of these businesses are SMEs and operate in the retail and service sectors.
Employee ownership
According to estimates from 2010, the employee-owned sector in the UK is worth £25bn in 
revenue, accounting for two per cent of GDP.7 The Employee Ownership Association estimates  
thatthereareoveronehundredcompanieswithmajorityorsignificantemployeeownership. 
One of the main reasons employee ownership is under-developed in the UK is the lack of 
understandingofthemodelamongstkeysupportinstitutionssuchasbanks,financialandlegal
advisors, and policy makers.
TheemployeeownershipsectorintheUSissignificantlybettermonitoredandanalysedthan
itsUKcounterpart.TheNationalCenterforEmployeeOwnership(NCEO)isaprivate,non-
profitmembershipandresearchorganisationthatservesastheleadingsourceofinformation
on employee ownership in the US. The ideological beliefs underlying employee ownership in 
the US differ from those in other countries; industrial democracy is subordinate to the need to 
involveworkersincapitalismthroughshareownership.Thisbeliefreflectsthehistoricalorigins
of employee ownership in the country, when the major national companies of the early twentieth 
century(suchasProctorandGamble,andFord)offeredemployeessharesinthecompanyata
discount.Table 19 summarises the volume and value of the various employee ownership share 
plans in the US.
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Table 19-US ESOPs and share plans
Type of Plan Number of 
Plans (as of 
early 2010)
Number of 
Participants 
(as of the 
end of 2008)
Value of Plan 
Assets (as of the 
end of 2007)
ESOPs,stockbonusplans,&profitsharing
plans primarily invested in employer stock
11,300 13.6 million $901 billion
401(k)plansprimarilyinvestedin
company stock
800 5 million $200 billion
Broad-based individual equity plans 3,000 10 million ($5billionto$10
billion in 2008, 
S&P 1500 only)
Stock purchase plans 4,000 11 million (notrealisticto
estimate)
Source: A Statistical Profile of Employee Ownership, 
National Center for Employee Ownership, Updated April 2011, www.nceo.org.
Sociedades laborales is the Spanish term for an employee-owned company. Figures from the 
second quarter of 2010 highlight the scale and impact of employee-owned companies in Spain: 
15,303 employee-owned companies; 87,651 workers; estimated turnover of 16 billion euros  
(in2007).8
In Spain a company is recognised as employee-owned if the majority of the voting rights are held 
by permanent contract workers. There are also provisions in place to prevent large inequality 
amongstemployeeshareholdings(oneemployeecannotholdmorethanonethirdofthevoting
rights).9 CONFESAL is the umbrella body of Spain’s employee ownership sector and has seventeen 
members, one for each of the autonomous regions in the country. Political support for employee 
ownershipisquitestrong,withspecificlegislationmandatinggovernmentsupportofparticipation
in the property of the enterprise and a requirement ‘to facilitate access by workers to ownership  
of the means of production’.10
Employeeownershipisnotjustconfinedtothethreecountriesmentionedabove.AcrossEurope,
broad-basedfinancialparticipationschemesareafeatureofmostpublicandlargeprivate
organisations. Since the late 1990s, the number of companies and employees participating  
inshareschemesandprofitsharingrosesharply.Whilesuchadevelopmentistobewelcomed,
there remains much to do to promote and develop employee ownership in Europe.11
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The role of democratic enterprise  
in tackling pressing issues
Wehaveanalysedthecurrentincidenceofdemocraticenterprisesgloballybutwhatrole(ifany)
can they play in tackling some of the most pressing issues facing society today?
Globalisation
Globalisation in the economic realm presents both threats and opportunities for democratic 
enterprises. Co-operatives and employee-owned businesses must keep pace with their economic 
competitors, who increasingly seek to transfer operations and capital offshore in a bid to minimise 
costsandmaximiseprofits.Thiscreatesrealpressureondemocraticenterprisestofollowsuit 
or else develop alternative strategies.
Democratic enterprises can play a dual role in relation to globalisation:12
1.  They can accept globalisation and use it as a mechanism to achieve their social and economic 
objectives. The Mondragón co-operatives, for example, have embraced globalisation and have 
factories throughout the world, some of which are in rapidly developing nations.13
2. Theycanlimitthe(negative)effectsofglobalisationbyplacingemphasisbackonlocal
communities. Examples include the role of co-operatives in the Fairtrade movement,  
microfinanceandworkertake-overs.
Reflection - The current Industrial Revolution
Inlightoftheincreasingindustrialisationofdevelopingcountries(China,India,Brazil, 
and Indonesia for example), do you think there are opportunities for the democratic model  
of enterprise to help alleviate the problems industrialisation inevitably brings? What would  
be the impact of increased numbers of democratic enterprises in rapidly developing  
industrialised countries?
Growing income inequality
Income inequality is a worldwide phenomenon that receives considerable attention in the  
UK and other developed countries. Wilkinson and Pickett analysed the growing trend of income 
inequality in the UK from 1979 to 2006. These authors note that income inequality is linked with 
other inequalities, notably in access to education and social mobility. Reducing income inequality 
to create a fairer society is a complex challenge and it would be wrong to think that democratic 
enterprises provide a comprehensive solution. However, the collective sharing of rewards and the 
greater propensity of co-operatives and employee-owned businesses to keep money in the local 
economy mean that these enterprises can help to tackle the problem.
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Figure 12-Trends in UK income inequality
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Big Society in the UK
The Big Society initiative developed by the coalition government in the UK aims to help people  
‘to come together to improve their own lives. It’s about putting more power in people’s hands –  
a massive transfer of power from Whitehall to local communities.’14 The Big Society initiative  
hasfivemaintenets:
1.  Give communities more power over the planning process and the right to bid to take over 
public services as well as rescue local facilities or services that are threatened with closure.
2. Encourage volunteering.
3. Transfer power from central government to local government.
4. Support for mutuals, charities, co-operatives and social enterprises.
5. Publish government data.15
Since the manifesto was launched in June 2010, the UK co-operative, mutual, and employee 
ownership sectors have vigorously debated the opportunities and threats that the Big Society 
presents. Those in favour of the initiative have highlighted that it is a once-in-a-generation 
opportunity to gain favourable political support, which is a vital condition if the sectors are to 
grow. However, there are others who are wary of supporting the Big Society initiative, particularly 
within the co-operative movement.16 Concerns include the argument that the Big Society is just a 
smokescreen for cuts in government spending. There are also fears that Big Society is privatisation 
of state organisations and assets. Foremost among the concerns of the co-operative movement  
is the risk of failure that is attached to this initiative, which can damage the public perception  
of democratic models of enterprise.
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There is still a lack of collective response from the co-operative movement on the issue of Big 
Society, although efforts have been made to form organisations that can support the initiative.  
TheMutualsInformationService(MIS)wassetupin2010toprovideinformationandguidance
for public sector organisations wishing to become mutuals. A partnership involving Co-operatives 
UKandtheEmployeeOwnershipAssociation,theMIShas,todate(October2011),receivedover
two hundred enquiries from groups planning to exercise their ‘Right to Provide’ from a wide variety 
of services within the public sector.
Public support for democratic enterprise
Owing to the economic downturn, there is growing public support for more democratic forms 
of organisation. Graphs below show that trust in business institutions is low and people are 
questioningthebenefitsofmakingshareholdervaluethesoledriverofbusinessactivity. 
There are expectations that business should do more to invest in society. According to one survey, 
co-operatives are regarded as more trustworthy than the traditional PLC.
Figure 13-Trust in institutions 2008-2011
2008 2009 2010 2011
70%
63%
55%
46%
40%
27%
54%
46%
38%
59%
46%
43%
45%
36%
31%
30%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
Business Government Media NGOs
In US, 2011 decline mirrors 2008-2009 drop Only country to see across-the-board fall
Responses 6-9 on 1-9 scale; 9 = highest, Informed publics ages 25-64
Trust in Institutions: 2008-2011
Source: 2011 Edelman Trust Barometer: Findings. Edelman, 2011. 
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Figure 14-Public perception comparison of co-ops and PLCs
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Source: G. Simon and E. Mayo, Good business? Public perceptions of co-operatives 
(Manchester: Co-operatives UK, 2010), p. 6.
The right social conditions for the development and growth of democratic enterprises exist  
asweentertheseconddecadeofthetwenty-firstcentury.WilkinsonandPickettexplain:
1.  People are questioning how there are increasing social problems when we are so well  
off materially.
2.  Consumerism and materialism run counter to our values even though we still manage  
to get caught up in them.
3.  People understand that inequality is divisive and socially corrosive.17
The major UK democratic enterprise development bodies are dealing with record levels of 
enquiries from the public and entrepreneurs. In 2010–11 Co-operative Development Scotland 
received 245 enquiries for advice and specialist support, representing a 350 per cent increase 
comparedwiththefiguresfromtheprevioustwoyears.Similarly,theWalesCo-operativeCentre
supported 202 co-operatives and social enterprises during 2010, and the Employee Ownership 
Association has recorded a boost in the number of new members.
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Factors that affect the development  
of democratic enterprises
Although there are differences between co-operatives and employee-owned businesses, both forms 
of democratic enterprise face some common challenges when it comes to growth. A report by the 
All Party Parliamentary Group on Employee Ownership in May 2008 highlighted some of the 
barriers to the development of the employee ownership sector in the UK:
• a shortage of data on the extent of the sector and its performance;
• lackofawarenessandinformationaboutthesectoramongbusinessowners,advisers,financial
institutions, and public sector policy makers;
• unnecessarily restrictive tax rules affecting the sector;
• arelativelackofappropriatefinance;
• inadequate government appreciation of and support for the sector;
•  inadequate recognition in public purchasing procedures of potential value for money advantages 
offered by co-owned sector providers.18
Issues to consider
Social factors
Social capital 
Democratic enterprises are reliant on an intangible resource known as social capital in order  
to support the development and legitimise the purpose of those enterprises. Social capital is a term 
that ‘describes the pattern and intensity of networks among people and the shared values which 
arise from those networks’.19 There are different layers of social capital, known as bonding, bridging 
and linking. Without a ‘well’ of social capital to draw on, democratic enterprises will struggle to 
become established, and subsequently develop, in certain communities.
Education 
There is interest in learning about co-operatives at primary and secondary level, as evidenced  
by the growth in the number of co-operative trust schools in England.20 In higher education, 
however, opportunities to learn about democratic models of enterprise are limited. The majority  
ofeconomicresearchfocusesontheinvestor-ownedfirmandthemajorityofteachingin 
businessschoolsalsoconcernstheinvestor-ownedfirm.Democraticenterprisesrarelyfeature 
in undergraduate economics or business management textbooks. A study by Hill in 2000 revealed 
that only nine of the nineteen introductory economics textbooks that he analysed mentioned co-
operative enterprises, and only one had more than a page on them.21 Hill’s study was corroborated 
by Kalmi in 2007.22 It is important that students of all ages, who will form the next generation  
of entrepreneurs, are afforded the opportunity to learn about alternative models of enterprise.
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Economic factors
Financial resources 
Reports,studies,andanecdotalevidencepointtothelackoffinancialresources,particularlystart-
up capital, available to democratic enterprises. This constraint affects the formation of democratic 
enterprises more than investor-owned enterprises.
Density 
 An economic ecosystem is characterised by the presence and density of certain types of 
organisation. Low density of democratic enterprises in an economy will tend to inhibit the rate  
of new formation.
Support structures 
 An appropriate support framework is central to the development of the few successful, large-scale 
democraticenterprisessectorsintheworld(MondragóninSpain,Emilia-RomagnainItaly).
Elementsincludetailoredfinancialprovision,facilitatinglegislation,anddevelopmentagencies
with appropriate resources. The provision of these support services is more the onus of the  
co-operatives themselves rather than being dependent on an external agency.23
Political factors
Knowledge and information 
 Although all three major political parties in the UK declared support for co-operative and mutual 
models of enterprise in the general election of 2010, there is a need to improve the knowledge  
of these models among policy makers.
Research 
 The UK needs institutional structures to promote research about co-operatives and employee-
ownership, similar to those found in Europe and the US.24
Supportive legislation and taxation 
 In the UK, companies are encouraged to distribute shares amongst employees through attractive 
taxbreaksandfacilitativelegislation(mostnotablyShareIncentivePlans).Levelsofemployee
ownershipintheUSwouldnotbewheretheyaretodaywithoutthesupportofthetaxefficient
ESOPlegislation.Finally,workerco-operativesinSpain,ItalyandFrancehaveflourishedas 
a result of legislation that facilitates their development.25
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SEMINAR EXERCISE - Action planning
Materials to support this exercise can be found on the VLE
1.  Divide the students into a number of groups depending on class size. It is not  
important how many members there are in each group but try to keep them evenly 
spread.Makesureeachgrouphasenoughflipchartpaper,markersandpost-itnotes.
2. Explain the scenario and assign a topic to each group.
3.  Ask each group to identify key factors and actors related to each topic. Give the 
participants around 10 minutes to do this.
4.  Now it is time for the action planning segment of the exercise: ask each group to develop 
a set of actions that each actor could take to contribute to the development of democratic 
enterprises.
5. Geteachgrouptopresenttheirfindingstotheclassasawholeandconductthe
discussion element of the exercise.
Where to now?
A report commissioned by Co-operatives UK in 2010 sought to provide a ‘roadmap’ for how the  
UK movement could develop and grow in the next decade. The report outlined three key steps:
•  UK co-operatives need to act more like a movement, particularly in response to the present 
socio-economic climate.
•  The movement should shift its focus from co-operative ‘form’ to co-operative ‘values’, again  
toreflectthepressingconcernsintheUKsuchasenvironmentaldamageandsocialcorrosion.
• Thereneedstobeanewmodelforfinancingco-operativecreationandgrowth.26
There are some avenues that seem more promising than others:
•  Energy supply and renewable energy generation are becoming areas of growth for consumer  
co-operatives, as evidenced by the number of recent start-ups.27
•  Business succession offers good potential for the creation of employee-owned businesses.
• Thefinancialcrisishascreatedopportunitiesformorecreditunions,co-operativebanksand
mutualfinancialproviders.Thisisevidencedbythesupportforthecampaigntore-mutualise
the former Northern Rock building society and the preferred bidder status awarded to The Co-
operative Bank in the sale of Lloyds TSB branches.
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Summary of learning
This chapter has argued that:
• Co-operativesandemployee-ownedbusinessesplayasignificantroleinsocietiesandeconomies
around the world.
•  The democratic enterprise sector in the UK is under-developed compared with the situation 
in some other countries and will remain so until more favourable regulatory frameworks and 
policies are in place.
•  There are social, economic, and political issues that must be addressed for the movement  
to develop and grow.
• Renewableenergyandfinancialservicesareamongthemostpromisinggrowthareas 
for democratic enterprise.
Essay/discussion questions
•  Assess the current status of democratic enterprises in your community. How many are there? 
Were you aware of their existence before conducting this research? If not, what does that say 
about education policy?
• Howmightacasebemadetogovernmentforsupport(financialandlegislative)fordemocratic
enterprises?
Useful resources
Big Society Network - http://thebigsociety.co.uk/.
Beyond Grey Pinstripes - http://www.beyondgreypinstripes.org/.
People and Planet - http://peopleandplanet.org/.
Co-operative Global News Hub - http://www.thenews.coop/.
Co-operatives UK 2012 - http://www.uk.coop/2012 .
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Epilogue
Theglobalfinancialcrisishasshakenpeople’sfaithinthefreemarketandtheinvestor-owned,
profitmaximisingfirmcreatingagroundswellofsupportforalternativemodelsofenterprise. 
Inresponsetouncertaintiesintheeconomicclimate,Borzagaandothersargueforthebenefits 
that will arise from having greater economic plurality. Co-operatives and social enterprises are 
unlikely to replace capitalist enterprise entirely; however, they should play a stronger role in  
the current economic system. Plurality in the business world is an antidote to the damage that  
is caused by having one dominant model of enterprise.1 Gibson-Graham describes the role  
of co-operatives as ‘enabling ethical economies’.2
Ofcourse,thefinancialcrisispresentsaveryrealthreattoenterprisesofallkinds.Muchneeded
credit for businesses is dwindling, real wages are declining in many countries, and the spending 
power of the vast majority of citizens has been drastically reduced due to the austerity budgets 
enacted throughout the European Union. Now, more than ever, we need to remember that 
enterprising and entrepreneurial behaviour can be a collective activity which takes concern  
for community and ethical approaches on board.
TheUnitedNation'sannouncementthat2012istheInternationalYearofCooperatives(IYC)
provides the perfect opportunity to communicate the message that co-operatives are successful, 
values-based organisations owned by their members. The IYC has three main objectives:
•  To increase awareness about cooperatives and their contributions to socio-economic 
development and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.
•  To promote growth of co-operatives to address common economic needs and for socio-economic 
empowerment.
•  To establish appropriate policies by encouraging governments and regulatory bodies to ensure 
essential frameworks are in place that are conducive to co-operative formation and growth.3
It is important that the 2012 IYC not only be a celebration of co-operative achievement to date,  
but also serve as a springboard for developing the co-operative movement into a greater force  
for the future.
1.  C. Borzaga, S. Depedri, and E. Tortia, ‘Organisational Variety in Market Economies and the Role of Co-operative and Social 
Enterprises: A Plea for Economic Pluralism’ Journal of Co-operative Studies 44 (2011): 19–30. See pp. 20–2. The same authors 
also outline their proposal for greater economic plurality in another paper: C. Borzaga, S. Depedri, and E. Tortia, ‘The Role of 
Cooperative and Social Enterprises: A Multifaceted Approach for an Economic Pluralism’ Trento: EURICSE Working Paper, 2009.
2.  J. K. Gibson-Graham, ‘Enabling Ethical Economies: Cooperativism and Class’ Critical Sociology 29 (2003): 123–62. See p. 157.
3.  United Nations, ‘What are the Objectives of the Year?’ http://social.un.org/coopsyear/objectives-of-the-year.html, accessed 29 
September 2011.
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Glossary
Articles of Association:  
asetofrulesthatdefinethestructureofaUKcompanyandmustberegisteredwithCompanies
House for a business to be incorporated.
Assets:  
afinancialtermfortheeconomicresourcesabusinesspossesses.Assetscanbetangible 
orintangiblebuttheymustproducevalueforthefirm.
Bylaw:  
astandingrule,notincludedinthearticlesofassociation,whichspecifiesoperationalpractice 
and policy of the co-operative.
Capital:  
aneconomictermforaresourcethatisusedtoproducegoodsandservices.Fromafinancial
perspective,capitalreferstothemoneyrequiredbyabusinesstofinanceitsoperations.
Capitalism:  
aneconomicsystemwherethemeansofproductionareprivatelyownedandoperatedforprofit.
Common ownership:  
aprinciplethatensuresthattheassetsofanorganisationareheldindivisibly(i.e.cannot 
be distributed amongst individual owners).
Common shares:  
are forms of corporate equity ownership. Individuals who purchase common shares in an 
organisationaregrantedtherighttoparticipateingovernanceandprofitinproportiontothe
amount of shares the
CommunityInterestCompany(CIC): 
a new company form intended as a brand for social enterprise in the UK. It can be registered  
asacompanylimitedbyguarantee(CLG)orcompanylimitedbyshares(CLS),haslimited 
profitdistributionandanassetlock.
Competitive advantage:  
astrategicbenefitoneorganisationhasoveritscompetitors.Competitiveadvantagesarecreated 
by providing more value to your customers than your competitors can.
Consumer co-operative:  
a co-operative whose membership is made up of those who purchase the goods/services  
of the business.
Conventional business/company:  
see investor-owned business.
Co-operative advantage: thestrategicbenefitco-operativeshaveoverotherformsofenterprise; 
a co-operative advantage is derived from the unique ownership and governance structure of  
the business.
Co-operativeDevelopmentScotland(CDS): 
a subsidiary of Scottish Enterprise, CDS provides support and development services to the  
co-operative sector in Scotland.
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Co-operatives UK:  
the UK-wide trade body that campaigns for co-operation and works to promote, develop and unite 
co-operative enterprises.
Corporate governance:  
a system for directing, controlling and administering companies.
Credit union:  
atypeofnot-for-profit,consumerco-operativethatprovidessavings,creditandotherfinancial
services to its members.
Democracy:  
a system of government where citizens are able to participate in the voting process  
on an equal basis.
Direct democracy:  
a form of democracy where people collectively make decisions for themselves, rather than through 
elected representatives.
Director:  
anelectedorappointedmemberofthegoverningbody(boardofdirectors)ofanorganisation.
Dividend:  
a payment made by a business to its shareholders. Payments are usually based on the amount  
of shares an investor owns. In co-operative terms, dividend refers to the share of surplus a member 
receivesfromtheco-operative(seePatronagerefund).
Employee-owned businesses:  
organisations that are partially or entirely owned by their employees.
Equity:  
another term for the shares or stock in a company. It can also refer to the concept of fairness.
Ethics:  
a branch of philosophy that examines the morality of decisions. It has been applied to business  
tocreatethefieldofprofessionalethics.
Fair trade:  
a social movement that campaigns for the equitable remuneration of producers in developing 
countries.UnderFairtradecertification,producersareguaranteedapremiumpricefortheir
produce.
Federation:  
a union of autonomous organisations that associate together for a common purpose. Examples  
of co-operative federations include Co-operatives UK and the International Co-operative Alliance.
Hybrid co-operative:  
a co-operative whose membership consists of more than one type of member e.g. a co-operative 
whose members are drawn from consumers and workers. May also be referred to as a multi-
stakeholder co-operative.
InternationalCo-operativeAlliance(ICA): 
an independent, non-governmental association which unites, represents and serves co-operatives 
worldwide. Founded in 1895, ICA has 269 member organisations from 97 countries active in all 
sectors of the economy.
169Democratic Enterprise: Ethical business for the 21st century
Industrial and Provident Society:  
an organisation that is registered under the Industrial and Provident Societies Act in the UK.  
Co-operatives have traditionally registered as Industrial and Provident Societies.
Industrial democracy: 
an arrangement which involved workers making decisions, sharing responsibility and authority  
in the workplace.
Investor-owned business:  
anorganisationwhereownership,controlandbeneficiaryrightsaregrantedtothosewhoinvest
capital in the business.
Member:  
a person that belongs to a group or organisation. Co-operative members jointly own and 
democratically control the enterprise.
MondragónCorporation(MC): 
a network of primarily worker co-operatives in the Basque region of Northern Spain. See chapter  
6 for more details.
Patronage refund:  
the entitlement a member has to the surplus generated by the co-operative; a member’s share  
of the surplus is based on the amount of trade they conducted with the co-operative in a year.  
It is more commonly referred to as ‘dividend’ in the UK.
Preference shares:  
special types of share that usually carry no voting rights but have priority over ordinary shares 
whenitcomestothedistributionofdividends(orassetsinthecaseofdissolution).
Price/earnings ratio:  
ameasureofthepricepaidforasharerelativetotheannualnetincomeorprofitearnedbythefirm
per share.
Primary co-operative:  
a co-operative that serves its members directly. An example of a primary co-operative would  
be a local co-operative that sells groceries directly to its members.
Producer co-operative:  
a co-operative whose membership is made up of those who sell their goods/services  
to the business.
Profit/surplus: 
the amount of revenue left over after all costs, depreciation and taxes have been taken into account. 
Inco-operatives,theprofitgeneratedbythebusinessisknownasthesurplus.
Proportionality:  
the practice of measuring and distributing effort/reward based on the ratio of one element  
to another. Co-operatives distribute surpluses based on the amount of input a member contributed 
to the business.
Representative democracy:  
a form of democracy where decisions are made on behalf of people by elected representatives.
Rochdale Pioneers:  
aconsumersocietyestablishedinthetownofRochdale,Englandin1844,widelycitedasthefirst
exampleofaco-operativeenterpriseasweknowittoday(withvaluesandprinciples).
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Rules:  
the equivalent term in an Industrial & Provident Society co-operative for the Articles of Association 
of a company.
Scotmid:  
the largest independent consumer co-operative in Scotland.
Secondary co-operative:  
a co-operative whose membership consists of other co-operatives. The Co-operative Group was 
originallysetuppurelyasasecondaryco-operative(theCo-operativeWholesaleSociety)toservice
the buying needs of its consumer society members.
Social enterprise:  
a form of organisation whose primary purpose in trading is to achieve social objectives rather than 
maximiseprofits.
Society:  
a term for an organisation that is established under the Industrial and Provident Societies  
or Friendly Societies Acts in the UK
The Co-operative Group:  
the largest consumer co-operative in the world with over six million members, focusing primarily 
onretailandfinancialservicesintheUK.
The Fenwick Weavers:  
the earliest co-operative enterprise in the world for which there are full records, the Fenwick 
Weavers’ Society in Ayrshire, Scotland, was established in 1761 and began co-operative trading  
in foodstuffs in 1769.
Trustee:  
aperson,whoseroleisdefinedinlaw,whomanagesanasset(whichisheldinatrust)onbehalf 
ofabeneficiary.
Unallocated patronage:  
the amount of surplus generated by member trade that is retained by a co-operative for business 
purposes. The members have no claim to this portion of the surplus.
Unincorporated:  
refers to an organisation that has not registered its Rules or Articles of Association with the 
relevant legal body. Individuals in an unincorporated organisation remain personally liable for  
any losses/debt.
Worker co-operative:  
a co-operative whose membership consists of those who work in the business.
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Key web resources
Caseplace   www.caseplace.org
Co-operative Development Scotland www.cdscotland.co.uk
Co-operative News  www.thenews.coop
Co-operatives UK  www.uk.coop
Co-operative Education Trust Scotland www.cets.coop
Employee Ownership Association www.employeeownership.co.uk
European Federation of Employee Share Ownership www.efesonline.org
International Co-operative Alliance www.ica.coop
John Lewis Partnership www.johnlewispartnership.co.uk
Mutuo   www.mutuo.co.uk
National Center for Employee Ownership www.nceo.org
National Cooperative Business Association www.ncba.coop
Ohio Employee Ownership Center www.oeockent.org
Scottish Agricultural Organisation Society www.saos.co.uk
Sustainable Employment www.sustainableemployment.eu
UK Society for Co-operative Studies www.co-opstudies.org
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The United Nations has declared 2012 to be the 
International Year of Co-operatives in recognition  
of the impact that co-operative enterprise has on 
more than three billion people across the globe.  
Co-operatives contribute to national and local 
economies in virtually every country by championing 
an ethical approach to business underpinned  
by internationally agreed values and principles.  
Yet despite the wide-ranging successes of co-
operatives,infinancialtermsaswellasinthe
development of sustainable communities, the study 
of these democratic forms of enterprise remains 
surprisingly absent from the curricula of most 
university business schools around the world.
Designed primarily for undergraduate students, 
Democratic Enterprise provides an introductory-
level analysis of democratic models of enterprise, 
namely cooperatives and employee-owned 
businesses. A supplement to any course that deals 
with these topics, it also stands alone as a template 
for academics who wish to incorporate material 
on democratic models of enterprise into courses 
relating to economics, business studies, sustainable 
development, enterprise, and organisational theory 
and behaviour.
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